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In the decade of the 1980s, the bankruptcy reorganization of
companies worth hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars
became commonplace. The companies that sought the protection
of the bankruptcy courts were usually in tremendous upheaval.'
Under bankruptcy law, it fell to the incumbent managers to decide
1 At the time they filed, the majority of the 43 companies we studied were losing
millions, or tens of millions, of dollars each month. See Table I, infra note 25.
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how to respond to these problems. Their decisions were often
between courses of action that would serve either the interests of
their shareholders or the interests of their creditors, one at the
expense of the other.2 For example, upon filing, the management
of Continental Airlines suspended all flights, locked its union work
force out, and resumed operations only as it was able to hire
nonunion replacements. At the time they did so, there was
considerable doubt as to whether the plan could work. From the
standpoint of the company, it was a desperate gamble.3 But from
the standpoint of the shareholders who were firmly in control of the
company, it was hardly a gamble at all. The alternative was a
liquidation in which they would recover virtually nothing; the
reopening would be almost entirely at the risk of creditors. Taking
the opposite course late in the Manville Corporation bankruptcy,
management of the nearly solvent company sided with its commer-
cial creditors against its shareholders. Management backed a
reorganization plan that left the old shareholders with only a
nominal interest in the emerging company, while simultaneously
providing the unsecured bank lenders payment in full-with interest
those lenders could not have won in a contested hearing.4 The
deal relegated the asbestos health claimants to the position of
shareholders in the emerging company, a position that quickly
proved inadequate to satisfy their mounting claims.
5
Decisions such as these raise two important questions in stark
relief. The first is who the management of a reorganizing company
is normatively supposed to represent. Surprisingly, neither the
law6 nor legal theory7 can provide a consistent, coherent answer.
2 See infra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
3 See Bryan Burrough et al., Continental Air Reopens in Chaos With Reduced Flights,
Lower Fares, WALL ST.J., Sept. 28, 1983, at 31.
4 See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 634 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
5 See Stephen Labaton, Asbestos Trust Fund ofManville Queried, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,
1990, at DI; Stephen Labaton, Manville Trust Fund in Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
1989, at DI; Cynthia F. Mitchell, Manville Trust May Be Forced Into Stock Sale, WALL
ST.J., Feb. 8, 1989, at A6.
6 For example, the case law is in conflict as to whether the shareholders of an
insolvent company are entitled to vote managers out of office during reorganization
if the managers do not serve the interests of shareholders. See infra notes 93-108 and
accompanying text.
7 Those legal theorists who have recently addressed the question have tended
toward the view that the management of an insolvent, reorganizing company should
be loyal to creditors, not shareholders. See Douglas G. Baird, Fraudulent Conveyances,
Agency Costs, and Leveraged Buyouts, 20J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 n.18 (1991) ("When the
firm becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duty of the directors shifts from the sharehold-
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The second is who these managers in fact represent. Perhaps
because there is a well-developed body of theory that purports to
demonstrate that the managers of solvent companies will act in the
shareholders' best interests, most leading theorists simply assume
that the same is true for insolvent and reorganizing companies. In
their models, they assume managers and shareholders to be in
perfect alliance. 8  Others, equally without empirical data or
supporting analysis, assert that managements act on behalf of
creditors once a company becomes insolvent.
9
We address both questions in this Article. We show empirically
that neither the assumption of shareholder control nor the
assumption of creditor control is correct. The process by which the
behavior of managements of insolvent, reorganizing companies is
influenced and controlled is complex and in many ways haphazard.
It differs from case to case. The results are often troubling from a
normative perspective. We also show that creditor and shareholder
influence over management frequently prevents companies from
maximizing their value.
ers to the creditors."); Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Bargaining After the
Fall and the Contours of the Absolute Priority Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 738, 762 n.58
(1988); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11
Reorganization Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461, 463 (1992) (arguing that "unsecured
creditors, rather than shareholders, should be the voters in any directorial election").
We discuss and criticize this point of view infra notes 328-39 and accompanying text.
8 For example, even though the Bankruptcy Code gives the exclusive right to file
a plan to the debtor-in-possession, see 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1988), with the result that it
is exercised by management, Bebchuk considers it to be in the hands of shareholders.
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 775, 799 (1988) ("Under the existing rules, the equityholders usually have the
exclusive right for a specified period of time to file (and seek confirmation of) a
reorganization plan."); see also LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & HowARD F. CHANG, BARGAIN-
ING AND THE DIVISION OF VALUE IN CORPORATE REORGANIZATION 4,18 (Harvard Law
School Program in Law and Economics No. 80, 1990) ("As already noted, the
equityholders have control over the agenda for the first six months of bargaining, and
the courts often extend this period."). Others are only slightly more cautious. See
Julian R. Franks & Walter N. Torous, An Empirical Investigation of U.S. Firms in
Reorganization, 44 J. FIN. 747, 748 (1989) ("[Elquityholders ... possess the
prerogative to enter and protract the reorganization process while their managerial
representatives retain control of the firm.") (emphasis added); MarkJ. Roe, The Voting
Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE LJ. 232, 266-67 (1987) ("[T]he current
framework for reorganization gives managers, presumed to be allies of shareholders,
substantial control over the reorganization process.").
9 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26J.L. &
ECON. 395, 404 (1983) ("[S]hareholders lose the controlling votes when their shares
are under water [sic]; managers become answerable to other investors.").
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In recent years it has become fashionable to argue in the
strongest terms that management has too much power in chapter 11
proceedings and that they exercise it in a self-serving manner.
1 0
These issues have a significant historical dimension. Prior to 1939,
the structure for governance of reorganizing companies was much
the same as it is today. Managers remained in office and played a
major role in determining the course of the reorganization. Under
the direction of William 0. Douglas, the Securities and Exchange
Commission conducted a number of empirical studies of the
operation of the reorganization process. The SEC concluded that
managements responsible for the companies' problems tended to
remain in office and act in a self-serving manner to the detriment
of public investors.
1 1
In 1939, the system was reformed by providing that upon the
filing of a reorganization case by a large, publicly held company, the
company's management would be replaced by a court-appointed
10 In a recent article, Bradley and Rosenzweig ask "is Chapter 11 ... appropriately
viewed as a mechanism that permits managers to abridge contractual agreements with
creditors and other stakeholders in order to enhance their own welfare?" Michael
Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Casefor Chapter 11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043,
1048 (1992) [hereinafter Bradley & Rosenzweig, Untenable Case]. They answer their
own question in an article about their article. See Michael Bradley & Michael
Rosenzweig, Time to Scuttle Chapter 11, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1992, at F13 ("[W]e believe
that the principal beneficiaries of Chapter 11 are corporate managers .... Chapter
11... in fact serves mainly to protect manager'sjobs."). Other commentators echo
the same views:
During the Eighties, Chapter 11 became... a powerful tool of megacorp-
orations .... Chapter 11 permitted megacorporations... [and] the men
who ran them to escape the consequences of their greed and incompetence.
If viewed as a government program to provide large amounts of aid to giant
corporations, the Bankruptcy Code has been one of the most successful
federal programs.
LAURENCE H. KALLEN, CORPORATE WELFARE: THE MEGABANKRUPTCIES OF THE 80s
AND 90S at ix (1991); see also id. at 468 ("Often ... one must wonder just what has
happened [in a chapter 11 proceeding]. The answer is simple: thejobs, salaries, and
perks of those in the executive suite... have been 'saved.'"); KevinJ. Delaney, Power,
Intercorporate Networks, and "Strategic Bankruptcy," 23 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 643, 663
(1989) (asserting that characterizing bankruptcy as simply an instrument employed
to achieve economic efficiency ignores its use to preserve power by management,
among others); Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in
Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 34 ARIz. L. REV. 89, 131 (1992) (describing the potential
desire of managers to prolong reorganization in an effort to retain their jobs).
1 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT ON THE STUDY & INVESTIGATION OF THE
WORK, ACTIvmEs, PERSONNEL AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION
COMMrrEES (1937-40) pt. 8 at 319-20 [hereinafter DOUGLAS REPORT]. For more
information about this study and the corporate reorganization system about which it
reported, see infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
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trustee. 12 Perhaps predictably, the managements of ailing compa-
nies chose not to surrender their control to trustees. Chapter X of
the Bankruptcy Act, which embodied the 1939 reforms, fell into
disuse. Congress repealed chapter X in the "reform" of 1979.1'
The system returned to the pre-1939 practice under which the
managers of the debtor company remained in office and trustees
were rarely appointed. The flow of large, publicly held companies
through the bankruptcy reorganization process resumed slowly at
first, but now has built to a steady procession. 14 The question is
whether this resumption of reorganization under management
control has been accompanied by a resumption of the management
abuses that led to the 1939 reform. Our conclusions on this point
are less certain. We have found that managements are often able
to exploit power for their own benefit. But we have also found that
management is highly vulnerable to the power of others. That
vulnerability is perhaps best demonstrated by the high rate of
turnover of both the managements that presided over the compan-
ies' declines and the managements that replaced them.
15
This Article is based on an empirical study of the forty-three
largest publicly held companies to file and complete a bankruptcy
reorganization between 1979, when the new Code became effective,
and 1988.16 We have attempted to discover the actual practices
12 See Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 885 (1938).
13 See Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 401,92 Stat. 2549,2682 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1501 (1988)).
14 The best information on the rate of bankruptcy filings by publicly held
corporations is provided by the SEC, which maintains a list of all companies with
publicly held securities that file a chapter 11 petition. Those lists show that the rate
of filings increased substantially during the first half of the 1980s and thereafter
leveled off. For publicly held companies claiming assets of $100 million or more at
filing, there were only two filings in fiscal year 1980, but this number had risen to 14
by fiscal year 1986 and has since remained at about that level. In fiscal year 1990, the
most recent year for which we have data, there were 17 such filings. See Securities
& Exchange Comm'n, Public Companies Filing Chapter 11 Petitions (unpublished
data, on file with authors).
15 These conclusions are based on the empirical study described in the next
paragraph of the text. Our findings in this respect are reported infra notes 187-224
and accompanying text.
16 This project was designed to discover what is happening in the so-called
"megabankruptcies." We studied all cases filed after October 1, 1979 (the effective
date of the new Bankruptcy Code), in which a plan was confirmed before March 15,
1988, if the debtor reported at least $100 million in assets in its petition and had at
least one issue of debt or equity security registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. A primary area of inquiry in this research has been the process of plan
negotiation and confirmation, with special attention paid to the fate ofjunior creditor
and shareholder classes. Our findings in this regard are reported in Lynn M. LoPucki
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with respect to corporate governance in these kinds of cases. In the
course of our study we collected and reviewed documents from the
court files, 17 other publicly available information concerning the
debtor corporations such as SEC filings, and newspaper and journal
articles about both the companies and the cases. We also conducted
more than 120 personal interviews with lawyers who played key
roles in these cases. Many of our conclusions about management's
role in these cases are based on these interviews.
1 8
Part I of this Article describes the context in which the issues of
corporate governance typically arise and the common sources of
conflict among management, shareholders, and creditors. We also
review other studies which bear on the corporate governance issues
we address. Part II describes the sources of management power and
the means by which that power is limited or controlled by various
constituencies. In Part III, we examine the uses managements made
of their power. We attempt to assess how much power manage-
ments had and for whose benefit they applied it. In Parts II and III,
our discussion is informed both by theoretical perspectives that
would attempt to predict a priori how management should behave
and our empirical findings on how they in fact did behave. In Part
IV we evaluate a proposal to avoid the problem of corporate
governance by requiring an auction sale of the company shortly
after the filing of the case. We express serious doubt. Part V
addresses the normative question that lies at the center of the
& William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization
of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 178 (1990) [hereinafter
LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share]. In a second article, we reported
on forum shopping practices in these cases and suggested possible legislative
responses. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum
Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis.
L. REV. 11, 57-58 [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Venue Choice]. A forthcoming
article will report on the levels of success achieved in the reorganization cases we
studied. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
May 1993) [hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Patterns]; see also Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625, 625-28 (1991)
[hereinafter LoPucki & Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down] (advocating the extinguish-
ing of shareholder interests in the cases of insolvent debtors).
17 For each case we obtained the court order confirming the plan of reorganiza-
tion, the confirmed plan of reorganization, and the disclosure statement prepared for
that plan.SlThough individual interviews are the source of much of the information we
present here, we do not cite to the interviews because we have guaranteed the
interviewees confidentiality. See also infra notes 184-85 and accompanying text
(discussing the specifics of our interviewing process).
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article: for whose benefit should management govern the large,
publicly held company in bankruptcy reorganization?
I. THE BANKRUPTCY CONTEXT
A. The Legal Procedure for Reorganization
When a corporation is unable to pay its debts as they become
due, one solution may be to "restructure" the debt. The restructur-
ing may be merely a postponement of the time for payment, or it
may include a reduction in the amount owing or conversion of some
of the debt into equity interests. A restructuring may be accom-
plished without the filing of a bankruptcy reorganization case, but
there are advantages in filing. First, in bankruptcy reorganization
cases, specified majorities of creditors can bind dissenting minori-
ties of the same class through voting.19 No corresponding power
to bind dissenters exists in the absence of bankruptcy. 20 Second,
the automatic stay protects the debtor from the collection efforts of
creditors. 2 1 This protection ordinarily lasts for the duration of the
case. While the stay remains in effect, the debtor can operate its
business and continue receiving the cash flow from operations, but
suspend payment on some or all of its debt. One result is often an
immediate, dramatic improvement in cash flow. Another may be to
increase the pressure on creditors to consent to a debt
restructuring. Once the stay is in effect, often the quickest way for
a creditor to obtain a resumption of payments is to consent to a
plan that restructures the debt.22 There are many other potential
advantages in reorganizing through bankruptcy, rather than an out-
of-court workout.
23
19 This voting procedure is described infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
A bankruptcy reorganization plan can also be approved over the dissent of particular
creditors by what is called a "cram down" procedure, see 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1988),
but approval in this manner is less common in the cases of large, publicly held
companies, see infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
20 See Roe, supra note 8, at 236-46 (discussing how "buoying-up," spurred by
individually acting owners and creditors, subverts a firm's ability to reorganize outside
bankruptcy).
21 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
22 Payments to unsecured creditors on prepetition claims during chapter 11 cases
are rare. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRUPTCY
PROCEEDINGS 542-43 (2d ed. 1991). Judges, however, may approve such payments in
certain cases. See id. at 542 n.14. The rarity of these payments makes chapter 11
markedly different from chapter 7 and chapter 13 proceedings, in which interim
payments are common, even required.
23 Although it is possible to avoid immediate taxation of debt forgiveness as
1993)
678 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:669
In discussing the decisions that must be made as part of a
reorganization, bankruptcy professionals distinguish between the
"business plan" and the "reorganization plan." Though some
businesses have operations that are healthy at the time they file for
reorganization, 24 most are incurring substantial losses from
ongoing operations. 25 The set of decisions by which the company
ordinary income in an out-of-court restructuring, it may be easier to do so in
bankruptcy. See 26 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1988) (providing for nonrecognition of
debt forgiveness income in all bankruptcy cases, but otherwise only if debtor is
insolvent). Particular debtors may find advantage in the bankruptcy rules permitting
rejection of executory contracts, the recovery of property preferentially or
fraudulently transferred by the debtor in the past, or in other provisions of
bankruptcy law. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 365, 547 (1988).
24 The Johns-Manville Corporation is an example from among the cases that we
studied. Shortly after filing for bankruptcy reorganization, the company ran full page
advertisements proclaiming that, aside from the company's liability for injuries from
asbestos, its business was in good health. See N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1982, at D3.
25 Operating losses were reported in 26 of the 41 cases for which we had
information, and in all but three of those 26 cases the losses exceeded $10 million
annually. Though the losses may in part reflect peculiarities in the application of
accounting principles in periods of severe distress, operating losses of that magnitude
suggest that more than a financial restructuring was needed to return the company
to profitability.
TABLE I
OPERATING INCOME IN LAST FISCAL YEAR COMPLETED BEFORE FILING
(in millions)
Net Operating Net Operating
Income Income
Name of Case (Loss) Name of Case (Loss)
Air Florida ($11.29) AM International (20.38)
Amarex 20.83 Anglo Energy (14.03)
Baldwin-United (123.92) Braniff (94.90)
Charter 214.78 Combustion Equipment 4.64
Continental Airlines (34.59) Cook-United (12.84)
Crystal Oil (16.46) Dreco 27.49
Energetics (31.92) EPIC Not Available
Evans Products 12.04 FSC 16.90
HRT 15.75 Itel 75.10
Johns-Manville Corp. (59.27) KDT (2.83)
Lionel 163.66 Marion (17.95)
McLouth (32.03) MGF (60.97)
NuCorp (27.03) Oxoco (55.45)
Penn-Dixie (7.24) Phoenix Steel (7.65)
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hopes to reverse those losses and restore the financial health of the
company is commonly referred to as the "business plan." 26 The
business plan typically calls for the sale or abandonment of
unprofitable parts of the business and reductions in the expenses of
those parts that are retained, but many other kinds of plans are
possible.
The second set of decisions relates to the financial restructuring.
It includes decisions as to what classes of creditors and shareholders
should share in the estate, and what kinds or combinations of cash,
notes, debentures, and shares27 each should receive. This second
set of decisions is embodied in a document called the "plan of
reorganization," which must be "confirmed" by the bankruptcy
court.
2 8
With regard to both sets of decisions, bankruptcy procedure
thrusts management of the debtor corporation into a central role.
Upon the filing of the reorganization case, the debtor corporation
becomes a "debtor in possession."29 Its management continues in
office. Except in those rare cases in which the court orders
otherwise, the debtor-in-possession is authorized to operate the
Pizza Time Theatre (69.76) Revere 19.68
Salant (16.12) Sambo's Restaurants 14.13
Saxon 6.10 Seatrain Lines 17.66
Smith International Not Available Storage Technology (12.30)
Ticoma Boatbuilding (22.76) Technical Equities 15.73
Towle (51.90) Towner (29.38)
White Motor (53.54) Wickes (63.96)
Wilson Foods 23.24
Calculations of net operating income were made using information provided in
the respective company's 10K filed with the SEC, annual report, or Moody's report
for the full financial year prior to filing for bankruptcy. When necessary, we adjusted
what a company reported as operating income to exclude interest payments, income
taxes, or tax benefits.
26 Bankruptcy law does not formally recognize or regulate the "business plan," but
that term is in widespread use among bankruptcy professionals. See, e.g., In re White
Motor Credit Corp., 14 B.R. 584, 587 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) ("[The debtor] has
submitted an extensive 'Business Plan' [to the court].").
27 Sometimes there will also be securities of other corporations, received by the
reorganizing corporation in exchange for a transfer of assets as part of the business
plan, available for distribution as part of the reorganization plan.
28 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123, 1129 (1988). When confirmed by the court, a
reorganization plan alters the legal rights of creditors, shareholders, the debtor, and
other parties to the case. See id. § 1141.
29 See id. § 1101(1).
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business,3 0 and it is the debtor's management who actually do so.
They have authority to determine what changes in business
operations are necessary-that is, to propose and implement a
business plan.3 l The Bankruptcy Code also gives the debtor,
normally acting through its management, the exclusive right to
propose a reorganization plan during the first 120 days of the case
and such additional periods as the court may order.3 2 This right
is generally referred to as the "right of exclusivity" or simply
"exclusivity."
In reorganization cases involving large companies, there are
typically thousands of creditors and shareholders who are "parties
in interest," with the right to participate. In the aggregate, the
interests of these creditors and shareholders are likely to be
sufficient to warrant the costs of monitoring the debtor and
participating in the reorganization case. Yet the interest of any
particular creditor or shareholder is likely not to be sufficient to
warrant the cost of that creditor or shareholder's participation. As
it is usually expressed in economic theory, the creditors and
shareholders have a "collective action" problem.
3 3
To deal with this problem, the Bankruptcy Code provides for
the appointment of committees of creditors and equity holders to
represent parties similarly situated. With the approval of the court,
the committees can hire professionals to represent them, including
attorneys, accountants, and financial advisers.3 4 The fees of these
professionals are paid by the debtor corporation,3 5 effectively
passing these costs on to some or all of the persons who will share
in distributions under the reorganization plan. These committees
have the right to consult with management, to participate in the
formulation of a reorganization plan, and to challenge manage-
ment's actions in court.
3 6
30 See id. §§ 1107(a), 1108.
-3 For limitations on management's authority over the business plan, see infra
notes 83-86 & 134-38 and accompanying text
32 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) (1988). The exclusivity period is commonly extended
in cases involving large, publicly held companies. See infra notes 88-90 and
accompanying text.
33 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (1971)
("[E]ven if all of the individuals in a large group are rational and self-interested, and
would gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common interest or objective,
they will still not voluntarily act to achieve that common or group interest.").
34 See 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988).
35 See id. § 330(a).
36 See id. § 1103(c).
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The Code requires that an unsecured creditors' committee be
appointed in every case.8 7 In fact, such a committee was appoint-
ed and organized in all but one of the cases in our study.38 The
U.S. Trustee has the authority to appoint such additional commit-
tees of creditors or shareholders as the U.S. Trustee deems
appropriate, and upon request of a party in interest, the court may
order the appointment of additional committees. 39  Equity
committees were appointed in twenty-two of the forty-three cases in
our study (fifty-one percent),40  and additional committees
representing particular groups of creditors were appointed in
twenty of the forty-three cases.
41
The Bankruptcy Code's procedures for creditor and shareholder
participation in the approval of reorganization plans are elaborate.
Before a plan can be submitted for a vote, the court must approve
a disclosure statement explaining the proposed plan and providing
other useful information to assist creditors and shareholders in
voting on the plan. 42 A proposed plan must divide claims and
interests into classes,43 with all claims or interests in a class treated
alike.4 4 Votes on the plan are tallied by class. A class of claims
has accepted a plan if the holders of at least two-thirds in amount
and more than half in number of the allowed claims voting in the
class have accepted the plan.45 A class of interests has accepted a
7 See id. § 1102(a)(1).
38 In the one case in which no unsecured creditors' committee was appointed,
EPIC, there was one very large unsecured creditor which was also the principal
shareholder of the debtor. This creditor was going to participate in the case whether
or not a committee was appointed. There was no collective action problem with
respect to representation of its position. In EPIC there were many secured creditors
with modest claims and a committee was appointed to represent their interests.
39 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1988). Through most of the period of our study, the
U.S. Trustee program was in effect in only 18 districts, including the important
jurisdiction of the Southern District of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 581(a) (1982)
(amended 1986). In other districts, a bankruptcy judge appointed the committees.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1982) (amended 1984 & 1986).
40 See LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share, supra note 16, at 139.
Another recent study of large reorganization cases reports the formation of 29 equity
committees in 68 cases (43%). See Brian L. Betker, Management Changes, Equity's
Bargaining Power and Deviations from Absolute Priority in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies
at 11 (Oct. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
41 A case-by-case breakdown of these committees appears at LoPucki & Whitford,
Bargaining Over Equity's Share, supra note 16, at 139.
42 See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988).
43 See id. § 1123(a)(1).
44 See id. § 1123(a)(4).
45 See id. § 1126(c).
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plan if the holders of at least two-thirds in amount of the allowed
interests voting in the class have accepted the plan.
46 If all
impaired classes accept the plan, and it satisfies other statutory
requirements, it will be confirmed and modify the legal rights of
even those who voted against it.
47
If some impaired classes, but less than all,48 reject the plan, the
bankruptcy judge can confirm it nevertheless, if it is "fair and
equitable" and does not "discriminate unfairly" against the rejecting
classes. 49 To be "fair and equitable," the plan must comply with
what is known as the absolute priority rule-meaning either that the
dissenting classes are paid in full or that classes with lesser priority
than the dissenting classes receive nothing.50 When a plan is
confirmed despite a class' rejection of it, the plan is said to be
"crammed down" against the class.
In the bankruptcy reorganizations of large, publicly held
companies, plans are rarely crammed down against resisting classes
of creditors or shareholders. There is a widespread belief among
practitioners that cram down is expensive and impractical. 51 As
a consequence, plan proponents place considerable emphasis on
winning the vote of all affected classes. Because the members of a
class are not likely to vote for a plan opposed by the committee
representing that class, 52 plan proponents almost invariably
attempt to negotiate the endorsements of the committees. As will
be explored further in Parts II and III, committees can sometimes
employ the leverage they gain from their role in the reorganization
46 See id. § 1126(d).
47 See id. § 1129(a). Among the other statutory requirements is that each
dissenting claimant receive under the plan at least as much as it would receive in a
liquidation. See id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii).
48 The plan must be approved by at least one class of impaired creditors. See id.
§ 1129(a)(10). A class is not impaired if it receives cash equal to the amount of its
claims or if the plan does not alter its contractual rights other than curing previous
defaults. See id. § 1124. So long as the distributions proposed are in accord with the
absolute priority rule, the plan is confirmable despite the opposition of all other
creditors and shareholders. See id. § 1129(b).
49 See id. § 1129(b).
50 A corollary of the absolute priority rule, not expressly stated in the Code, is
that classes senior to the dissenting class(es) should not receive more than full
payment. See Kenneth N. Klee, Cram Down H, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 229,231-32 (1990).
51 See LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining overEquity 's Sharesupra note 16, at 137-41,
144.
52 Committee recommendations with respect to a proposed plan are frequently
reported in the disclosure statement that is distributed before the vote.
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plan approval process to influence management with respect to
other issues of corporate governance.
B. The Basic Conflicts in a Reorganization
The process of corporate governance is, among other things, a
process of conflict resolution. In this section, we examine the basic
conflicts among managers, creditors, and shareholders that
managers are commonly called upon to resolve. Three issues tend
to predominate: (1) what levels of investment risk should the
company seek while it determines whether or how to reorganize; (2)
to what degree should the assets of the company be liquidated
rather than reorganized; and (3) what mix of cash, debt and equity
should be distributed and to whom?
1. Level of Risk in Investment Policy
Senior interests are often in sharp conflict with juniors as to the
level of risk an insolvent company should accept in its investment
policy.53 To illustrate, assume that the value of a debtor's assets
are equal to the amount of its liabilities, all of which are unse-
cured.54 If the assets are preserved and invested conservatively
during the reorganization case and distributions are then made in
accord with the absolute priority rule, creditors will recover
approximately the full amounts of their claims55 and shareholders
will recover little or nothing. If the assets are invested aggressively,
they might increase or decline in value. If they decline, the
shareholders will recover nothing and the creditors will receive less
53 This basic creditor-shareholder conflict exists in all insolvency situations. For
further exposition, see Jeremy I. Bulow &John B. Shoven, The Bankruptcy Decision,
9 BELLJ. EcON. 437, 43940 (1978); Michael C.Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. EcON.
305, 334-37 (1976); Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State
Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 WIs. L. REv. 311, 335-36.
-" The liabilities are assumed to be unsecured in order to avoid confusion between
the vulnerability of secured and unsecured creditors discussed here and the
vulnerability of secured creditors under the rule of United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371-73 (1988) (holding that secured creditors
are not entitled to accrue or collect interest on undersecured claims).
55 Assuming that the assets have the same value in liquidation as in reorganization,
the creditors would be entitled to interest on their claims under the best interests of
creditors test set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1988) because they could recover
that interest if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7. See id. § 726(a)(5). The
proceeds of a conservative investment policy would probably be the approximate
amount of that interest, so the proceeds essentially would go to creditors.
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than they would have if the assets had been invested conservatively.
If the assets increase in value, the creditors will still recover only the
full amounts of their claims, while the benefit of the increase
accrues to shareholders. It can thus be seen that when a marginally
solvent company engages in high risk investment, the risks are
borne primarily by creditors56 while the benefits accrue primarily
to shareholders.
This splitting of the risk of loss and the prospect of gain has
profound implications for corporate governance of insolvent and
marginally solvent companies. It will be referred to repeatedly
throughout this Article. At this point, it is sufficient to observe that
under certain commonly occurring circumstances, the holders of
junior interests will have reason to prefer that the company engage
in high risk investments while the holders of senior claims have
reason to prefer the opposite policy.
When free from the control of creditors and shareholders,
managers who wish to retain their jobs57 might have reason to take
either side in this conflict. A manager tainted by the company's
financial problems might prefer to take high risks because only they
could lead to returns sufficiently high to restore the manager to
favor. On the other hand, a manager whose job and company are
not in immediate jeopardy might prefer investments with risks that
are lower than those preferred by the company's investors.
58
56 Holders of shares that would be entitled to no distribution under a strict
application of the absolute priority rule often are able to negotiate a share of a
chapter 11 distribution. See infra note 61. Consequently they have something to lose.
In most circumstances, however, they risk little because deviations in favor of
shareholders from the absolute priority rule in the reorganization cases of large,
publicly held companies are relatively small. See LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over
Equity's Share, supra note 16, at 142 tbl. III.
57 Economic models often equate avoiding liquidation of the company with the
manager's retaining of his or herjob. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and
Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 282 (1991) (employing
a model equating liquidation with "financial ruin"). Our empirical finding that CEO
job loss is common even in successful reorganizations, see infra Table IV
accompanying note 190, leads us to place more weight on the possibility that the CEO
may come to ruin even when the company does not.
58 SeeJohn C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1, 16-24 (1986); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 57 at 286-92.
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2. Reorganization Versus Liquidation
Management often has a career interest in preserving the
company. If the company is sold off, either in small parts or as a
unit, the managers are likely to lose their jobs.59 Reorganization
under their continued management is sometimes the managers' only
means of salvaging their reputations and careers. But it is impor-
tant to realize that not all managers of reorganizing companies have
these concerns. For example, some of the managers of the
companies we studied were hired after the company was in severe
difficulty for the express purpose of liquidating it.60 Whether it
is in the interests of management to liquidate or reorganize will
depend on the circumstances.
The holders of underwater 6 1 claims and interests often have
reason to oppose liquidation until the distributions to them under
a reorganization plan have been fixed. Such holders derive at least
part of their bargaining leverage in plan negotiations from their
ability to dispute the value of the assets continued in their current
use, and therefore the value of the reorganization securities that
would be issued if the company were reorganized rather than
liquidated. Even if market values are available, parties in interest
are permitted to argue that they are incorrect.62 But this leverage
59 In nine of ten cases in our study in which the assets of the company were sold
as a unit, the purchasers immediately installed their own CEOs. See infra Table V
accompanying note 203. Only in the McLouth Steel case did a CEO's tenure in office
continue after a sale of the business. During the McLouth case, the secured creditors
forced the retirement of Gene E. Gann as CEO; Milton Deaner replaced him. Later,
the debtor sold substantially all of the assets, primarily steel mills, to Tang Industries.
Tang operated them as a subsidiary; Deaner continued as CEO of that subsidiary.
0 See infra note 172.
61 We use the colloquial term "underwater" to refer to claims or interests in the
debtor corporation that would be entitled to nothing if the assets of the company,
valued at their liquidation or reorganization values, were distributed in accord with
the absolute priority rule. We avoid reference to such claims or interests as
"worthless" because they are not. Underwater claims retain resale value during the
reorganization case because they usually share in the distributions under the plan.
See JULIAN R. FRANKS & WALTER N. ToRous, How FIRMS FARE IN WORKOUTS AND
CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATIONS 15 (John E. Anderson Graduate Sch. of Management
at UCLA No. 1-91, 1991) ("[A]ll firms in our Chapter 11 sample experience deviations
from the rules of absolute priority."); LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's
Share, supra note 16, at 141-42, 166 (reporting deviations from the absolute priority
rule in favor of equity in 29 of 43 cases (67%)); Brian L. Betker, An Analysis of the
Returns to Stockholders and Bondholders in a Chapter 11 Reorganization 4 (1991)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (reporting deviations from the
absolute priority rule in favor of equity in 42 of 65 cases (65%)).
62 See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Baer, 651 F.2d 1341, 1347-48 (10th Cir. 1980) ("With
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disappears to the extent that the values of assets are fixed through
their liquidation during the case. Reflecting this change in leverage,
in interviews we encountered the adage that "cash goes to creditors;
[only] equity goes to equity."
63
This analysis does not mean that reorganization will be in the
interests of the holders ofjunior claims and interests in every case.
The holders may be so far underwater that they cannot win a share
of the distribution; in that event, they will have no interest in what
becomes of the company.64 Nor does this analysis mean that the
holders of senior claims will necessarily favor liquidation of the
company. If the reorganization value of a grossly insolvent company
is sufficiently in excess of its liquidation value,65 it will be in the
interests of the holders of senior claims to permit reorganization,
a newly reorganized company coming from the throes of bankruptcy, the actual
market value of a share of stock may be considerably less than the pro rata portion
of the going-concern value of the company represented by that stock.").
63 In only two cases, Combustion Equipment and KDT, was anything other than
common stock distributed to common stockholders. In those two cases, the
distributions were nominal. The common stockholders in Combustion Equipment
received $315,000 in cash; the common stockholders in KDT received $1,664,868 in
cash. All values reported in this Table are present values as of the day after
confirmation of the plan of reorganization. To the extent possible, we based them
on actual trading values after confirmation. The methods by which we determined
their present values are discussed in LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's
Share, supra note 16, at 135-36.
The amount of cash distributed to creditors in the cases we studied was more
than a thousand times the amount distributed to shareholders. While a considerable
amount of equity was distributed to creditors as well as equityholders, aside from the
$2 million in cash shown here, former equity holders received all of their distribu-
tions in new equity.
TABLE II
DISTRIBUTIONS TO CREDITORS AND SHAREHOLDERS
(in millions)
Distributions Distributions made in
Distributions made in debt the equity of the
made in cash obligations emerging company
Total amount
distributed to creditors $2513 $3560 $1691
in 43 cases
Total amount
distributed to common $2 $0 $917
shareholders in 43 cases
64 This possibility is discussed in LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's
Share, supra note 16, at 158-60.
65 The possibility that the reorganization value of companies are never in excess
of their liquidation values is considered infra notes 284-308 and accompanying text.
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even at the price of permitting underwater claims and interests to
share in the distribution, because seniors will be able to capture the
bulk of the going-concern premium.
3. Nature and Beneficiaries of the Distributions
The most evident conflict of interest between different classes
of creditors and shareholders concerns how much value each should
receive in the distribution under the plan. In addition, there can be
conflicts about whether the distributions that are made should
consist of cash, debt, or equity. The distribution will usually consist
of some combination of the three.
The various classes often differ as to the type of property they
prefer to receive. Creditor classes tend to prefer distributions in
cash or debt. If they receive a distribution in equity, many will
quickly sell it,66 and the sale may often be at a discount.6 7 While
most creditors probably prefer cash to debt, that preference appears
to be especially strong among trade creditors. 68  The holders of
underwater equity may believe they can win a bigger distribution if
they accept equity.
69
Most managements can be expected to prefer that substantial
portions of the distributions be made in equity. Cash distributions
immediately deprive the company of liquidity. Though debt
distributions may help a company reduce its future tax liability, they
fix a claim against the company that may later threaten the
managers' jobs. 70 Managers who want to stay in office will want
66 Banks may be required to sell the equity interests they receive. See infra note
168 and accompanying text. Investors who receive stock for bonds may choose to sell
because the stock does not fit their portfolio. Trade creditors are often compelled
to sell by their financial circumstances.
67 Several of our interviewees referred to the "dumping" of reorganization shares
in the period following confirmation of the plan, with the implication that this
dumping depressed prices.
6 In the Revere Copper & Brass case, the confirmed plan of reorganization
offered unsecured creditors a choice between payment in full over time with interest
at 14%, and immediate payment of about 60 to 65 cents on the dollar in cash.
Interviewees reported that institutional lenders generally opted for full payment with
interest while the trade creditors preferred the cash option.
69 See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
70 See Michael C.Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.-
Oct. 1989, at 61, 67 ("[T]he violation of debt covenants creates a board-level crisis
that brings new actors onto the scene, motivates a fresh review of top management
and strategy, and accelerates response.").
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to ensure that the company emerges from reorganization with no
more than a manageable level of debt.
C. Other Studies
Major revisions of the laws governing the procedures for
reorganization were made in 1939 and 1979. The relevance of the
findings from particular studies to the issues discussed in this
Article depends both on the period to which the study relates and
the sizes of the companies studied.
1. Since 1979
For many years after the Bankruptcy Code became effective in
1979, there were no empirical studies of corporate governance in
the bankruptcy reorganization of large, publicly held companies. In
the past few years, however, there has been a flurry of activity,
primarily among finance scholars. A number of these studies bear
on particular aspects of this study, and they are cited as we discuss
those aspects.
Several empirical studies have addressed issues of corporate
governance in the context of the bankruptcy reorganization of
smaller companies. 71 Those studies found that management is
normally the dominant party in a chapter 11 reorganization and
uses its power to retain ownership of the company in disregard of
the absolute priority rule. One reason is that with little at stake, the
unsecured creditors of smaller companies often fail to participate
in the case. If there is a creditors' committee at all, it rarely
manages to engage management in negotiations or exercise
significant control.7 2 A second reason managers are able to
71 See EXEcUTIVE OFFICE FOR U.S. TRUSTEES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN
EVALUATION OF THE U.S. TRUSTEE PILOT PROGRAM FOR BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION
39-87 (1983) [hereinafter ABT STUDY];Jerome R. Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Control:
A Case For Adoption of the Trustee System, 70 MARQ. L. REv. 159, 160-65 (1987). See
generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-System Failure Under Chapter 11
of the Bankruptcy Code? (pts. 1 & 2), 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 247 (1983) (reporting on
an empirical study focusing on the effects of the 1979 changes in bankruptcy
reorganization processes).
72 See ABT STUDY, supra note 71, at 58; LoPucki, supra note 71, at 249-53. Both
of these studies were completed before 1986, when Congress extended the U.S.
Trustee system to all bankruptcy districts. While that change has made some
difference in the ability of management to act in an unfettered manner in chapter 11
proceedings, we doubt that it causes any change in the fundamental conclusions
about how smaller chapter 11 reorganizations proceed.
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dominate small cases is that for various reasons, the companies
depend on the managers for their survival.73 When these manag-
ers are also shareholders, they can often demand creditor acquies-
cence in a plan distributing value to equity-in violation of the
absolute priority rule-as their price for remaining with the
company.
74
There are several reasons to expect that the managers of large,
publicly held companies will have less power and use it for different
ends. Because the stakes are higher, creditors are more likely to
organize committees and participate actively in the case. In fact, the
committees nearly always engage management in intense negotia-
tions. Secondly, it is less likely that continuance of particular
managers in office will be critical to the success of a large, reorga-
nizing company. For example, relations with key suppliers and
customers are not so likely to depend on the continued presence of
a single individual. Finally, while the managers of the companies we
studied commonly owned some shares, in all but a few cases,
75
they were only a small percentage of the total shares outstanding.
So even if it is desirable to retain management, from the creditors'
perspective it is cheaper to reward them by providing advantageous
employment contracts than by providing a distribution to the entire
shareholder class. If management seeks to use its leverage to
reward itself, it may well discover that the easiest avenue to that end
is to ally with creditors and exact its price in the form of
compensation.
76
73 For example, key suppliers or customers may have strong personal relationships
with the incumbent managers. If those managers leave, the suppliers or customers
may go with them.
7 This point was made years ago in Harry G. Guthmann, Absolute Priority in
Reorganization: Some Defects in a Supreme Court Doctrine, 45 CoLUM. L. REV. 739, 741-
44 (1945). The only practical alternative for creditors if management leaves may be
immediate liquidation of the business. This alternative can leave creditors with even
less than they are provided under the plan proposed by the managers.
75 In four cases, Evans Products, Dreco Energy, Charter Company, and
Continental Airlines, a single shareholder held a substantial block of shares and was
active on the board of directors. The dynamic in these cases tended to be more like
the dynamic in smaller reorganization cases. See infra note 242 and accompanying
text.
76 Gilson and Vetsuypens have found that in large cases, CEO compensation is
sometimes tied explicitly to the creditor returns in chapter 11 proceedings, suggesting
that sometimes it is through compensation, rather than distributions under the plan,
that senior interests forge alliances with management. See Stuart C. Gilson & Michael
R. Vetsuypens, CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical
Analysis 21 (Sept. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors); see also
LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share, supra note 16, at 151 n.54;
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2. Between 1939 and 1979
During this period, the statutory framework for corporate
reorganization in bankruptcy was dramatically different. For
publicly held companies, trustees were normally appointed,
displacing managers from at least some of their functions. Partly
for this reason, there were relatively few reorganization proceedings
involving large, publicly held companies. And in any event, what
occurred in those proceedings has little relevance to the corporate
governance issues that are the focus of our study, because the




There are a number of studies of corporate reorganization from
the pre-1939 period.78 The largest and best known is the so-called
Douglas Report, a multi-volume study conducted by the SEC under
the direction of William 0. Douglas. 79  This report focused
Betker, supra note 40, at 24 ("[U]pon leaving office, Manville's chairman/CEO and
president received $1.8 million in severance pay. Manville's officers and directors
owned about .03% of the 24 million share[s] outstanding. The severance pay thus
represented about $250 dollars per share held by top management, yet equity holders
received only about 90 cents per share in the reorganization.").
7 For empirical studies of bankruptcy reorganizations during this period, none
of which focus on the questions addressed in this Article, see EDWARD I. ALTMAN,
CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY IN AMERICA passim (1971); PHILIP B. NELSON, CORPORA-
TIONS IN CRISIS 16-155 (1981); DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY:
PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM passim (1971); James S. Ang & Jess H. Chua, Corporate
Bankruptcy and Job Losses Among Top Level Managers, FIN. MGMT., Winter 1981, at 70.
78 For many years there were no reorganization provisions in the Bankruptcy Act
itself. Corporate lawyers nonetheless devised a reorganization procedure, borrowing
from the equity receivership. Typically in these proceedings management arranged
to remain in control of the business during the period of reorganization. For succinct
summaries of how reorganization proceedings built on the equity receivership
worked, see Theodore Eisenberg, Baseline Problems in Assessing Chapter 11, 43 U.
TORONTO L.J. (forthcoming 1993); E. Merrick Dodd,Jr., Note, Reorganization Through
Bankruptcy: A Remedy for What?, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1100, 1102-10 (1935).
When reorganization procedures were added to the Bankruptcy Act in the 1930s,
the same basic principle of management control was retained. Among empirical
studies of pre-1939 reorganizations, the best known, other than the DOUGLAS REPORT
discussed in this Article, is ARTHUR S. DEWING, CORPORATE PROMOTIONS AND
REORGANIZATIONS (1914).79 See DOUGLAS REPORT, supra note 11. The Report was published in eight parts
over a three year period. Congress had provided for the study in the Securities &
Exchange Act of 1934. See Act of June 6, 1934, ch. 404, § 211, 48 Stat. 881, 909
(codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78jj) (repealed 1987).
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centrally on the role of management in reorganization proceedings.
The report found that management exerted a great deal of control
over the proceeding, and that this power was frequently exercised
in a self-serving manner. Management sought to preserve them-
selves in office, and in doing so frequently thwarted investigations
into whether their own past behavior contributed to the corpora-
tion's financial distress. Another strong theme of the report was
that executives, perhaps in alliance with a few powerful creditors
such as commercial banks, were often able to control the commit-
tees that represented various claimants in the reorganization. This
power was sometimes exercised to the particular disadvantage of
public security holders, who found it difficult to challenge the
fairness of a proposed plan of reorganization supported by
management and the committees representing creditors and
shareholders.
80
There are important differences between the pre-1939 statutory
scheme and the current Bankruptcy Code. Most importantly, in
assigning to the U.S. Trustee the power to appoint committees,81
the current statute attempts to insure that management has little
influence over their composition. Nonetheless, the question of
whether the diagnoses of the Douglas Report apply today remains an
important one for our study.
82
80 The Douglas Report itself is voluminous, but one of the eight reports contains
a summary of the essential findings. See DOUGLAs REPORT, supra note 11, at pt. 8.
There are several contemporaneous commentaries which summarize the essential
findings, of which probably the best is E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., The Securities and
Exchange Commission's Reform Program for Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 38 COLUM. L.
REV. 223 passim (1938); see also John W. Hopkirk, William 0. Douglas-His Work in
Policing Bankruptcy Proceedings, 18 VAND. L. REV. 663, 666-84 (1965) (studying
Douglas's work in the field of bankruptcy and corporate reorganization).
81 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1988).
82 We are not implying our agreement with the criticisms that the Douglas Report
made of the 1930s bankruptcy reorganization system. For our purposes, we consider
the conclusions of the Douglas Report as hypotheses in our study of current
reorganization practice. For a contemporaneous criticism of the Douglas Report, see
Robert T. Swaine, "Democratization" of Corporate Reorganizations, 38 COLUM. L. REv.
256, 259 (1938) ("[T]he [Douglas] Reports fall materially short of the standards
imposed by the Securities Act of 1933 upon security underwriters."). Interestingly,
Swaine anticipated reasons commonly given for the 1979 reforms. In particular, he
was concerned that displacement of management by a court-appointed trustee and
the requirement that all reorganization plans be approved by a court as fair and
equitable would cause undue delay.
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II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF MANAGEMENT POWER
In Part I, we noted that management of the debtor corporation
routinely remains in office after filing and has considerable power
over both the business plan and the reorganization plan. In this
part, we explore these sources of power further and examine the
means by which creditors and shareholders can influence or compel
management to exercise this power in desired ways. In a short
concluding section, we emphasize the potentially important role of
the bankruptcy judge in determining the practical extent of
management power and the manner of its exercise. We present
findings from our empirical study where relevant.
A. Management's Power of Initiative
1. The Business Plan
Management's most fundamental power is its exclusive right to
initiate the business and reorganization plans. This power is most
complete with respect to the business plan. There is no legal
requirement that the business plan, as such, be approved by the
court or even revealed to creditors or shareholders. Management
may simply go about planning the business transactions needed-
such as the sale or closing of particular units, reductions in the
numbers of employees, or institution of new competitive strategies-
much as they would in the absence of bankruptcy.
When the transactions necessary to carry out the business plan
are not "in the ordinary course of business," creditors and share-
holders have the right to notice and a hearing before management
can commit the company.8 3 Examples of the transactions for
which prior notice must be given include: sales of assets outside the
ordinary course of business, borrowing money outside the ordinary
course of business,8 4 and the rejection of any executory contract
existing at the time of filing.8 5 There are no explicit statutory
standards to guide courts when they decide whether to approve
proposed management actions. Generally, however, the courts give
considerable deference to management's "business judgment."86
83 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (1988).
84 See id. § 364(b).
85 See id. § 365(a).
86 See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
While other parties in interest can make suggestions and exert
pressure, only management can initiate the transactions that
constitute the business plan. As long as management remains in
office, they can prevent implementation of an unwanted business
plan.
8 7
2. The Reorganization Plan
Neither management nor the debtor are entitled to vote on a
plan of reorganization. The debtor, however, does have the
exclusive right to propose a plan during the first 120 days of the
reorganization case, and such extensions of that time as the court
may grant for cause.8 8 The bankruptcy judge extended exclusivity
for the duration of the reorganization case for thirty-four of the
forty-three companies we studied.8 9 Only in the remaining nine
cases did creditors or shareholders ever have the opportunity to file
and seek confirmation of a plan not agreed to by management.
9°
So long as management retains the exclusive right to file a plan,
the process of plan proposal and approval goes forward only at a
time and on terms acceptable to management. Management's
87 See Frost, supra note 10, at 129 ("[A]lthough judicial review of particular
decisions provides some degree of control over managerial conduct when the conduct
is affirmative, the system may not address management's failure to act."). Perhaps the
sole exception is that if management's exclusive right to file a reorganization plan is
terminated, other parties could propose and adopt a reorganization plan that
mandated a particular business plan. But as we discuss further in the next section,
exclusivity is seldom terminated in the cases of large, publicly held companies.
88 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1988). The court can also reduce the exclusivity period
to less than 120 days, see id. § 1121(d), but that never happens in large cases.
89 See Table III, infra note 177.
go See Table III, infra note 177. These findings seem to us to be at variance with
the concern expressed by a leading practitioner that the bankruptcy courts are
"eroding" management's bargaining leverage in a chapter 11 by not extending this
exclusive authority routinely. See Harvey R. Miller & Jacqueline Marcus, The
Crumbling Debtor Leverage in Chapter 11 Cases-An Implementation or Perversion of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, in ALI-ABA COMM. ON CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL
EDUC., THE WILLIAMSBURG CONFERENCE ON BANKRUPTCY: CRITIQUE OF THE FIRST
DECADE UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND AGENDA FOR REFORM 447, 472, 469-81
(1988) [hereinafter ALI-ABA, CRITIQUE] ("[T]he evolving case law indicates a growing
rate of erosion of the debtor's maintenance of exclusivity as to plan proposal."). The
principal variable correlating with the removal of exclusivity in our study was not the
number of years over which the case proceeded but the venue of the case. In most
jurisdictions, including the important one of the Southern District of New York,
exclusivity is almost always maintained for the duration of the reorganization of a
large, publicly held company. See LoPucki & Whitford, Venue Choice, supra note 16,
at 30-32 & n.67 .
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ability to delay reorganization by not proposing a plan usually
provides considerable leverage in plan negotiations. Delay imposes
costs on creditors. First, while the case remains pending, the debtor
is required to make only adequate protection payments to secured
creditors, and is rarely permitted to make any payments to
unsecured creditors. Second, creditors usually bear risk of loss
from continuing business operations while the case remains open
that is out of proportion to their possibility of gain.
91
3. Management's Information Advantage
Management also gains considerable power by being better
informed than other interested parties. Management sees informa-
tion on the performance of the business first, is able to devote more
time to the company, and has direct access to and control over the
company employees who generate the information.
B. Creditor and Shareholder Power to Control Management
1. Shareholders' Ability to Remove Management
Absent bankruptcy, the managers of a corporation are appointed
to their offices by the board of directors. Though it might breach
an employment contract to do so, the board of directors is always
free to remove managers. Similarly, shareholders have the unfet-
tered right to remove directors from office. In theory, they do this
by casting their votes at a meeting of shareholders. In practice, they
do it by means of a proxy fight, or, as has become more common in
recent decades, acquiring a controlling block of shares through a
tender offer.
The machinery of corporate democracy is cumbersome, and
serious questions have been raised about its effectiveness in
enabling shareholders to compel management to serve shareholders'
interests. 92 But whether or not shareholders can make effective
91 See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
9 2 See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 277 (1932) ("[T]he shareholder in the modern corporate
situation has surrendered a set of definite rights for a set of indefinite expectations.");
Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1443 (1985) ("The prevailing structure of corporate governance
gives corporate management substantial discretion to reward itself .... ."). But see
Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theoiy of the Firm, 26J.L. & ECON.
375, 387 (1983) (-[W]hen the need arises, dispersed ownership will become
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use of their right to control management, in the financially healthy
corporation there seems to be no doubt that the right exists.
Once the corporation has become insolvent and filed for
reorganization, the shareholders' right to control the corporation
through voting becomes problematic. While the courts continue to
recite that "the right to compel a shareholders' meeting for the
purpose of electing a new board subsists during reorganization
proceedings," 3 they add that the right may be enjoined in cases
of "clear abuse." What constitutes "clear abuse" is not clear.
9 4
sufficiently concentrated to give proper guidance to, perhaps to 'boot' out, an
ineffective management."); J.A.C. Hetherington, Redefining the Task of Corporation
Law, 19 U.S.F. L. REV. 229, 236 (1985) ("Critics of all shades of opinion concerning
the modern business corporation would agree that, separation of ownership or not,
managements of publicly held corporations have in fact continued to strive to
increase corporate profits.").
93 Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In reJohns-Manville Corp.), 801
F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Van Siclen v. Bush (In re Bush Terminal Co.), 78
F.2d 662, 664 (2d Cir. 1935)); see e.g., In re Harper Indus., Inc., 18 B.R. 773, 775
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) ("Replacement of management remains the prerogative of
the Board of Directors (and ultimately the stockholders), and unless impeded by a
court order initiated by action of its creditors ... the Board is free to exercise that
prerogative."); Saxon Indus., Inc. v. NKFW Partners, 488 A.2d 1298, 1300 (Del. 1984)
("[A]bsent other compelling legal or equitable factors, insolvency alone, irrespective
of degree, does not divest the stockholders of a Delaware corporation of their right
to exercise the powers of corporate democracy.").
9 The leading contemporary case is In reJohns-Manville Corp., 801 F.2d 60. On
remand, the bankruptcy court enjoined the shareholder meeting in that case. See
Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In reJohns-Manville Corp.), 66 B.R.
517, 541-42 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). The clear abuse standard pre-dates adoption of
the 1979 Code. See Haugh v. Industries, Inc. (In re Public Serv. Holding Corp.), 141
F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1944) (decided under repealed Chapter X); In reJ.P. Linahan, Inc.,
111 F.2d 590, 592 (2d Cir. 1940) ("[T]he right of the majority of stockholders to be
represented by directors of their own choice ... is paramount and will not be
disturbed unless a clear case of abuse is made out."); AIrac Corp. v. Clement (In re
Alrac Corp.), 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1504 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1975). A number of
recent articles discuss this question. See Mark E. Budnitz, Chapter 11 Business
Reorganizations and Shareholder Meetings: Will the Meeting Please Come to Order, Or
Should the Meeting Be Canceled Altogether?, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1214, 1246 (1990)
(noting that "[s]everal courts have denied shareholder meeting requests upon finding
that the meeting would constitute a clear case of abuse of the traditional shareholder-
director relationship"); Anna Y. Chou, Corporate Governance in Chapter 11: Electing A
New Board, 65 AM. BANKR. LJ. 559, 560-89 (1991) (analyzing case law dealing with
post-bankruptcy shareholder election rights); Michael A. Gerber, The Election of
Directors and Chapter 11-The Second Circuit Tells Stockholders to Walk Softly and Carny
a BigLever, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 295,321 (1987) (recognizing the courts' reluctance to
suspend corporate governance in pre-Code cases); Raymond T. Nimmer & Richard
B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciaty Duties, Business Judgment;
Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEv.J. 1, 60-64 (1989) (discussing the treatment of
"clear abuse").
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The case law generally attempts to distinguish cases in which the
shareholders seek to replace management in order to improve their
leverage in bargaining, which is not considered abuse, from cases in
which the shareholders' attempt to replace management threatens
the success of the reorganization, which is considered abuse.
95
The distinction has not been easy to draw. In In re Johns-
Manville, the bankruptcy court enjoined shareholders from calling
a meeting of shareholders for the stated purpose of installing new
management that would seek a better deal for shareholders. 96 The
court concluded that new management with a mandate to drive a
harder bargain on behalf of shareholders would find it impossible
to obtain the agreement of creditors. The effect of trying, accord-
ing to the court, would have been further delay and, if new
management refused ultimately to accept the deal already offered
by creditors, possible failure of the reorganization and liquidation
of the company. On that basis, the court enjoined the meeting.
97
The decision is a controversial one, and strongly worded arguments
have been made that shareholders should have been able to hold
their meeting.
98
A lone footnote in a Second Circuit opinion in Manville strongly
implied that the shareholders' purpose in seeking to oust manage-
ment mattered only in the cases of solvent debtors. In the far more
common cases of insolvent reorganizing debtors, "denial of the right
to call a meeting would likely be proper [in every case], because the
shareholders would no longer be real parties in interest."9 9 The
footnote is dicta, because at the time it was assumed that the
Manville company was solvent. However, it suggests that sharehold-
ers of the large majority of reorganizing companies should not be
able to meet in any circumstances.
Among the four cases in our study where the matter was
contested, shareholders were denied the right to hold meetings as
often as they were permitted to hold them. In the FSC Corporation
case, the CEO of a grossly insolvent companyI ° ° had become a
95 See In reJohns-Manville Corp., 801 F.2d at 64-67; In re Potter Instruments Co.,
593 F.2d 470, 475 (2d Cir. 1979).
96 See Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In reJohns-Manville Corp.),
66 B.R. 517, 542 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
97 See id. at 536-42.
98 See Budnitz, supra note 94, at 1262-63; Gerber, supra note 94, at 337-56.
99 In reJohns-Manville Corp., 801 F.2d at 65 n.6.
100 The creditors in FSC recovered an average of only 37.6 cents on the dollar.
See LoPucki & Whitford, Bargainingfor Equity's Share, supra note 16, at 142. Though
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bitter adversary of an investor group that owned nearly fifty percent
of the stock.10 1 In an unreported decision, the bankruptcy court
enjoined a meeting of shareholders at which the controlling investor
group intended to elect new directors who would remove the CEO.
The court refused to allow the meeting because it would have cost
as much as $60,000 and would not have been "in the best interests
of the estate." 10 2 The CEO remained in control of the company
for the duration of the case. Under his stewardship, the company
proposed and obtained confirmation of a plan that shifted voting
control to the creditors. The CEO continued in office after
confirmation.
In two other cases from our study, Lionel Corporation 10 3 and
Saxon Industries, 10 4 attempts to enjoin shareholders from calling
a meeting to elect new directors were rejected by the courts.
10 5
By our valuation protocols, Saxon was grossly insolvent, while
Lionel was marginally solvent. 10 6 A state court in Saxon expressly
stated that the right to meet was not dependent on solvency;
10 7
we have no direct evidence that the solvency of the company played any role in the
court's decision, we assume that it did.
101 Prior to reorganization, the investor group sold its controlling interest in the
company to a group of buyers. In accord with the sale contract, the investor group's
officers and directors resigned from office. After the buyer group's officers and
directors had been in office for about a week, the buyers announced a rescission of
the sale and also resigned from office. The investor group refused the rescission and,
consistent with that position, refused to reassume their offices. During this period
in which the company de facto had no officers or directors, creditors petitioned the
company into involuntary bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court appointed a long time
employee of the company as CEO. When the original investor group later accepted
rescission of the contract for sale and sought to reassert control over the company,
the CEO resisted. There resulted the litigation in which the investors were denied
the opportunity to hold a shareholders' meeting for the purpose of removing the
CEO. See infra text accompanying note 102.
102 This decision is mentioned by the court in a later opinion. See In re FSC
Corp., 38 B.R. 346, 348 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983).
f03 See Lionel Corp. v. Committee of Equity Sec. Holders (In re Lionel Corp.), 30
B.R. 327 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
104 See In re Saxon Indus., 39 B.R. 49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); Saxon Indus., Inc.
v. NKFW Partners, 488 A.2d 1298 (Del. 1984).
105 The same result occurred in another large case in which a plan was confirmed
too recently to be included in our study. See In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., [1987-89
Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 72,328 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
106 See LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share, supra note 16, at 142,
166.
107 See Saxon Indus., Inc. v. NKFW Partners, 488 A.2d at 1300 (holding that
insolvency alone did not "divest the stockholders of a Delaware corporation of their
right to exercise the powers of corporate democracy"). The bankruptcy court had
earlier refused to enjoin the prosecution of the Delaware Court proceeding seeking
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the bankruptcy court did not address the issue in either case. In
both cases, once it was clear that the shareholders could meet and
vote, the shareholders were able to reach agreement with
management on terms that substantially improved their treatment
under the reorganization plan. In neither case was the meeting of
shareholders actually held. Since the period covered by our study,
two more courts have discussed the right of shareholders to meet
during chapter 11, but neither opinion directly addresses the points
we discuss here.
1 0 8
This line of cases makes the ability of shareholders of a
reorganizing company to hold a meeting to replace management
highly problematic. That complication makes hostile takeover of a
reorganizing company by purchasing a controlling block of shares
during the case impractical. Unless they could persuade the court
to issue a declaratory opinion, investors interested in control would
have to purchase the shares before they could learn whether they
could use the acquired shares to replace incumbent management.
Few are likely to take that risk.10 9 Since the threat of hostile
takeover will be reduced during reorganization, management's
position may be more secure, making reorganization more attractive
to them.
a shareholder meeting, even though Saxon was clearly insolvent. See In re Saxon
Indus., 39 B.R. at 50.
108 See In re Heck's, Inc., 112 B.R. 775 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1990) (opining that
once management proposes a plan that would extinguish equity interests, it is a clear
abuse for equity holders to attempt to meet); In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., [1987-89
Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 72,328 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (reversing an
unpublished bankruptcy court order which had enjoined shareholders from meeting).
109 On the other hand, friendly takeovers of companies in chapter 11 are
reasonably common. Typically, the outside investor agrees to provide the financing
necessary to fund a reorganization plan in return for a control block of shares under
the reorganization plan. Once such a deal is made, the board of directors of the
debtor corporation, perhaps as a condition of the agreement, often appoints the
investor's nominees as management even before the plan approval process is
completed. In our study, there were several companies that followed this pattern,
such as Cook-United, Inc.
Investors recently attempted the hostile takeover of a corporation in chapter 11
by acquiring claims, not shares. See In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282, 286-87
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (outlining a claim purchase plan as part of a hostile takeover
strategy). If enough claims are acquired, the investor can ensure that after
confirmation it will control the company by receiving a majority of the shares for its
acquired claims. Takeover does not occur, however, until after confirmation of a
plan. See ChaimJ. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control
of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOzo L. REv. 1, 13-25 (1990); Herbert P. Minkel,
Jr. & Cynthia A. Baker, Claims and Control in Chapter 11 Cases: A Call for Neutrality,
13 CARDozo L. REV. 35, 74-101 (1991).
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Although there are fewer cases, it seems clear that the bankrupt-
cy court has the power to prevent a board of directors from
replacing management that is analogous to its power to prevent
shareholders from replacing the board. 110 We doubt that a court
would prevent a board from removing a manager that the board
reasonably considered incompetent.111  Still, the potential
inability of a board to replace management is another impediment
to shareholder control of management through corporate
governance processes.
2. Creditors' Ability to Remove Management
Even if a court denies shareholders the right to elect directors
because creditors are the real parties in interest, no mechanism
exists by which the creditors can themselves elect directors. The
formal method for creditors to bring about a change in manage-
ment is to move for appointment of a trustee. Although the Code
appears to vest considerable discretion in the court to appoint
trustees, 112 in practice the appointment of a trustee is regarded
by the bankruptcy courts as an extraordinary remedy to be em-
ployed reluctantly.
113
Trustees were appointed in only two of the forty-three cases in
our study (five percent).11 4  Both appointments were at the
request of creditors. In three other cases, the court appointed
persons who functioned essentially as trustees, without that
title.1 15 We refer to these appointees as "quasi-trustees." If they
110 See In re Gaslight Club, Inc., 782 F.2d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The case law
demonstrates that the court has considerable authority to interfere with the
management of a debtor corporation in order to protect the creditors' interests.");
In re United Press Int'l, Inc., 60 B.R. 265, 272-73 (Bankr. D.C. 1986).
111 Precisely this happened many times in the cases we studied, without any effort
by any party to resort to the "dear abuse" standard to prevent the removal.
11 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988).
113 See, e.g., In re Microwave Prods. of America, Inc., 102 B.R. 666, 670 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 1989) ("The appointment of a trustee is the exception rather than the
rule in chapter 11 cases, and is an extraordinary remedy available to creditors."); In
re Tyler, 18 B.R. 574, 577 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) ("All of the authorities agree that
the appointment of a trustee under § 1104 is an extraordinary remedy."); see also
Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 94, at 54-60 (offering an extensive discussion of the
relevant case law).
114 The cases were Sambo's Restaurants and NuCorp.
H5 In the Pizza Time Theatre case, creditors moved for appointment of a trustee.
Before the motion was ruled upon, the board of directors consented to the
appointment as CEO of a specific person nominated by the creditors, and to a court
order stripping the board of its ability to remove that person from office.
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are included, the proportion of cases in which management was
displaced by a trustee is about twelve percent. It then is apparent
that the appointment of trustees plays a greater role in these cases
than it does in small reorganization cases.
11 6
During the period of our study, the persons who filled the office
of trustee were formally selected by the bankruptcy court in some
districts and by the office of the U.S. Trustee in others. 117 Under
either system, parties in interest could sometimes exert influence by
nominating or supporting candidates for trustee.1 18 Once ap-
pointed, a trustee "is a fiduciary who has an obligation to treat all
parties in a reorganization case fairly." 119 Nevertheless, in the
cases we studied there was a clear tendency for trustees to be seen
by the parties in the case as exercising their discretion against
underwater claims and interests and in favor of more senior
claims. 120 Partly for that reason, the holders of junior claims and
interests rarely seek the appointment of a trustee.
In the EPIC case, the incumbent management resigned at filing because it was
implicated in fraud. The board of directors was controlled by the debtor's only
shareholder, who was also a major creditor. Because of this conflict, the board asked
the bankruptcy court to appoint an attorney for the debtor. In negotiations over the
business and reorganization plans, the attorney functioned essentially as a trustee.
Shortly before the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy case against FSC
Corporation, management and the board resigned en masse. The bankruptcy court
appointed a vice-president to be CEO, and enjoined the shareholders from electing
a new board.
116 In an earlier study of the reorganization of small companies, LoPucki found
that trustees were appointed in about 10% of the cases. See LoPucki, supra note 71,
at 124-25. But direct comparison of that figure with the rate reported here overstates
the importance of trustees in small reorganization cases. Nearly all of the appoint-
ments in the small cases came only after the debtor had abandoned its efforts to
reorganize; the trustees so appointed quickly converted the cases to chapter 7. See
id.
117 In 1986, the U.S. Trustee program was extended nationwide. See Bankruptcy
Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-554, § 226, 100 Stat. 3088, 3102-03. Currently, all chapter 11 trustees are
selected formally by the office of the U.S. Trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 1163 (1988).
118 For example, the trustee appointed in Nucorp was suggested by the secured
creditors; the quasi-trustee appointed in Pizza Time Theatre was chosen by creditors
and "introduced" to the board.
119 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I 1106.01(2)(b) (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed.
1992).
120 Both trustees, and two of the three quasi-trustees, came to be perceived as
strong advocates of creditors, or particular groups of creditors. Though considered
neutral at the time of his appointment, the trustee in Nucorp came to be regarded
by the unsecured creditors as a close ally of the secured creditors. Shortly after his
appointment, the trustee in Sambo's closed the business and proposed a plan that
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Incumbent managers also have good reason to fear the appoint-
ment of a trustee. The appointment necessarily means that their
power will be limited, even if they continue to be in charge of day-
to-day operations. As a result, a creditor's threat to seek
appointment of a trustee, or an examiner,121 can be a powerful
leverage device. To avoid even a small chance that a trustee or
examiner may be appointed, managers may be willing to make
substantial concessions to creditors.
1 22
3. Withdrawal of Credit
In nearly all of the cases studied, the debtor had an ongoing
relationship with a group of institutional lenders that supplied the
bulk of its credit needs. The agreement between the debtor and
these primary lenders generally provided that, in the event of
default, 123 the lenders had the right to declare their entire debts
strictly adhered to the absolute priority rule. The effect was to zero out shareholders.
The quasi-trustee in FSC openly battled against the efforts of shareholders to regain
control of the company. The quasi-trustee in Pizza Time Theatre was actually selected
by creditors and "introduced" to the board of directors. The only trustee or quasi-
trustee to advocate for underwater claims or interests was the quasi-trustee in EPIC.
He advocated making a modest distribution to limited partners whose equity interests
were clearly underwater. In an exception to the general tendency for trustees and
quasi-trustees to take the side of seniors againstjuniors, the trustee who zeroed out
the shareholders in Sambo's then battled tenaciously to force the compromise of
priority claims against the estate, and thereby increase the recovery of general
unsecured creditors.
121 Section 1104(b)(2) permits the court, on motion of a party in interest, to
appoint an "examiner" to inquire into management's past behavior. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1104(b)(2) (1988). One purpose for appointment of an examiner can be to help the
court determine whether appointment of a trustee is appropriate. The statute has
been interpreted to require the court in large cases to appoint an examiner upon
request of a creditor. See id. ("[O]n request of a party in interest... the court shall
order the appointment of an examiner ... if... the debtor's fixed, liquidated,
unsecured debts.., exceed $5,000,000.") (emphasis added); In re Revco D.S., Inc.,
898 F.2d 498, 500-01 (6th Cir. 1990). Examiners were appointed in a few of our
cases, but never was the appointment of an examiner followed by appointment of a
trustee. Often a principal function of the examiner was to recommend whether the
debtor corporation should pursue a remedy against former management. But even
on this topic, the examiners' recommendations were not followed in some of the
cases. Except in the White Motor case, discussed infra note 122, examiners did not
play important roles in the cases we studied.
122 For example, in White Motor, the appointment of an examiner led to the
likelihood of the appointment of a trustee. That likelihood was sufficient to result
in the resignation of the incumbent CEO. Similarly, under threat of the appointment
of a trustee, the board of directors of Pizza Time Theatre consented to the
appointment of a CEO of the creditors' choosing.
123 Many, if not most, of the defaults by debtors in the cases studied were not
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immediately due and payable. If the debtors did not pay, nonbank-
ruptcy law and the credit contracts provided a variety of procedures
the creditors could use to coerce payment through the forcible
liquidation of assets. The procedures were often complex, cumber-
some, and slow.124  Nonetheless, in the absence of bankruptcy,
the lenders' ability to withdraw the funds they had loaned to the
debtor generally constituted a credible threat to the existence of a
debtor's business and provided leverage sufficient to compel
changes in corporate behavior.
Upon the filing of a bankruptcy case, creditors' rights to
withdraw the money they have loaned are blocked initially by the
automatic stay. 125 For unsecured creditors to obtain relief from
the automatic stay during a reorganization case is virtually impossi-
ble. 1
26
But scholars who conclude that the automatic stay renders
creditors helpless 127 overstate their point. Secured creditors have
the right to relief from the automatic stay in some circumstanc-
es. 128 In some of the cases we studied, secured lenders were able
failures to pay when due. A large portion were failures to maintain financial ratios.
Moreover, the contracts of many creditors contain covenants that the company will
not default on any of its debts, coupled with acceleration clauses. If the company
defaults on any of its obligations, it is likely that a large portion of its debt will
immediately fall due. This will include obligations to holders of publicly held debt.
Default on publicly held debt is particularly troublesome because of the difficulty of
renegotiating the terms. See Roe, supra note 8, at 277.
124 See LoPucki, supra note 53, at 315-21.
'25 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
126 See id. § 362(d). The expectation is that unsecured creditors will be paid only
under the plan of reorganization.
127 See, e.g., Bradley & Rosenzweig, Untenable Case, supra note 10, at 1076 ("The
1978 Act thus provides managers with.., a way to keep control of the firm free from
the intrusive monitoring of creditors .. ").
128 Secured creditors have the right to reclaim their collateral if. (1) the collateral
is not needed in the reorganization and the debtor does not have a realizable equity
in it, or (2) the debtor fails to "adequately protect" the creditor against a decline in
the value of the collateral during the reorganization case. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)
(1988).
During most of the period covered by our study, the courts in the Ninth Circuit
and some other jurisdictions interpreted the adequate protection requirement in a
manner that often required payment of interest to secured creditors. See Grundy
Nat'l Bank v. Tandem Mining Corp., 754 F.2d 1436, 1441 (4th Cir. 1985); In re
American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426,432 (9th Cir. 1984). Late in the period
covered by our study, the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's interpretation
in United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365 (1988),
leaving secured creditors entitled to interest on their secured claims only to the
extent that the value of their collateral exceeds the amount of their claims. Timbers
substantially reduces the likelihood that a secured creditor can gain substantial
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to generate considerable leverage from a credible threat to demand
adequate protection for their collateral. Among the cases in our
study, McLouth Steel provides the most dramatic example. In that
case, the primary lenders had blanket liens on virtually all of the
debtor's assets. Shortly after the filing of the case, the lenders
moved to lift the automatic stay on the ground that the debtor was
unable to provide them with adequate protection. Fearing that the
stay would be lifted, the debtor entered into a settlement agreement
that was so burdensome it effectively put the secured lenders in
control of the company.
1 29
Even creditors who have no right to withdraw funds already lent
may be able to obtain leverage through their ability to supply the
debtor's credit needs during reorganization. 10 In ordinary
circumstances, debtors and creditors often anticipate and rely on
the future extension of additional credit.13 1  In the financial
turmoil surrounding bankruptcy, the creditors who routinely
supplied the company's credit needs prior to reorganization may be
able to condition further supply on management's service of those
creditors' special interests.
Not all debtors will be vulnerable to this kind of pressure.
Under the protection of the automatic stay, some debtors can solve
their immediate cash flow problems by suspending payments to
unsecured creditors and limiting payments to secured creditors to
the decline, if any, in the value of the secured creditors' collater-
al.1 3 2 Without that drain on cash flow, revenues from operations
may be sufficient to sustain those operations. But if they are not,
leverage by means of a threat to lift the automatic stay for failure to provide adequate
protection.
129 Among other things, the agreement contained a "drop dead" provision, by
which the debtor agreed to surrender the steel mills to the secured lenders if the
debtor did not sell them by a date only a few months away. The secured lenders
maintained their control by granting short extensions of the drop dead date.
130 The Bankruptcy Code permits debtors to borrow money during reorganization
and, with certain limitations, to grant new, postpetition lenders priority over
prepetition creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)-(d) (1988) (stating that prepetition
creditors must be provided with "adequate protection"). Management's desire for
new financing, together with an existing creditor's incentives to provide it, can
provide each with leverage against the other. See George G. Triantis, Relational
Stakeholder Contracts in Bankruptcy, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. (forthcoming 1993).
131 See e.g., K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 1985)
(holding that the implied obligation of good faith imposed on lender a duty to give
notice to borrower before refusing to advance funds under financing agreement).
132 For secured creditors, whether interim payments are made depends on how
adequate protection issues are resolved. See supra note 128.
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the debtor must find the money elsewhere or face immediate
closure and liquidation. In these circumstances, the ability to
supply additional credit without the obligation to do so can be an
important source of creditor leverage against a debtor.
133
In sum, the controls over management behavior usually available
to creditors of a financially distressed corporation through the
exercise of their contractual fights are inhibited by bankruptcy, but
they do not disappear. If the debtor is unable to maintain adequate
protection payments to a secured creditor or needs additional credit
to sustain operations in bankruptcy, particular creditors may gain
influence over management behavior.
4. Resistance to Management's Initiatives
Earlier we emphasized management's extensive powers of
initiative with respect to both the business and reorganization plans.
We also briefly discussed the processes for objection to those
initiatives by creditors and shareholders.13 4  With respect to the
business plan, the normal process is to object to the bankruptcy
court after receiving notice of a proposed transaction "other than
133 Prepetition creditors often have greater incentives to provide the new
financing than do strangers to the situation, and for this reason, they may be the only
available lenders. By providing new financing, existing creditors may enable the
business to survive and generate the funds necessary to pay both the old and the new
loans. In addition, a creditor may be able to negotiate an improvement in its position
with regard to the old loan. The most common form of improvement is "cross-
collateralization'-the priority or security negotiated for the new loan applies to the
old loan as well. See, e.g., In re Roblin Indus., Inc., 52 B.R. 241 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
1985) (cross-collateralization permitted in a situation in which the prepetition claim
may or may not have been fully secured). The cost of these priorities are borne not
by the debtor, but by other creditors whose relative priorities have been reduced.
If one assumes that management's objective is to continue operations and that
management is to some degree beyond the control of other parties to the
reorganization case, it can then be demonstrated that it is in the interests of major
prepetition creditors and management to form a coalition. The purpose of the
coalition is to extend and accept the credit necessary to continue operations.
Creditors benefit from enhanced priority for their old debt. The cost of the
enhancement is normally passed along to now junior creditors in the form of
increased risk. Management benefits from the possibility of a reduced interest rate
on the new loan and the ability to continue the company in business. The model
presented here is an extension of one first presented by Bulow & Shoven, supra note
53, at 437, and adapted in LoPucki, supra note 53, at 336-38, regarding coalitions
between the major lender and shareholders. Because management is assumed to be
able to act without the approval of shareholders, in the present context the coalition
is formed with management rather than with shareholders.
134 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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in the ordinary course of business." 135 When such an objection
is made, the bankruptcy court will hold an adversary hearing and
the parties will be able to use normal discovery processes in
preparation for that hearing.
136
Curiously, the Code does not explicitly provide a standard for
the court to apply in ruling on these objections. Probably most
courts consider whether the proposed transaction is in the "best
interests of the estate." 137  In making that judgment, they are
likely to extend considerable deference to the expertise of
management, for reasons similar to those that underlie the
deference accorded management under the business judgment
rule. 138 Significantly, there is no statutory requirement that the
court consider the kinds of conflicts of interest that can exist
between creditors and shareholders in the formulation of a business
plan.
As was discussed earlier,139 in preparing a reorganization plan
management usually seeks and obtains the endorsement of the
committees representing impaired classes. This perceived need for
committee endorsement provides creditors, and to a somewhat
lesser degree, shareholders, with leverage against management that
the committees can apply to the plan of reorganization, the business
plan, or other issues.
If management can sell all or substantially all of the assets of the
company pursuant to § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, it arguably
circumvents the creditor and shareholder protections in the
reorganization plan approval process. 140  On this basis, some
courts have rejected management's attempts to sell major assets
without the formalities of the reorganization plan approval
process. 141 But compliance with the plan confirmation process
135 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (1988).
136 See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014 ("[R]elief shall be requested by motion, and
reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing shall be afforded the party against
whom relief is sought.").
137 See, e.g., Committee of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.),
722 F.2d 1063, 1068 (2d Cir. 1983).
138 See Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 94, at 12-14. See generally DENNIsJ. BLOCK
ET AL., THE BUSINESSJUDGMENT RULE 2 (3d ed. 1989) (explaining that courts will not
usually second guess the merits of the decisions of the directors).
139 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
140 For an enumeration of these protections, see supra text accompanying notes
42-50.
141 See e.g., Committee of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.),
722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding debtor applying for permission to
conduct sale outside of ordinary course of business lacked business justification for
1993]
706 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:669
may take several months. If the proposed buyer is unwilling to wait
for reorganization plan approval, the predominant view seems to be
that the court should approve the sale if management has an
"articulated business justification" for going ahead immediately
rather than waiting for plan confirmation.
142
In addition to directly opposing management's plans through
objections and voting, disgruntled creditors or shareholders can
indirectly pressure management by bringing, or threatening to
bring, vexatious litigation. We have discussed elsewhere the
methods by which they sometimes proceed. 14  If they do not
have official committee status they can seek it. Once they have that
status they can retain counsel, and perhaps other professionals,
whose fees will be paid by the debtor. The committee can conduct
embarrassing discovery, expose the efforts of management or other
parties to the reorganization to serve their self-interest, draw out
negotiations over the plan, and inject uncertainty into the confirma-
tion process. The primary limit on this power is the bankruptcy
judge, who has discretion over the funding of this activity.
1 44
5. Fiduciary Obligations of Management
Directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to the corporations
they serve. Among these duties are the duty of loyalty, which
prohibits the director or officer from engaging in self-dealing to the
detriment of the corporation itself or some constituent group to
whom a fiduciary duty is owed, and the duty of care, which requires
the use of reasonable care in making decisions on behalf of the
corporation. 1
45
The law governing fiduciary duties of managers does not speak
directly to the question of where management's loyalties should lie
selling without complying with plan formalities); PBGC v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re
Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935, 939 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating district court was
without power to approve sale not in the ordinary course of business because such
a proposal would be short-circuiting requirements for confirmation of the reorganiza-
tion plan).
142 See In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1070. For excellent discussions of this issue,
see Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 94, at 15-20; Skeel, supra note 7, at 494-505.
143 See LoPucki & Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, supra note 16, at 628.
144 See In re Heck's, Inc., 112 B.R. 775, 808 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1990) (denying
attorney fees to attorney for equity security holders committee).145 
See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND
FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 138-56 (4th ed. 1990). Shareholders can
sue directors and officers who violate their fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (involving a solvent corporation).
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when the interests of creditors and shareholders are in conflict.146
But one might interpret it as so doing, by entertaining a question-
able inference. The inference is that if a particular constituency is
permitted to sue for breach of a fiduciary duty of loyalty or care,
management has a duty to advance the interests of that constituency
when they are in conflict with the interests of other constituencies.
No clear authority exists for or against the drawing of this
questionable inference. The inference is suggested by the fact that
when a particular constituency is permitted to sue for breach of a
fiduciary duty, it is often said that the fiduciary duty is "owed" to
that group. Nonetheless, the more usual understanding is that
officers and directors have a duty to act for the benefit of the
corporation, and that determining which groups are permitted to
sue for its breach does not change what the officers and directors
are expected to do.
147
Even if one accepts the inference, however, there is the
additional difficulty that the cases are unclear as to whom
management "owes" fiduciary duties. Most authorities agree that
once insolvency intervenes, creditors can sue for breach of fiduciary
duties by directors and officers. 148 There is considerable wisdom
in this point of view. Once insolvency intervenes, it is creditors who
146 In the following discussion we have benefitted greatly from Stephen H. Case,
Fiduciaiy Duty of Corporate Directors and Officers, Resolution of Conflicts Between Creditors
and Shareholders, and Removal of Directors by Dissident Shareholders in Chapter 11 Cases,
in ALl-ABA, CRITIQUE, supra note 90, at 373, 373-413.
147 See Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Debtor STN Enters., Inc. v. Noyes (In re
STN Enters., Inc.), 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[T]he 'majority rule' permits
recovery by creditors of an insolvent corporation for mismanagement as if the
corporation itself were plaintiff . . . .") (emphasis added).
148 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 354-56
(1985); STN Enters., 779 F.2d at 904; Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 (2d
Cir. 1981); Berres v. Bruning (In re Bruning), 143 B.R. 253, 255-56 (D. Colo. 1992)
(holding that a trust that arises in favor of creditors during insolvency is not a
constructive trust, but a "technical" trust that puts officers and directors in a
"fiduciary capacity" within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(4) (1988)); Chittenden
Trust Co. v. Serbert Lumber, Co. (In re Vermont Toy Works, Inc.), 82 B.R. 258, 302
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1987); Fox v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 141, 143 (Cal.
1982); Association of Haystack Property Owners v. Sprague, 494 A.2d 122, 125 (Vt.
1985). In a few instances creditors have sought to establish that fiduciary duties are
owed to them even when the corporation is solvent, but creditors have generally lost
those suits. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F.Supp.
1504, 1524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that a creditor does not acquire an equitable
interest in the corporation and is not owed a fiduciary duty); Thomas R. Hurst &
LarryJ. McGuinness, The Corporation, The Bondholder and Fiduciaiy Duties, 10J.L. &
CoM. 187, 206 (1991) (stating that "prior cases provide little support for creation of
fiduciary duty to bondholders").
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will bear the bulk of the company's losses, so they should be able to
initiate legal action when losses result from inappropriate
management behavior. The case for a fiduciary duty to creditors is
especially strong in bankruptcy, where creditors' contractual rights
are suspended by the automatic stay. There is a growing number of
statements, however, that post-insolvency fiduciary duties run only
to creditors. 149 If that were an accepted statement of current law,
it would be possible to argue that when a conflict of interest arises
between creditors and shareholders, management of an insolvent
corporation has a legal obligation to serve the creditors' interests.
We do not believe, however, that these statements should be
viewed as establishing current law. First, contrary statements appear
in both the cases and the law reviews. 150 Second, the view that
managers of insolvent companies owe fiduciary duties only to
creditors fails to recognize the very real interest that shareholders
can have in the management of those companies. For many
insolvent companies a substantial possibility exists for a return to
solvency prior to the confirmation of a plan. 1 5 1  Even if the
company never returned to solvency, shareholders might be able to
149 Perhaps the best known expression of this attitude was not directed at the
issue of fiduciary duty as such. In the Second Circuit decision in In reJohns-Manville
Corp., concerning whether shareholders could demand a shareholder meeting and
elect new directors during a chapter 11 proceeding, see supra notes 93-99 and
accompanying text, the court stated in a footnote that if the company were insolvent
"denial of the right to call a meeting would likely be proper, because the shareholders
would no longer be real parties in interest." 801 F.2d 60, 65 n.6 (2d Cir. 1986); see
also FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 977 (4th Cir. 1982) ("'[W]hen a corporation
becomes insolvent, or in a failing condition, the officers and directors no longer
represent the stockholders, but by the fact of insolvency, become trustees for the
creditors ... .'") (quoting Davis v. Woolf, 147 F.2d 629, 633 (4th Cir. 1945)); In re
Baldwin-United Corp., 43 B.R. 443, 459 n.22 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (asserting that the
.rule prevailing in most jurisdictions ... is that when the corporation becomes
insolvent .... the directors of a Chapter 11 debtor are not fiduciaries of the
corporation; rather, they are fiduciaries of the estate, which the debtor-in-possession
holds as trustee for the creditors .... [T]he nature of the directors' duty has changed
from helmsman to guardian.") (citations omitted). There have also been several
statements to such effect in recent legal scholarship. See supra note 7.
150 See Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 355 ("[T]he fiduciary duty of the trustee runs to
shareholders as well as to creditors."); In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068,
1072 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that duty of trustees is "to maximize the value of the
estate, not of a particular group of claimants"); Frost, supra note 10, at 118-20
(arguing that "bankruptcy fiduciary duty points management in the direction of acting
in the interest of both creditors and shareholders"); Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note
94, at 29-37 (stating that directors owe fiduciary duty to both creditors and
shareholders in bankruptcy).
151 See supra notes 53-56 & 61 and accompanying text.
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win a share of the distribution under the plan. If the value of those
possibilities is reduced by the wrongful acts of management,
shareholders should have a remedy.
15 2
We conclude that the better view is that management "owes"
fiduciary duties to both the creditors and the shareholders of an
insolvent company, until their claims or interests are extinguished
as part of the reorganization case.1 53 It follows that the law of
fiduciary duty does not provide a reliable way for either creditors or
shareholders to check management when it acts in an otherwise
appropriate manner on matters with regard to which the interests
of creditors and shareholders conflict.
Moreover, even if the law of fiduciary duty provided share-
holders or creditors with arguments as to whose interests manage-
ment should serve, in the reorganization context it would largely be
of only theoretical value. Suits by either creditors or shareholders
against management for breach of fiduciary duty for actions taken
by them during a reorganization case are rare.1 54 At least part of
the explanation must lie in the fact that if creditors or shareholders
are dissatisfied with the conduct of management, they have the
opportunity to challenge that conduct directly in the reorganization
152 To provide a concrete example, suppose a company whose net worth is a
negative $10 million (and hence is insolvent). If management either negligently
passes up (in violation of the duty of care) or converts to its own use (in violation of
the duty of loyalty) a corporate opportunity that would increase net worth by $100
million, shareholders are hurt to the extent of $90 million (and creditors to the extent
of only $10 million).
15' We have argued elsewhere that in some circumstances, it is appropriate to
extinguish claims or interests before confirmation of a plan. See LoPucki and
Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, supra note 16, at 625-28.
154 For proof they exist, see Frankel v. Frankel (In re Frankel), 77 B.R. 401 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1987) (creditor sued chief operating officer after reorganization to hold
officer's debt for breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty in failing to preserve collateral
during reorganization as nondischargeable in officer's later bankruptcy case). Suits
by creditors or shareholders initiated after the filing of a chapter 11 petition for
breach of fiduciary obligation by management's conduct before the filing of the
petition are relatively common. See, e.g., In re STN Enterprises, 779 F.2d 901,904 (2d
Cir. 1985) (unsecured creditors' committee sues owner/manager during
reorganization for breach of fiduciary duties in period before filing); In re Vermont
Toy Works, Inc., 82 B.R. 258,264-65 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1987) (denying secured creditor's
complaint for declaratory judgment requesting determination that collateral it
repossessed from debtor prepetition was not property of estate); Fox v. MGM Grand
Hotels, Inc., 187 Cal. Rptr. 141, 143 (Cal. 1982) (debenture holder brought class
action on behalf of unsecured debenture holders against corporate issuers for
intentionally acting to prejudice the interests of the unsecured creditors); Association
of Haystack Property Owners v. Sprague, 494 A.2d 122, 124 (Vt. 1985) (purchasers'
class action against directors of corporate vendor for breach of fiduciary duty).
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case by moving for appointment of a trustee or objecting to a
proposed transaction. If they do not challenge it, or are
unsuccessful in their challenge, it is unlikely they could later prevail
in an action against management for breach of fiduciary duty.
55
6. Employment Contract Incentives
The degree to which management will side with creditors or
shareholders in formulating business and reorganization plans is
likely to be influenced by management's perception of its own self-
interest. For the solvent corporation, scholars have already
developed theories of what behavior is in management's self-interest
and how different corporate constituencies can structure manage-
ment's incentives to their own benefit.156 Management is seen as
self-evidently interested in their own salaries and perquisites, in
preservation of the company and therefore their jobs, and in their
reputation as effective managers.' 5 7 Management compensation
schemes can be devised to link management's interests to those of
shareholders.1 58 Examples would be bonuses that increase when
stock prices increase and options to purchase stock in the future at
an already-fixed price.
These techniques for linking management self-interest to
shareholder welfare lose their effectiveness when the company files
for reorganization. Pre-existing management compensation
programs are not binding on the debtor-in-possession; they are
executory contracts that can be rejected. 159 Moreover, because
the fortunes of the companies have been in decline, management
probably is not faring well under existing incentive compensation
schemes anyway. To provide substantial incentives for management
155 The legal conception of fiduciary duty may nevertheless influence management
behavior if management chooses to act consistently with its fiduciary obligations.
Additionally, in ruling on challenges to management's actions based on other
provisions of the bankruptcy code, a bankruptcy court may be influenced by its
conception of management's fiduciary duties.
156 SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 53, which is a classic work in this tradition.
157 These latter interests in particular are thought to incline management to adopt
more risk averse strategies than are desired by many shareholders. Management's
interests would be severely compromised by insolvency, whereas shareholders can
hold diversified portfolios and thus do not have so much at stake if the company
becomes insolvent. See Coffee, supra note 58, at 16-24.
1s See Demsetz, supra note 92, at 387 ("[A] linking of the interests of management
to those of shareholders ... is ... supplied by correlating managerial wages and
corporation performance.").
159 See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988).
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to serve the interests of shareholders, the compensation programs
must be reformed. Because stock prices are low, the old sharehold-
ers may have to suffer substantial dilution to provide any real
incentive for management to defend their interests. In itself, this
may not be a problem. Considering the potential power of
management to affect the amounts of distributions under the plan
of reorganization, the shareholders of stock in a $100 million
company who currently expect to receive $1 million of the distribu-
tion under a plan might be delighted to give 10% or even 25% of
their shares to win the loyalty of management. But once the
reorganization case has been filed, creditors, employees, and others
are likely to take an interest in management compensation and the
incentives it creates. They are likely to think that management's
compensation should be tied to the success of the company, or
perhaps even themselves, 160 not the success of shareholders. In
the battle to determine the compensation scheme for management
and thereby fix management's incentives, these other parties are
likely to have the upper hand. Management's compensation during
the reorganization case is subject to review by the bankruptcy
court 16 1 and any agreements for compensation to be paid after
the case must be fully disclosed. 162 The court is likely to believe
that the managers of an insolvent company should serve the
interests of the company, not the interests of holders of its
underwater shares.
160 See Gilson & Vetsuypens, supra note 76, at 30 (finding that CEO compensation
in distressed firms sometimes was explicitly tied to creditor payoffs).
161 Though there is no section of the Bankruptcy Code that dearly and
unambiguously authorizes court review of management compensation, a considerable
majority of bankruptcy courts interpret §§ 327 and 330 as providing that authority.
Those sections authorize the court to review the compensation of "professional
persons." 11 U.S.C. §§ 327, 330 (1988); see In re Phoenix Steel Corp., 110 B.R. 141,
142 (Bankr. D. Del. 1989); In re Athos Steel & Aluminum, Inc., 69 B.R. 515, 521
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re Zerodec Mega Corp., 39 B.R. 932, 935 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1984).
Some courts have held that corporate officers are not "professional persons"
within the meaning of these sections but have nonetheless sustained the bankruptcy
court's authority to review executive compensation under its general authority to
enter any order "necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions [of the Code]
... or to prevent an abuse of process." 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988); see In re New York
City Shoes, Inc., 89 B.R. 479, 483 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Lyon & Reboli, Inc.,
24 B.R. 152, 153-54 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
162 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(5)(B) (1988). Sometimes the terms of management's
post-confirmation compensation are made part of the plan of reorganization and
approved as part of the plan approval process.
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7. Employment Market Incentives
In the context of solvent corporations, some scholars argue that
various market incentives, additional to those created by the
employment contract, induce management to protect shareholder
interests. 163  Here we address primarily whether the market for
the services of managers can provide similar incentives within the
context of a chapter 11 proceeding.
164
The market incentives argument posits that managers want to
preserve their ability to obtain jobs with other firms at top salaries.
That ability not only provides them an alternative should they lose
their current job, it also gives them a basis to negotiate for higher
salaries in their current jobs. Managers cannot "shirk" or enrich
themselves at the expense of the company because this conduct
would become known in the marketplace and adversely affect the
managers' marketability.1
65
163 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 397 ("Shareholder's interests
are protected not by voting but by the market for stock (and the managers' need to
raise new capital), the market for goods, and the market for managers' services.").
164 Like the market for the services of managers, the market for goods will likely
lose much of its capacity to discipline management in the context of the insolvent,
reorganizing company. We suppose that a reorganizing company could be so
vulnerable that only the best efforts of management could save it and any attempt by
management to serve other interests would quickly cause it to fail. In that case it
could be argued that the market for goods, acting in tandem with the employment
market for managers, provides incentives for management conduct. But we doubt
that the financial condition of many large companies is so tenuously balanced.
Furthermore, the analysis ignores the possibility that a manager's own interests may
be served perfectly well even if the company does not survive. For example, manage-
ment might engineer the closing of the business desired by creditors in return for
releases or severance pay.
The market for capital, either in the form of loans or purchases of equity, does
sometimes provide incentives for particular management conduct. But if manage-
ment seeks to appeal to the market for loans, their incentives may be to serve creditor
interests rather than shareholder interests. Seesupra notes 130-33 and accompanying
text. Management seldom have reason to be concerned about the market for the
company's debt or equity securities. Although management theoretically could
finance the reorganization through a public offering, that was not done in any of the
cases we studied and has only rarely been done in cases outside our study. Managers
who want to retain their jobs will not necessarily be happy to discover new investors
willing to purchase a controlling interest in the company during reorganization; such
investors will almost certainly replace management with persons of the investors' own
choosing. See infra Table V accompanying note 203.
165 This literature suggests that the labor market for management services
provides an incentive for managers to acquire a reputation for serving shareholder
interests (or not to shirk), perhaps because it is too difficult to control management
behavior solely by providing sufficient economic incentives to act in shareholder
interests. See Demsetz, supra note 92, at 387 ("The many years of investment in...
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In the context of insolvent, reorganizing companies, the analysis
becomes more complex. First, some of the managers of these
companies have no intention of seeking another managerial
position. They may be so tainted by the financial demise of their
company that they are unemployable. Their primary concern may
be to avoid criminal or civil liability or to obtain as much severance
pay as possible.
Other managers are sufficiently tainted that they cannot be
viable candidates for other managerial positions unless they can first
restore their companies to financial health. These managers can be
expected to cling tenaciously to their jobs and vigorously contest
efforts to liquidate the company.166 Their bias in favor of reorga-
nization makes them natural allies of shareholders, particularly in
companies that are insolvent. But that does not necessarily mean
they will solely serve the interests of shareholders. If they wish to
continue in their current employment, they will want to serve
whoever is in control. As we demonstrate throughout this Article,
creditors often exert considerable control over a reorganizing
company.
If the corporation is insolvent, then a substantial majority of the
voting shares of the emerging company will most likely be distribut-
ed to creditors upon confirmation of the plan. 167  One might
expect that incumbent managements would seek to identify these
incipient shareholders and serve their interests. But management's
calculus of its self-interest in this regard is complicated by the fact
that most of these incipient shareholders will sell their shares
shortly after they receive them. For example, banks, usually the
largest creditors in the cases we studied, are prevented by banking
regulations from holding reorganization securities for more than
about two years after their receipt. 168 Through our study, we
reputation [by managerial personnel] are not lightly put at risk in the pursuit of the
advantages offered by shirking."); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of
the Firm, 88J. POL. ECON. 288, 296 (1980) ("[A] manager's talents and his tastes for
consumption on the job... must be imputed by managerial labor markets at least
in part from information about the manager's current and past performance.").
166 For an interesting case study of such behavior by corporate managers, see
BARBARA MARSH, A CORPORATE TRAGEDY: THE AGONY OF INTERNATIONAL
HARVESTER COMPANY 238-94 (1985). The latter portion of this book recounts the
efforts of International Harvester Company to restructure its debt and avoid both
liquidation and bankruptcy. The chief executive officer who led this effort, Archie
McCardell, resigned when it failed. The company never filed for bankruptcy, but in
the end it liquidated most of its assets and paid the proceeds to creditors.
167 See LoPucki & Whitford, Patterns, supra note 16, at 18.
168 The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 generally prohibits bank holding
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discovered that they frequently dispose of them much more quickly
than that. It is possible that a manager who expected the shares to
be sold to investors not yet identifiable would wish to cultivate a
reputation for serving shareholder interests, because equity
investors will want a manager with such a reputation.
169
An alternative to serving the interests of those who will control
the emerging corporation is to serve the interests of those who hire
managers in the marketplace. The preferences of the latter are not
all the same. Some of the managers of companies in our study
appeared to be cultivating reputations for saving financially
distressed companies. 70  Their reputations might appeal to
companies from owning shares of non-banking companies, but it contains an
exception for "shares acquired by a bank holding company... in satisfaction of a
debt previously contracted... but such shares shall be disposed of within a period of two
yearsfrom the date on which they were acquired." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(2) (1988) (emphasis
added).
Banks, as opposed to bank holding companies, are regulated by the Banking Act
of 1933 (Glass-Steagall), ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.), which contains no such specific provision. Before the adoption
of Glass-Steagall, case law had established that national banks, although generally
prohibited from owning shares in non-banking companies, could acquire such shares
by way of payment of debt, but only with a view that the shares would be promptly
resold. See First Nat'l Bank v. National Exch. Bank, 92 U.S. 122, 128 (1875) ("In the
honest exercise of the power to compromise a doubtful debt owing to a bank ....
stocks may be accepted in payment and satisfaction, with a view to their subsequent
sale or conversion into money so as to make good or reduce an anticipated loss.");
McBoyle v. Union Nat'l Bank, 122 P. 458, 459 (Cal. 1912) ("[W]here a national bank
had bought stock pledged to it, its duty [was] to dispose of such stock as soon as a
sale.., could be made."). Given the regulatory purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act,
it is generally assumed that the statute did not expand the powers of national banks
to own securities; quite the contrary, the statute was intended to restrict those
powers. See generally Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617,632 (1971) (holding
that under Glass-Steagall commercial banks could not enter the investment banking
business based on the fact that Congress wanted to prevent commercial banks from
making "loans to customers [which] would facilitate the purchase of stocks and
securities"). Hence, it is generally assumed that the pre-statutory requirement that
shares acquired as payment of debt be resold quickly still applies.
169 In some of the cases we studied, investors assembled controlling blocks of
shares after confirmation by purchasing from creditors who received the shares under
the plan. This was true, for example, in the case of Anglo Energy. See Business Briefs,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1986, at 28 (announcing an "orderly transfer of control" of
Anglo's board of directors to Equity Strategies, a mutual fund). Because investors
who acquire entire companies nearly always install new management, see infra Table
V accompanying note 203, managers who anticipate those events might regard their
situation as hopeless.
170 These managers are sometimes called turnaround experts. For example,
Sanford Sigiloff, who had previously managed the turnaround of Daylin, Inc. (earlier
case not in our study), managed the turnaround of Wickes Companies (in our study)
and then went on to manage the turnaround of L.J. Hooker Corp. (later case not in
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shareholders or junior creditors who seek management with a bias
in favor of reorganization. To enhance such a reputation, a
turnaround expert might tend to favor the interests of shareholders
and junior creditors against their seniors, but within limits. In the
reorganization of insolvent companies, it is unlikely that
shareholders or junior creditors ever have the unfettered ability to
make hiring decisions.1 7 1  Other managers appeared to be
cultivating reputations for liquidating financially distressed
companies. 17 2 These managers presumably would be interested
in making themselves attractive to creditors, who are likely to be in
our study).
171 Creditors in this situation are fearful about appearing to direct corporate
affairs because of concern that they will later be found to have assumed fiduciary
responsibilities, as the party in control of the corporation, to other corporate
constituencies. See, e.g., State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 690
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (holding creditors liable for interferingwith a debtor's business,
based on the assertion that a debtor is "entitled to have its affairs managed by
competent directors and officers who would maintain a high degree of undivided
loyalty to the company"). Compare Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics of LenderLiability,
99 YALE L.J. 131, 146-47 (1989) (arguing that imposing a fiduciary duty on lenders
is inappropriate since fiduciary duties are intended to govern agency relationships,
not arms-length transactions such as financing) with Dan S. Schechter, The Principal
Principle: Controlling Creditors Should Be Held Liable For Their Debtors' Obligations, 19
U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 875, 882-85 (1986) (arguing that controlling creditors should be
held partly liable for a debtor's obligations upon its insolvency on the grounds that
controlling creditors receive extra benefits over other creditors without incurring any
additional liability). Nonetheless, it is beyond dispute that creditors frequently are
consulted about management turnover decisions, and boards of directors are
frequently careful to hire somebody that potential future lenders will find acceptable.
We report empirical data about creditor involvement in management turnover
decisions supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
172 Victor Palmieri, who had managed the liquidation of the Penn Central
Railroad (not in our study), then managed the liquidations of Baldwin-United and
EPIC (both in our study).
William Scharffenberger cultivated a more ambiguous reputation. He oversaw
the partial liquidation of Penn-Dixie Steel and the complete liquidation of Saxon
Industries (both in our study). In the latter case, the creditors' committee initially
proposed a business plan of complete liquidation; Scharffenberger did not resist and
cooperated fully with the efforts of the creditors' committee to find the most
advantageous buyer. Scharffenberger resisted efforts by the equity committee to
block the sale favored by the creditors' committee. After the Saxon reorganization
plan was confirmed, Scharffenberger was hired as CEO of Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel
Co., which was attempting to reorganize. This company is not in our study because
a reorganization plan was not confirmed until Dec. 12, 1990, well after the deadline
required for inclusion in our study. Scharffenberger also resigned as CEO of
Wheeling-Pittsburgh after confirmation. SeeJonathan P. Hicks, Chairman Will Leave
Wheeling-Pittsburgh, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1991, at D4; Wheeling Steel Plans an Earnings
Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1990, at 31.
19931
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control when a company seeks new management to oversee a
liquidation.
In sum, managers' concerns for their own future employability
gives them an interest in establishing a reputation during the
reorganization, but it is difficult to predict the direction in which
those considerations are likely to bias those managers. Given the
number and volatility of those considerations, it may make sense for
managers to avoid choosing sides, an effort we observed in many of
the cases studied.
C. Judicial Power
Nearly every type of power exercised by management, sharehold-
ers, or creditors is exercised subject to the discretion of the
bankruptcy court. To give but a few examples, if there is objection,
the court must approve most transactions that will be part of
management's business plan, such as sales of assets, the borrowing
of money, or rejections of executory contracts. 173 The debtor's
right of exclusivity expires 120 days into the case, unless the court
extends it for cause. 174 Perhaps most importantly, the court can
influence bargaining through monitoring, 175 mediating, setting
deadlines by scheduling matters for adjudication, or regulating the
amount and time of payment of the fees and expenses of the lawyer
negotiators. 176 With this broad array of weaponry, it would seem
that a skilled, aggressive bankruptcy judge who wished to do so
could wield virtually complete power over the governance of a
reorganizing company. In a few of the cases we studied, the judges
did so; but in most they did not. Based on interviews and our own
independent analysis, we concluded that, aside from extending
173 See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
174 See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1988). Of course, the judge's ultimate control over
governance of the corporation lies in thejudge's discretion to order the appointment
of a trustee.
175 In many of the cases in our study, this tactic was pursued at hearings on the
debtors' motions for extensions of exclusivity, where the parties were often asked to
report on the progress of negotiations. Courts following this approach typically
granted extensions at intervals of one to three months. In a few cases, monitoring
was accomplished through the appointment of an examiner.
176 During most of the period of our study, the courts split as to whether
bankruptcyjudges could raise various matters on their own motion or whether they
had to wait for a motion by a party in interest. In 1986, Congress amended 11 U.S.C.
§ 105 to expand the sua sponte powers of the bankruptcy court, and those powers are
now quite broad. See BankruptcyJudges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer
Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 203, 100 Stat. 3088, 3097.
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exclusivity for the duration of the case, the judges played an
insignificant role in eighteen of the forty-three cases (42%), and that




BANKRUPTCYJUDGES' ROLE IN PROCEEDINGS
Exclusivity Extended for
Name of Case Cumulative Role of Judge Duration of Case
Air Florida Major Extended
AM International Insignificant Extended
Amarex Insignificant Lifted
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The two cases in which judges played the greatest role will
demonstrate the exercise of judicial power at the extreme. In the
Johns-Manville reorganization, the judge held "oversight hearings"
to monitor negotiations, appointed a future health claimants'
representative who frequently consulted with the judge and became
"the catalyst for, if not the architect of" the reorganization
plan, 178 pressured lawyers to accept the proposals of the
representative, and twice enjoined shareholders from holding their
annual meeting. When equity balked at the plan, the judge
disbanded their committee. As a result, the common shareholders,
who had voted against the plan, were not represented by counsel at
the cramdown hearing. The judge confirmed the plan, and the
confirmation order was upheld on appeal.
179
In the Evans Products reorganization, the judge permitted
exclusivity to expire only 120 days into the case. Even though the
company bordered on solvency and cram down would ultimately
turn on the testimony of investment bankers about the value of the
securities being issued, the judge denied the motion of the official
Non-Insider Equity Committee to retain an investment banker or an
accountant. The controlling shareholder, a highly unpopular
corporate raider, blocked acceptance of a plan that would have
distributed $18 million to equity. The Non-Insider Equity
Committee sued to compel acceptance, but the judge refused to
Seatrain Lines Insignificant Extended
Smith International Insignificant Extended
Storage Technology Significant Extended
Tacoma Boatbuilding Significant Extended
Technical Equities Significant Extended
Towle Insignificant Extended
Towner Major Extended
White Motor Major Extended
Wickes Insignificant Extended
Wilson Foods Significant Extended
Column two is based on information we collected about the cases, and
interviewees' responses to two questions: (1) What role did the judge play in the
case? and (2) Did the judge condition extensions of exclusivity on progress in
negotiations? We then categorized the judges' role as "insignificant," "significant,"
or "major." The judgment as to significance of the role is our own. Column three
indicates whether exclusivity was extended until it was too late to file a competing
plan, regardless of whether a competing plan was filed.
178 In reJohns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 626 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
179 See Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 650 (2d Cir. 1988).
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intervene. The bank creditors then filed a different plan providing
nothing for equity. In the face of conventional wisdom that
litigation over valuation was so complex and unwieldy as to be
impractical, the judge scheduled a confirmation hearing with only
a single day for the presentation of evidence and argument, and he
informed counsel that no additional time would be allocated. At
the hearing, the same judge crammed down the plan-the only time
equity holders with representation were "zeroed out" in the cases in
our study.
180
It seems remarkable that the kind of power exercised in these
two cases goes unused in so many other cases.181  Judicial
restraint seems to be a norm in large reorganization cases. The
implicit understanding is that the appropriate judicial role involves
deciding issues brought before the court by parties in interest. That
each bankruptcy judge is assigned, on the average, more than 3000




In this Part we have examined the foundations of management
power and canvassed a variety of ways in which creditors and
shareholders can influence or control the exercise of that power.
To summarize, the fundamental source of management's power is
its ability to remain in office after the filing of the reorganization
case and to initiate the business and reorganization plans.
Shareholders may be able to vote the managers out of office and
creditors may be able to oust them through the appointment of a
trustee, but neither of these events is likely. The automatic stay
relieves the debtor of the necessity to repay already outstanding
debt.
!8o See In re Evans Prods. Co., 65 B.R. 31, 34 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1986).
181 For another account of a case in which the judge played a very active role in
overseeing the case, see RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE
DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY (1991). Thejudge in that case was a districtjudge, not
a bankruptcy judge. According to the report by Sobol, in a case in which top
management owned a major portion of the shares, the judge actively steered the
outcome of the proceedings towards the interests of shareholders and management.
The plan also released management from liability for breaches of fiduciary duty prior
to confirmation. See infra note 230.
182 See e.g., BANKRuPTCY YEARBOOK AND ALMANAc 6, 353-446 (Christopher M.
McHugh ed., 1992) (reporting 943,987 bankruptcy filings during 1991, handled by
approximately 300 bankruptcy judges).
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Individually or through their committees, creditors and
shareholders can resist management's implementation of the
business plan in court, but this direct approach is unlikely to be
successful. Their leverage against management is much greater with
regard to the plan of reorganization, where the consent of creditors
is considered to be a virtual necessity and the consent of organized
equity holders only somewhat less so. The perceived need for
creditor consent to the reorganization plan may give creditors
sufficient leverage to affect or control the business plan. If the
debtor must seek additional credit from existing creditors, it may
also fall under their hegemony.
Neither creditors nor shareholders are likely to take formal legal
action against managers for perceived breaches of the managers'
fiduciary duty of loyalty. Prepetition employment incentive
contracts are unlikely to motivate management to serve the interests
of shareholders once the reorganization case has been filed. But
contracts entered into postpetition may motivate management to
serve particular interests, most likely those of creditors. Finally, the
market for management services may provide important incentives
for management behavior during reorganization, but the effect is
uncertain as to both its magnitude and direction.
Together, the mechanisms discussed in this Part comprise the
system of corporate governance during the reorganization of large,
publicly held companies. The most prominent attribute of this
system is its complexity. Depending on the circumstances and the
inclinations of the principal actors, any one of these sources of
power may become predominant in a particular case. But it is more
likely that several influences over management power will operate
in a particular case, and each will pull management in a somewhat
different direction. Because these influences work in such a
conflicted environment, it is difficult to predict how management
will view their incentives in a particular case, let alone in a
population of cases.
III. THE APPLICATIONS OF MANAGEMENT POWER
In this Part we present empirical evidence about how much
power management had in the cases studied and for whose benefit
they exercised it. There is an ambiguity in the concept of
management power. In economic analyses, the choices people make
are presumed to be self-serving. If, for example, a manager eschews
salary and bonuses, instead allowing the money to be distributed to
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creditors and shareholders, the economist will say it is because the
manager derives more utility from allowing the money to be
distributed. From this perspective, managers are bound in service
to their own self-interest. If power is defined as having discretion
to determine the course of events, the only power managers have is
to choose between alternatives of precisely equal value to them, or
to make mistakes.18 3 Because of differences in the information
available to them, their abilities, and what they value, not all
managers will make the same choices, but they will all have the same
objective-to maximize their own utility.
In this Part we will consider management to have greater power
or autonomy when it appears that they have exercised their legal
authority in ways that serve their self-interest but do not
simultaneously serve the interests of other parties. In keeping with
the perspective of economic analysis, we will assume that if
management acted in a way that benefited creditors or shareholders
it must be because those groups could impose sanctions on
management. Because of the threatened sanctions, management
came to understand that acting in the interests of another group
was also in management's self-interest. We will describe such a
management as having had less power or autonomy. We will first
address the extent of management's power, and then discuss which
groups have benefitted from management's actions. In the latter
discussion, we will in effect be describing which groups were able to
compel management to act in the group's interest.
A. Methodology
Inquiry into these matters is difficult because there are no
simple, objective measures that can be used. How does one
measure the extent of management's autonomy or power, and then
compare it with the autonomy or power of management in a
different case? There are some objective benchmarks, such as
whether management stayed in office and preserved the exclusive
power to propose a plan. But even they are not unambiguous. The
lifting of exclusivity will not necessarily diminish the power of
management much; other parties may lack the information needed
185 SeeJeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law
and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1311 (1986) (noting that the "egoism" theory
of law and economics "holds that all decisions, unless mistaken, are by definition self-
interested. All choices ... are designed to maximize personal utility").
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to prepare a viable reorganization plan. In addition, a management
with all the trappings of power may in fact be compelled to do the
bidding of creditors; the managers may fear that a trustee will be
appointed or that needed interim financing will not be forthcoming.
We encountered similar problems in determining whose
interests management served. It was usually possible to discover
whether management favored a liquidation or continuation of the
company, and whether they proposed or advocated a distribution to
equity in a reorganization plan. Yet these facts alone do not reveal
whose interests were being advanced. Though liquidation is
commonly in the interests of creditors and reorganization serves the
interests of shareholders, they may not in particular cases. Even if
we know that management negotiated for a substantial distribution
to equity in violation of the absolute priority rule, we cannot
foreclose the possibility that management had the power to insist on
an even greater violation, but chose not to insist on it.
Our conclusions, then, are necessarily somewhat subjective. We
have drawn extensively on our interviews with the attorneys.
18 4
We have not simply accepted at face value what these attorneys told
us. In fact, different attorneys in the same case did not always have
the same opinion about such matters as the extent of management
power and in whose interest it was exercised. Rather, we have
interpreted what we were told, testing it against other information
about the cases derived from other sources, such as official
documents and newspaper stories. This methodology runs the risk
that other researchers might well have reached different conclusions
from the same sources of information, but there seems no other way
to address empirically the questions we have posed.
The utility of many empirical studies depends upon the degree
to which the sample of cases studied reflects the universe of cases
about which the study seeks to draw its conclusions. We chose to
study all chapter 11 reorganizations filed under the Bankruptcy
Code by or against publicly held corporations, if the bankruptcy
184 In each case we attempted to interview the principal lawyers for the debtor,
the creditors' committee and the equity committee (if appointed). In all but a few
instances, we were able to obtain the requested interviews. In a few cases, we
interviewed another lawyer who also played a key role in the case (e.g., an attorney
for a group of bank creditors). We conducted a total of 125 interviews. Some of the
interviews were in person; the majority were by telephone. The interviews ranged
from about 20 minutes to about an hour and a half in length, and many topics were
covered. The power and loyalties of management were central issues addressed in
each interview.
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petition reported $100 million or more in assets and the confirma-
tion of the reorganization plan occurred before March 15,
1988.185 Because we studied all cases within the indicated time-
frame and size limit, we did not need to calculate the probability
that a relationship not present in the universe of cases was present
in our sample purely by chance. The cases we studied may differ
from those currently before the bankruptcy courts because of
changes in the patterns of management behavior, the law, or other
factors. 186  Where we have reason to believe such changes have
occurred, we so note.
B. How Much Power Does Management Have?
1. Management Turnover as an Index of Power
We have already reported several empirical indications that
management's power was extensive in the cases studied. Trustees
were rarely appointed.18 7  Shareholders tried to discipline
management by electing new directors in only four instances; in two
of the four the court enjoined the attempt.1 88  Management
retained the exclusive authority to propose a plan of reorganization
for the duration of all but nine of the forty-three cases we
studied.189
One finding conflicts dramatically with this image of manage-
ment power during reorganization. The turnover rate for the CEOs
of these distressed companies was much higher than the turnover
rate for CEOs of most large, publicly held companies. In the period
starting eighteen months before filing and ending six months after
confirmation, there was at least one change in CEO in thirty-nine of
forty-three cases (91% of the total number of cases).
185 The Bankruptcy Code first became effective on October 1, 1979. See Act of
Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682. Our closing date for
our sample was dictated by the need to study the cases before we conducted our
attorney interviews. The majority of those interviews were conducted over the
summer of 1988.
186 Even though the law governing reorganization practice has remained stable
since 1979, we noticed that the practice itself has been evolving. We hypothesize that
this evolution reflects a process of experimentation and learning on the part of
lawyers, judges, and other participants in the cases. Reorganization practice is
dynamic.
187 See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 96-108 and accompanying text.
189 See Table III, supra note 177.
1993]
724 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:669
TABLE IV
CEO TURNOVER










Case Exiting CEO filing) bankruptcy? confirmation)




Amarex Mason +17 yes
Anglo Energy Johnson -3
Rhodes yes 0
Baldwin-United Thompson -5





Charter Mason +1 yes
Combustion Benningson +1 yes
Equipment Madden +12 yes
Kalven yes -6
190 Time of turnover is shown in relation to filing or confirmation, whichever is
closer in time to the CEO's departure. A negative number indicates that the turnover
occurred before the event. A turnover is considered to have occurred a stated
number of months before or after confirmation if it occurred closer to that number
of months before or after confirmation than to any other number of months. To
illustrate: a zero indicates that the turnover occurred within 15 days before or after
the event. If the bankruptcy case was filed on January 1, a "+1" indicates that the
turnover occurred during the period from January 16 to February 14. Because a
different system of counting was used in preparing Figures I and II, the number of
months shown on this Table for a particular resignation may be one month less than
the number shown in those figures.
191 A turnover was considered to have occurred "during bankruptcy" if it occurred
after the filing of the petition and before confirmation of the plan, or if it was
contemplated by the parties at the time the plan was confirmed. We considered a
resignation to be contemplated by the plan of reorganization if it was agreed to by
the CEO before or contemporaneous with confirmation of the plan. In some cases,
the agreements were reported in newspapers or we learned of them through
interviews. In others, the "agreement" was no more than an understanding among










Crystal Oil Roberts -10
Averett yes +5




EPIC Billman 0 yes
MDIF Management yes 0









Johns-Manville McKinney yes -4
Corp.
KDT Kittay (died) -2
Green yes 0
Lionel Saypol +5 yes
Wasserman +14 yes
Marion Stickelber +10 yes
Blohm 0










Phoenix Steel No turnover
during period
Pizza Time Bushnell -2
Theatre Pike 0 yes
Montgomery +4 yes
Munro +6 yes



















Storage Awieda +1 yes

















76 exiting CEOs 45 exits during bankruptcy
In thirty-one of these cases (72% of the total number of cases)
there was at least one change in CEO during the pendency of the
chapter 11 case, or contemplated by the plan of reorganization.
The changes were concentrated around the two critical dates in a
reorganization case, filing and confirmation. The first concentra-
tion was during the three-month period beginning two months
before the filing of the reorganization case. The second
concentration occurred in the month after confirmation. Other
studies have found a "normal" CEO turnover rate of approximately
10% annually for large, publicly held firms.1 92 If retirements are
192 We draw our information about the "normal" CEO turnover rate from the
many studies now being published attempting to link corporate performance to CEO
turnover. Two recent publications provide an annual CEO turnover rate comparable
to the data we have collected. Fizel and Louie used a sample drawn from Forbes'
annual report on executive compensation for 1984-85, and determined that 72 of the
706 CEO's were replaced in a one-year period. See John L. Fizel & Kenneth K.T.
Louie, CEO Retention, Firm Performance and Corporate Governance, 11 MANAGERIAL &
DECISION EcON. 167, 169 (1990). In another study, Puffer and Weintrop used a
sample of 480 large, publicly held U.S. corporations traded on the New York and
American stock exchanges and found a CEO turnover rate of 11% for 1983. See
Sheila H. Puffer &Joseph B. Weintrop, Corporate Performance and CEO Turnover: The
Role of Performance Expectations, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 6-7 (1991).
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excluded, the annual turnover rate for "normal" CEOs would be
considerably lower.19 3 For the CEOs of the companies we studied,
the comparable annualized turnover rate during the first
concentration period (around filing) was 167% per year.194 For the
second concentration period (the month after confirmation) the
annualized turnover rate was 307%.195
Surprising as these statistics are, they are consistent with two
other recent studies of CEO turnover during bankruptcy reorganiza-
tions. Gilson reported that only 29% of "senior managers"-defined
as the CEO, the chairman of the board, and the president-remain-
ed with the firm over a four year period beginning two years before
filing. 196  Betker found that only 9% (18 of 202) of the top
managers who held office two years before default still held office
one year after confirmation.
19 7
Some of the departures in the cases studied were voluntary; the
CEOs could have remained in office if they had chosen to do so.
For example, several of the CEOs who departed had established
193 Puffer and Weintrop excluded firms where the departing CEO was over age
63, on the theory that retirement probably produced the turnover. They then found
an annual turnover rate of 5.3%. See Puffer & Weintrop, supra note 192, at 7.
Weisbach studied turnovers among firms on the Forbes 500 list for 1970.80 and
excluded turnovers where the CEO was within one year of 65, again on the theory
that the turnover was caused by retirement. He found an annual turnover rate
between 4 and 5% in his sample. See Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO
Turnover, 20J. FIN. ECON. 431, 438, 454 (1988).
194 There were 18 CEO turnovers during this period. Seven of them occurred in
the month after filing. See infra Figure I accompanying note 198. The 18 turnovers
were divided among the 43 cases, an average of 0.4186 turnovers per case. We
annualized that turnover rate by dividing it by 1/4, the portion of a year included in
the first concentration period. That is, on the average, 1.67 turnovers occurred
during each case year of the concentration period.
195 In the month after confirmation there were 11 turnovers. See infra Figure II
accompanying note 201. In most of these cases, some or all of the parties consented
to confirmation only after there was agreement on management turnover. The 11
turnovers were divided among the 43 cases, an average of 0.2558 turnovers per case.
We annualized that turnover rate by dividing it by 1/12, the portion of a year
included in the second concentration period. That is, on the average, 3.07 turnovers
occurred during each case year of the concentration period.
196 See Stuart C. Gilson, Management Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. FIN.
EcON. 241, 247 tbl. 3 (1989).
197 See Betker, supra note 40, at 8.
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FIGURE 1198
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Months after
filing
reputations as turnaround managers or liquidators. Apparently in
accord with their intention at the time they took office, they
managed their companies until confirmation and then moved on to
other similar positions.1 99 Another CEO who had served a long
term in office left when he reached retirement age. 20 0 Though
the company was in reorganization, there was no indication that his
198 Figures I and II are based on data which differs slightly from that presented
in Table IVsupra accompanying note 190. The data in Table IV is based on calendar
months, while the data in this figure is based on a precise count of days from the
turnover to filing. Since the time from filing to confirmation varied for each of the
companies, this figure and the next do not represent the bulk of the time between
those two time periods. But the actual length of the proceedings is irrelevant, since
our data show that the turnover of the CEOs is concentrated around these two events
and the bankruptcy proceedings were not so short as to make the two figures overlap.
199 See supra note 172.
200 William F. Collins of Revere Copper & Brass. Mr. Collins continued to serve
as Chairman of the Board of Directors after his resignation as CEO.
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FIGURE 11201















resignation was forced. For nearly all of the other CEO changes in
our study, however, the resignation appeared to be involuntary.
In an effort to elaborate on these findings, we examined each
case to determine the fate of the CEO who was in office at the time
of the business failure that led to bankruptcy. Of the forty-two
companies that had such "tainted" CEOs, only the ones who headed
Seatrain Lines and Phoenix Steel remained continuously in their
positions through confirmation of a plan of reorganization. 20 2
Thus the rate of attrition for these "tainted" CEOs was 95%.
201 See supra note 198.
202 See infra Table V accompanying note 203.
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TABLE V
TURNOVER OF TAINTED CEOS
20 3
Creditor Debtor's CEO
participation in hired by
Company name & departure of purchaser to
Name of tainted Date tainted Months tainted run the
CEO20 4  CEO left from filing CEO?20°  business?
Air Florida Sept. 1981 -33 no no sale of
Acker business
AM International Feb. 1981 -15 no no sale of
Ash business
Amarex May 1984 +17 yes no
Mason
Anglo Energy Aug. 1983 -3 no no sale of
Johnson business
Baldwin-United Apr. 1983 -6 no no
Thompson
203 This Table shows the names of the "tainted" CEOs in the cases studied and the
times of their departures. The fourth column shows whether creditors participated
in the departures of the tainted CEOs. The last column shows whether purchasers
of the debtors' businesses hired the CEOs who were serving immediately prior to the
sales to continue to run those businesses.
204 We defined a CEO as tainted if the CEO was in office during the last
profitable year before filing and remained in office after it was apparent that the
company was in serious financial difficulty. While this theoretically rendered it
impossible to identify a manager in many hypothetical circumstances, in the large
majority of cases it presented no problem. The tainted manager served from long
before the company's financial difficulties arose until their manifestation was obvious.
In a few cases, we could not determine which of two CEOs who held office
successively should be considered tainted, but the problem was moot because both
resigned before confirmation.
In three of the 40 cases, the tainted CEO did not leave office until after
confirmation, but it was contemplated at the time of confirmation that he would leave
shortly thereafter. The CEOs were Posner (Evans Products), Solomon (HRT), and
Neely (Smith International).
2o5 We consider creditors to have "participated" in a turnover decision if we have
evidence that powerful creditor interests requested or suggested a change of CEO,
and the other information we have about the case is consistent with an assumption
that the change of CEO resulted in increased creditor influence over the
reorganization process. As we discussed earlier, there are many ways in which
creditors can exert pressure on the board of directors of a reorganizing company.
See supra notes 112-72 and accompanying text. In determining whether there was
creditor participation in CEO turnover, we interpreted our information
conservatively-that is, we did not attribute a turnover to creditor pressure unless we
had convincing information to that effect. We are confident, therefore, that creditor
participation in CEO turnover in the cases studied was even more extensive than we
report. In some instances the Wall Street Journal attributed the change to creditor
pressure. None of these attributions conflicted with our own interview data; we











yes no sale of
business
yes no
Continental Airlines Oct. 1982 -11 no no sale of
[Lorenzo's predecessor] business
Cook-United Feb. 1983 -18 no no sale of
Jeffers business
Crystal Oil Aug. 1985 -10 no no sale of
Roberts business
Dreco July 1982 +1 yes no sale of
Pheasy business
Energetics May 1984 -5 yes no sale of
Smith206  business
EPIC Sept. 1985 0 no no sale of
Billman business
Evans Products 1984 about yes no sale of
Orloff -12 business
FSC Aug. 1981 -1 no no sale of
Garland/Garmasi 2 7  business
HRT Feb. 1984 +15 no no
Solomon
Itel July 1979 -18 yes no sale of
Redfield business
Johns-Manville Corp. Aug. 1986 +48 yes no sale of
McKinney business
KDT June 1982 -2 no tainted CEO no
Kittay2 O8  departure
Lionel June 1982 +4 yes no sale of
Saypol business
Marion Jan. 1984 +1 no no sale of
Stickelber business
McLouth May 1982 +4 yes yes
Cann
MGF July 1983 -17 yes no sale of
Major business
NuCorp May 1982 -2 no no sale of
Burns business
Oxoco Apr. 1985 -17 yes no sale of
Carr business
206 Smith was later reinstated as CEO, but only after nearly all of the company's
assets were surrendered to its principal lender.
207 The two served simultaneously as CEO.
208 Kittay died in office.
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Penn-Dixie May 1977 -23 no no sale of
Castle business
Phoenix Steel Survived no tainted CEO no sale of
Hug departure business
Pizza Time Theatre Feb. 1984 -2 yes no
Bushnell
Revere Aug. 1984 +22 no no sale of
Collins business
Salant Mar. 1985 +1 no no sale of
Forcheski business
Sambo's Restaurants July 1979 -28 no no sale of
Battistone business
Saxon Apr. 1982 0 no no
Lurie
Seatrain Lines Survived no tainted CEO no sale of
Pack departure business
Smith International Nov. 1987 +20 yes no sale of
Neely business
Storage Technology Dec. 1984 +1 yes no sale of
Aweida business
Tacoma Boatbuilding Apr. 1985 -7 no no sale of
Lowe business
Technical Equities Jan. 1986 -.05 yes no sale of
Stern business
Towle Nov. 1985 -5 no no sale of
Florence business
Towner Apr. 1984 -5 no no sale of
Towner business
White Motor July 1979 -14 no no sale of
Knudsen business
Wickes Mar. 1982 -1 yes no sale of
McNeely business
Wilson Foods no tainted CEO no sale of
No tainted CEO 209  departure business
Tainted CEOs were not the only ones to suffer abnormally high
rates of attrition. We also discovered abnormally high rates among
the replacement CEOs who succeeded them in office. We defined
a "replacement" CEO as a CEO who was not tainted, court-
appointed as a trustee, or interim. We considered a CEO interim
if the manager served only during the search for his successor.
2 10
Some replacement managers were hired with the expectation they
2
09 This company had no profitable year after it was spun off from LTV
Corporation. Therefore, by our definition, it had no tainted CEO.
TO The masculine pronoun is used because all CEOs in the cases studied were
men.
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would serve only during reorganization; we included them in the
category of replacement managers. We investigated the turnover
rates for replacement CEOs for the period from filing of the
reorganization case to thirty days after confirmation of the plan.
We determined the number of replacement CEOs who left office
during the period and divided it by the total number of years that
replacement CEOs served in office during the period.211 The rate
of turnover was 31% per year, several times the rate of turnover for
the CEOs of large, publicly held companies.
212
TABLE VI




manager years for manager turnover



















211 See infra note 213.
212 See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
213 This Table shows the data from which we calculated the rate of turnover for
non-tainted ("replacement") CEOs during the period from the filing of the
bankruptcy case to 30 days after confirmation of the plan. That rate is the ratio of
turnovers of replacement CEOs during the subject period (24), divided by the total
number of years served by all replacement CEOs during the subject period (76.25).
Thus, we eliminated from the numerator the turnovers of tainted CEOs and court-
appointed trustees during the subject period and we eliminated from the
denominator those portions of the subject period during which a tainted CEO or a
trustee served as CEO. We also eliminated from the denominator the period after
sale of all of the company's assets and during which the company had no CEO. The
turnover ratio thus calculated was 31% per year.
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214 Smith was the CEO before the bankruptcy petition, but was replaced and later




















































215 During the case, while Deaner was managing McLouth Steel, the company sold
substantially all of its assets, including the name McLouth Steel, to Tang Industries.
Deaner continued as CEO of the Tang subsidiary that contained the assets. The
debtor company changed its name to MLX and reorganized around the company's
net operating losses (NOLs). Because neither Deaner nor Panny lost their jobs
during the remainder of the case, we did not have to determine which of them was
CEO of the "real" McLouth Steel.
216 Gait was appointed trusteeJanuary 11, 1983. We do not include his tenure in
office in computing the total time that replacement managers served.
217 McLaughlin was appointed trustee December 8, 1983. We do not include his
tenure in office in computing the total time that replacement managers served.
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It is not entirely clear what caused the rates of turnover for
these companies to be so high. Several factors were at work. The
reorganizing companies we studied were frequently bought and
sold; the buyer nearly always installed its own CEO even if there was
no particular reason to be dissatisfied with the performance of the
incumbent. 2 19  Some companies were liquidated piecemeal;
reorganization eliminated the job of CEO along with the company.
Replacement managers that came from within the companies may
have been so closely linked to the ousted managers that they fell
heir to the ousted manager's opposition. 220  If one assumes
retaining their jobs is a high priority for managers, these findings
218 Griggy was neither a tainted manager nor a replacement manager. For that
reason, we do not include Wilson Foods in the statistic on the rate of turnover for
replacement managers.
219 See supra note 59.
220 Examples include Pizza Time Theatre, in which three successive replacement
managers from within the company lasted a total of about eight months, and
Manville, in which the hand picked successor of the outgoing CEO drew so much
criticism that the appointment was scrapped shortly after it was announced. Our
sources conflict as to whether the replacement CEO in Manville ever actually assumed
office. The managers of companies not in financial distress may be less likely to have
serious opposition.
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suggest that managers have relatively little power during bankruptcy
reorganization.
This conclusion is strengthened by evidence that CEO turnover
frequently resulted from creditor pressure.221 Drawing on news
reports and our interviews with attorneys participating in the cases,
we found evidence that creditors "participated" in causing the
departure of eighteen of the forty tainted CEOs who left office
before or during the reorganization.
222
The high attrition rate for tainted managers might be explained
by a cultural norm that when a large, publicly held company suffers
the kind of massive loss223  that leads to bankruptcy
reorganization, someone must take the blame. By analogy to the
notion of ministerial responsibility in parliamentary governments,
perhaps the CEO must accept responsibility when something goes
wrong on the CEO's "watch." But the fact that replacement
managers also have a high rate of turnover indicates that more than
a cultural norm is involved. Management autonomy is limited.
Chapter 11 is not a safe haven for incumbent management, as it is
sometimes described.224
221 See Gilson, supra note 196, at 249 tbl. 4 (finding evidence of creditor pressure
in 20 of 176 top management (CEO, president, or board chair) changes based on
Wall StreetJournal reports); Betker, supra note 40, at 10 (finding evidence of creditor
pressure in 12 of 68 CEO changes based on the same sources).
22 Seesupra Table V accompanying note 203. Considering only the tainted CEOs
who left during the bankruptcy case, the level of creditor participation is even higher.
Nine of 14 such departures (64%) involved creditor participation. See supra Table V
accompanying note 203. The rate of creditor participation in departures may have
been higher during reorganization because (1) creditors sought to remove CEOs only
after the boards failed to do so or (2) creditors had less fear of lender liability for
participating in the debtor's personnel decisions once the reorganization proceeding
had been commenced. It is also possible that creditor participation was as high
before as during reorganization, but our methodology was more likely to discover
participation during reorganization.
223 The magnitude of these losses is reflected in the losses of the companies'
investors. Creditors received what they were owed at filing in only five of the 43
cases we studied. See LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining OverEquity's Share, supra note
16, at 166 tbl. IV(A). If one assumes that creditors are not made whole unless they
receive both what they are owed at filing plus interest at market rates between filing
and confirmation (a period that averages over 2.5 years), then creditors received full
payment in only one of the 43 cases we studied. See id. at 176 tbl. IV(B). Except
when the company was solvent, shareholders received relatively minimal distributions.
See id. at 142 tbl. III.
224 See supra note 10.
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2. Coverups and Grabs as Indicators of Management Power
One of the Douglas Report's principal criticisms of the pre-1939
procedure for reorganization was that managers were able to remain
in control of the company and manipulate the reorganization case
for their own benefit. The report particularly emphasized manage-
ment's ability to use that control to foreclose investigations into
their own prior wrongdoing. 225 In this section we attempt to
assess the degree to which this criticism remains valid under post-
1979 reorganization procedure.
Managers in the cases studied were certainly not uniformly
successful in foreclosing investigation into their own wrongdoing.
In four of the cases, CEOs ousted from control were later indicted
for defrauding the company.226 The SEC brought administrative
charges against several others. 227  Replacement managements
sometimes pursued claims against previously dismissed managers for
the benefit of the corporation and the claimants in the
reorganization proceeding.
2 28
225 See Dodd, supra note 80, at 225-31.
226 In Saxon, Penn-Dixie, and Technical Equities, the "tainted" CEO was indicted
and convicted of fraud. Each received a prison sentence. See Technical Equities
Founder Gets 5 Years for Fraud, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1988, pt. IV, at 2 (Technical
Equities); Business Briefs, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 1986, at 7 (Saxon); Former Penn-Dixie
Chief Officer is Fined, Given 15-Month Term, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 1979, at 34 (Penn-
Dixie). In EPIC, the "tainted" CEO was indicted but became a fugitive from justice.
See Paul W. Valentine, Fugitive Head of Md. S&L Faces U.S. Charges, WASH. PosT, Jan.
31, 1990, at B7.
227 See, e.g., Ex-Baldwin Chief Settles, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1987, at B30 (Morley
Thompson, former CEO of Baldwin-United, charged by SEC with accounting
irregularities, and proxy solicitation and fraud violations; case settled by consent
order); Bill RitterJudge Rules Ex-Nucorp Boss Committed Fraud, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20,
1985, pt. IV, at 1 (Richard Burns, former CEO of Nucorp, found to have defrauded
investors and creditors in a case brought by the SEC; Burns enjoined from violating
SEC regulations in the future); Robert E. Dallos, Big Accounting Firm Charged with
Fraud, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1985, pt. IV, at 2 (former AM International executives
charged with accounting irregularities by the SEC).
In a number of cases, shareholder and creditor groups brought fraud actions
against the former managers. Since these actions were against the managers in their
individual capacities, they were not automatically stayed by the corporation's
bankruptcy. When successful, these actions in effect increased the recovery of the
plaintiff classes. See, e.g., Bill Ritter, Several Nucorp Suits Settled for $41 Million, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1986, pt. IV, at 2 (Richard Burns, former CEO of Nucorp, settled
class action by shareholders for $41 million). In interviews, we were told that a class
action by creditor classes against former executives of Technical Equities was settled
for an amount that allowed those creditors to recover 30 to 40% of their claims even
before there was any distribution from the bankruptcy estate.
228 This occurred in the cases of Technical Equities, EPIC, and Baldwin-United.
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But events in other cases suggest that reorganization procedure
sometimes enables managers to escape liability for their wrongdo-
ing. Through its strong presumption against appointment of
trustees and its grant of considerable powers of initiative, reorgani-
zation procedure gives even badly tainted managers leverage to
negotiate their exits. 229 As part of the exit deal, management may
receive a release of liability.210 The filing of the reorganization
case may also have the effect of hindering or delaying actions by
defrauded creditors and shareholders against current and former
managers. 231 These continuing problems demonstrate that the
In each of these cases, damages actions against former officers were unresolved at the
time of confirmation. Since it was anticipated that the proceeds of the action would
be substantial, the reorganization plan made special provision for the distribution of
the proceeds once the litigation was resolved. In Baldwin-United, for example, a trust
was established and assigned the claim against former managers, with various
creditors made beneficiaries of the trust. We estimate that the value of the trust
constituted more than 15% of the total distribution to unsecured creditors and
equityholders in that case.
229 For example, in Manville, the CEO McKinney was essentially forced out of
office by creditors. At the time of his exit, he negotiated severance pay of more than
$1.1 million. Such an exchange is perhaps even easier to accomplish before a
reorganization case is filed because court approval is not required. For example, the
co-CEOs who founded Itel Corporation and led it to financial disaster resigned 18
months before the filing of the reorganization case, pursuant to an agreement under
which they received slightly less than $1 million in severance benefits. The court-
appointed examiner later concluded that the co-CEOs had breached fiduciary duties
to the company. The examiner recommended that the company rescind the
agreement and sue to recover the benefits, but the report was never acted upon, and
the co-CEOs kept the money. International Harvester Company, a case not in our
study, provides another example. In that case, CEO Archie McCardell received some
$600,000 in severance pay in return for his resignation. See MARSH, supra note 166,
at 273. The company never filed bankruptcy, but eventually liquidated most of its
assets and paid the proceeds to creditors.
230 For example, in Braniff Airways, management proposed a plan of reorganiza-
tion that provided for the release of both present and former managers from all
liabilities that arose before the confirmation date, including possible liability for
mismanagement. See Disclosure Statement Pursuant to Section 1125 of the
Bankruptcy Code at 95-100, In re Braniff Airways, Inc., No. 482-00369 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. July 15, 1983). Though the provision was controversial and of questionable
legality, all classes of creditors and shareholders voted in favor of the plan. It was
confirmed and the managers were released.
A similar provision was included in the plan of reorganization that was confirmed
in In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 701 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959
(1989). In the Texaco bankruptcy, a provision of the plan exempted corporate officers
of any liability to the corporation for breach of fiduciary duty. See In re Texaco, Inc.,
84 B.R. 893, 900 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
231 For example, in Pizza Time Theatre, the tainted CEO resigned before filing,
but left the company in the hands of allies. When defrauded bondholders sued the
former CEO, the company was able to persuade the bankruptcy court to enjoin the
1993)
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1979 reform has given at least some managers who led their
companies into financial distress the ability to inhibit inquiry into
their wrongdoing and to escape liability for it.
In the course of our study, we became suspicious that some
CEOs were using leverage generated from the power vested in the
debtor-in-possession by the Bankruptcy Code to negotiate increases
in their personal compensation. 23 2 To investigate this possibility,
we collected data on the levels of CEO compensation and the
circumstances in which that compensation was negotiated. When
we concluded that, because of the bargaining leverages provided to
management by the Bankruptcy Code, compensation was higher
than it otherwise would have been, we labeled it a management
"grab." This effort involved a good deal of subjective judgment on
our part because there are no readily available bench marks for
determining what compensation would have been under ordinary
circumstances. Compensation for the managers of large, publicly
held companies varies considerably.
233
In analyzing our data, we began with a presumption that
compensation was not the product of a "grab." We nevertheless
were able to identify five reasonably clear "grabs" in our study of
forty-three cases.234  In addition to these five cases, there were
action for a period of time. See Debtor's Second Amended Disclosure Statement at
18, In re Pizza Time Theatre, Inc., No. 584-00941-M (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 1985).
A second example from our study is the Amarex case. Management were the
representatives of a controlling shareholder block whose members were defendants
in a class action for allegedly misleading investors in the company. On the basis of
our interviews, we are fairly certain that management's primary goal in the
reorganization was to limit the amount of useful information about the company
obtainable by the representatives of the class action plaintiffs. In fact, the defendants
ultimately settled the class actions on favorable terms. Management was also
concerned about protecting the interests of limited partner investors in partnerships
in which the company was the general partner. These limited partner investors
included many persons with whom the controlling shareholder interests had
continuing business relations, and their interests did receive favorable treatment in
the bankruptcy reorganization.
232 For example, in McLouth Steel, creditors forced the resignation of the CEO
about six months after filing and brought in an outside management team to run the
company. About two months after its arrival, the new management team demanded
and received substantial bonuses. Because management had just forced give-backs
from the unions, the bonus demands embarrassed virtually everyone concerned. But
at that time it would have been very difficult for the company to find new manage-
ment because its continued existence was in serious doubt. Creditors and the court
acceded to the demand.
233 See John A. Byrne, The Flap Over Executive Pay, Bus. WK., May 6, 1991, at 90,
90-112 (reporting that compensation for CEOs among 365 large, publicly held
companies ranged from $210,000 annually to $18,000,000 annually).
2M The cases are Cook-United, HRT, McLouth Steel, Seatrain Lines, and Tacoma
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three other cases in which management successfully renegotiated
their employment contracts during plan negotiations. While
acquiescence in these demands by the other parties certainly could
be seen as concessions to management's reorganization bargaining
leverages, in each instance management could plausibly defend the
award as justified by their extraordinary service in bringing the
company successfully through the reorganization, and by the need
to keep the management team in place in the years immediately
after confirmation. As a result, we could not clearly classify these
cases as "grabs."
235
Boatbuilding. The information reported below about these cases comes principally
from the disclosure statements accompanying the plans that were confirmed,
subsequent SEC 10-K statements, and interviews we conducted with attorneys in the
cases.
In Cook-United, an outside investor provided a small amount of cash and
considerable consulting help in return for four of eleven seats on the Board of
Directors. A member of the investor group was appointed CEO. The reorganization
plan, confirmed a year later, allocated that CEO shares with a value, by our
calculations, of over $1,800,000, plus some additional options. This allocation was
in addition to the shares allocated to the investor group as part of the original deal.
In HRT, the incumbent CEO went along with a plan under which a controlling
interest was awarded to outside investors in return for a cash contribution that was
used to fund distributions to creditors under the plan. Before agreeing to this plan,
however, the CEO negotiated a four year employment contract, which the creditors'
committee and the outside investors agreed to support. The contract was entered
into even though it was understood by all concerned that the outside investors
intended to bring in their own management. A few months after confirmation, the
outside investor group bought out the CEO's contract for $1,100,000, plus a one year
$200,000 consulting contract.
McLouth Steel is discussed supra note 232,
In Seatrain Lines, the company almost totally liquidated over the six year period
it was in chapter 11. Management received five year employment contracts at
confirmation, a deal that they insisted upon in return for their support of the
reorganization plan.
In Tacoma Boatbuilding, a case which resembles Cook-United in some respects,
outside investors acquired control of the company before reorganization and installed
their own managers. After suffering additional financial reverses, the investor's
shares were grossly underwater and the investor ceased to be a major player in the
case. The managers continued in office and successfully proposed a plan of
reorganization that provided themselves with one-third of the reorganization shares.
255 The three cases are AM International, Salant, and Wickes. The information
reported below comes principally from the disclosure statements accompanying the
plans that were confirmed, subsequent SEC 10-K statements, and interviews we
conducted with attorneys involved in the cases.
In AM International, the CEO was given a three year employment contract
shortly before confirmation. Under this contract, the CEO not only received a
$300,000 annual salary, but at confirmation he received shares worth about $600,000
plus options to purchase four times as many additional shares at a potentially
favorable price.
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We consider these grabs evidence that in some reorganization
cases management derives considerable power from their
incumbency. That we could not identify more grabs may indicate
that the various checks on management power work in most cases.
We cannot conclude that solely self-serving management behavior
was as pervasive as it appears from the Douglas Report to have been
prior to 1939.236
C. For Whose Benefit Did They Manage?
As one might expect, when we asked lawyer-interviewees whose
interests a particular manager served, their responses were not
always consistent. Our task was complicated by the fact that often
more than one CEO was in office during the period in which the
business and reorganization plans were being formulated. In an
effort to bring some order to the massive amount of information we
collected, we invented four distinct models of management behavior
during reorganization. We then examined the data for each of our
cases to see which of our models most clearly and reasonably
described the behavior of the CEO or CEOs exercising management
authority when the business and reorganization plans were being
formulated and approved.
The models that we invented are as follows:
1. Aligned with creditor interests. By "aligned," we mean that
management generally took the side of creditors in the exercise
of its discretion during the case. We also included cases in
which management was aligned with one creditor group against
In Salant, the CEO received a five year employment contract at confirmation,
plus shares worth about $1 million. This executive was given credit by all parties for
having reversed the company's fortunes, and his continued presence at the company
was considered important to its future success.
In Wickes, senior management received as a bonus a package of cash, short term
notes, and warrants to purchase stock that had an estimated value of $18 million.
About one-fourth of this package went to the CEO. The CEO also entered into a five
year employment contract at confirmation at a salary approaching $1 million
annually. As in Salant, the management team in Wickes received credit from most
parties for having done an excellentjob in leading the company through reorganiza-
tion and providing a greater distribution to creditors under the reorganization plan
than had once been thought possible.
236 In fact, it may be that management has as much or more of this institutionally
generated leverage in the absence of bankruptcy. At least if the debtor hias filed
bankruptcy, other parties have ready access to legal process to control management
excesses.
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another creditor group (e.g., with secured creditors against
unsecured creditors).
2. Aligned with shareholder interests. Management advocated
what they considered to be the interests of shareholders, or
some class of shareholders-even if they did not cooperate with
an equity committee that had been appointed.237
3. Maximize the estate. Management was not aligned with
either creditors or shareholders. Instead, management sought
to maximize the value that could be distributed under the
reorganization plan and did not hesitate to liquidate assets if
that seemed the best way to do so. These managements did not
play an active role in negotiating about the strictly distributional
issues that are covered in a reorganization plan.
238
4. Preserve the company. Management was not aligned with
either creditors or shareholders. Instead, management was
committed to preserving some part of the traditional business
as a going concern under the same corporate structure. This
goal could serve the interests of various parties, including
management itself if it preserved their jobs. The actual
beneficiaries of the policy varied from case to case.
We classified a management as "aligned with" creditors or
shareholders if they fit one of those two definitions. Only if they
did not, did we consider whether to place them in one of the other
two categories. Classification of a management as aligned with
creditors or shareholders, therefore, does not imply that the
management did not attempt to maximize the estate or preserve the
company.
237 The Evans Products case provides an extreme example of a management that
advocated the interests of shareholders but did not work cooperatively with the
official equity committee. See infra note 242.
2-8 In these cases, management might take an active interest in the financial
structure of the post-confirmation company, believing that the amount of debt
outstanding relative to equity can affect the total value of the reorganizing company.
See generally RICHARD A. BREALY & STEWART C. MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 407-37 (3d ed. 1988) (outlining a theory of optimal capital structure based
upon an analysis of taxes, risk asset type, and the need for financial slack). But once
the basic financial structure was determined, management was indifferent as to who
should receive the various securities.
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A "preserve the company" orientation often served primarily the
interests of shareholders. Even though our "aligned with sharehold-
ers" category does not require active cooperation with the equity
class, but only identification with their welfare, we considered it
appropriate to create a separate category for two reasons. First,
there are circumstances in which reorganization is very much in the
interests of creditors. For example, unless creditors stand to
recover all or substantially all of their claims through liquidation, a
capture of the going concern value of the company through
reorganization will redound largely to their benefit.239 Second,
managements adopting a "preserve the company" approach typically
profess to be motivated by goals distinct from the interests of either
creditors or shareholders. These goals may include preserving the
"institution" as an end in itself, and protecting the welfare of
employees, suppliers, customers, and the communities in which the
company's businesses operate.
In a number of cases, management behavior seemed to have
characteristics of several of our categories. In one case, manage-
ment was closely aligned with creditors on most issues but with
shareholders on others. Another management fought to preserve
the company, but when that effort failed and creditors forced
liquidation, that management's new objective seemed to be to
obtain a grab. In still other cases, managers resigned during the
relevant period and their successors seemed to follow different
models. We did not classify the managements in these cases.
Finally, we did not classify the behavior of the trustees in the two
cases in which trustees were appointed.
Even after those exclusions, we were able to classify the
managements of twenty-five of our forty-three cases. The results are
shown in the following table.
239 As we reported in an earlier article, in cases in which large, publicly held
companies are insolvent, distributions to equity classes tend to be small. See LoPucki










































Several implications can be drawn from this table. First,
management does not consistently favor or represent either creditor
or shareholder interests. Although this finding is contrary to the
assumptions and conclusions of numerous authorities,241 it should
not be surprising. The sources of, and checks on, management
power are numerous and sensitive to variations in the underlying
facts. In light of such complexity, it would be surprising indeed if
managers aligned themselves with the same interests in every case,
or even if their behavior was easily predictable.
Second, the alignment of management is clearly a function of
solvency. The managements of solvent companies never aligned
with creditors; the managements of insolvent companies aligned
with creditors far more frequently than they aligned with sharehold-
ers. The same correlation with solvency would hold if we placed
managements who sought to maximize the estate in the creditor
column and managements who sought to preserve the company in
the shareholder column.
Third, management aligned with shareholders in only five
cases.242  It is interesting to note that in all five cases large
240 Of the 18 cases we could not classify, four concerned solvent companies and
the remaining 14 were insolvent.
241 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
242 In two of the five, the alignment was far from perfect. In Evans Products, the
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shareholders held seats on the board of directors. We suspect that
the existence of an active shareholder who holds a large block of
shares is an important factor in equity's ability to command the
allegiance of management. Among the thirty-two cases of insolvent
debtors, management aligned with shareholders only twice, and in
both of those cases a shareholder owning a controlling block of
shares was personally involved in management.
24 3
In addition to our classifications of management, several other
findings from our study buttress the conclusion that creditors
dominate many of the managements of insolvent, reorganizing
companies. First, recall that creditors frequently participated in
CEO turnover in circumstances consistent with the assumption that
the turnover resulted in greater creditor influence over management
conduct.
244
Second, when chapter 11 was enacted, some commentators
anticipated that reorganization plans for large, publicly held
companies would deviate substantially from the absolute priority
rule, because they assumed that management would have substantial
power to determine the outcome and would act in the interests of
shareholders. 245 In an earlier article, we documented that while
there were systematic deviations from the absolute priority rule
among the cases of the clearly insolvent debtors studied, those
deviations were usually small.246 If management had substantial
major shareholder and the equity committee were in open opposition to each other.
The creditors' committee and the equity committee agreed on a plan that provided
the equity class with a distribution valued at $18 million. The CEO (Victor Posner),
who was also the major shareholder, owning 42% of the shares, blocked approval of
the plan. The creditors then withdrew their support of the plan and instead sought
and obtained confirmation by cram down of a plan that provided equity with nothing.
We classified this management as nonetheless aligned with shareholders because the
CEO's actions, though ultimately counter-productive, were apparently motivated by
the goal of maximizing the distribution to the shareholder class. Some participants
believed that the CEO resisted the original plan because he was seeking a "side deal,"
but we do not have credible evidence to confirm this rumor.
In Dreco Energy, the CEO was a management consultant hired by the board at
the insistence of creditors. We classified this case as nonetheless aligned with
shareholders, because the powers of initiative normally possessed by management
were shared in this case with a major shareholder, who was the former CEO.
243 The two cases were Dreco Energy and Evans Products. Both had large
shareholders as chairman of the board of directors.
244 See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
245 These commentators are cited in LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's
Share, supra note 16, at 134 n.26.
246 See id. at 142 tbl. III col. 5. If two exceptional cases are excluded, the
distribution to equity classes in insolvent cases ranged from 0% to 8.1% of the total
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power and consistently exercised it in the interests of shareholders,
we would expect the deviations to have been more substantial.247
Finally, substantial creditor influence over management can be
inferred from the frequency with which significant corporate assets
were liquidated. We found that in thirty of the forty-three cases in
our study there was extensive liquidation of assets.248 Sometimes
the business was sold as a unit. Sometimes it was sold off in pieces
with the original entity retaining few assets other than tax losses
(NOLs) that could be deducted against future profits. Most
frequently, the company sold off large blocks of its assets during
chapter 11 and reorganized with the remaining assets as a much
smaller company. Liquidation of assets is in general, though not
without exception,249 a reorganization strategy that favors creditor
interests. In a forthcoming article, we report the data on liquida-
tion and shrinking more extensively.
250
value of the assets distributed to unsecured and equity classes under the reorganiza-
tion plan.
247 We reported in our earlier study that one reason distributions were made to
junior interests in violation of the absolute priority rule is that management
sometimes held out in reorganization plan negotiations for such a distribution, even
in cases in which no equity committee had been appointed at all. See id. at 150-52.
That management sometimes holds out for distributions to equity under a
reorganization plan does not establish that management is wholeheartedly committed
to equity's welfare. If it were, the deviations from the absolute priority rule would
probably have been much greater. But it does demonstrate that at least some
managements were not totally indifferent to the welfare of shareholders.
24 See infra Table VIII accompanying note 290. In some cases, the actual
liquidation took place post-confirmation, although it clearly was contemplated by all
parties at the time of confirmation that liquidation would take place. Liquidation
after confirmation avoids the necessity for bankruptcy court approval of the sales.
See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1988).
249 In Dreco Energy, for example, there was extensive liquidation of assets even
though management's negotiating strategy was directly controlled by a major
shareholder. Shareholder interests also received a substantial distribution under the
reorganization plan-the largest deviation from the absolute priority rule in our study.
See LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share, supra note 16, at 142 tbl. III.
Providing shareholders can be assured of a substantial distribution under the
reorganization plan, liquidation of unproductive assets can be in the shareholders'
interest.
250 See LoPucki & Whitford, Patterns, supra note 16.
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D. The Lack of Corporate Expansion
Earlier in this Article, we demonstrated that the making of high
risk investments that might sharply increase the value of the
company during a reorganization case is generally in the interests
of shareholders or junior creditors whose interests are underwa-
ter.25 1  Such investments were relatively rare among the cases
studied. Generally, these companies did not start new businesses,
make acquisitions not integrally related to the company's existing
business,2 52 expand significantly the existing business, 253 or
engage in other high risk activity.2 54  There seemed to be a
cultural norm that such investments were inappropriate for a
company in reorganization. 255 Several debtors had large amounts
251 See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
252 While it was common for the debtor companies to be acquired by others
during their reorganization cases, in only two instances did the debtors acquire other
companies. Salant, a manufacturer of clothing, was permitted to acquire Claxtenport,
which owned a process for putting creases in clothing. Air Florida, which had sold
all of its assets to Midway Airlines, was encouraged by the court to acquire another
airline company so that it could make use of its net operating loss carry forwards
(NOLs). Air Florida acquired Pocono Airlines during the reorganization case.
253 Continental Airlines was the only company in our study that increased the size
of its assets, sales, and employees during reorganization. The increase was
controversial and the court restricted it. Interviewees told us that the controversy
forced Continental to propose a plan and emerge from chapter 11 sooner than they
otherwise would have.
254 There were two exceptions. The debtor in Sambo's Restaurants gambled and
lost a large portion of the estate on new restaurant formats during reorganization.
But that case was one of the few in which there was no substantial separation of
possibility of gain from risk of loss. There was only a single level of debt, and equity
was so far underwater that any distribution made to them probably would have been
nominal even in the best circumstances. The unsecured creditors' committee, whose
constituents had the great bulk of the possibility of gain and the risk of loss, approved
the gamble.
Storage Technology completed development of a new product while in chapter
11, and the product was very successful. Its success enabled Storage Technology to
become solvent before confirmation. Because of the company's solvency, creditors
received post-petition interest under the reorganization plan. So this too ended up
being a case in which creditors shared in the profits from the new investment.
2 5A Two incidents in cases from our study illustrate this norm. During the
Continental Airlines case, the court refused to permit the debtor to buy United
Micronesian Development Association, the controlling shareholder in Air Micronesia.
The court stated: "The Code does not expressly prohibit the takeover of an
independent corporation during the course of reorganization. There are, however,
extenuating circumstances which render the attempted takeover of UMDA, under the
aegis of the Bankruptcy Court (Texas), inconsistent with the equitable principles that
pervade bankruptcy administration." Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Hillblom (In re
Continental Air Lines, Inc.), 61 B.R. 758, 783 n.49 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
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of net operating loss carryovers and designed acquisition strategies
as a way to utilize those carryovers. Nearly all of these debtors
believed that they could pursue these strategies only after
confirmation. Indeed, the desire to expand was cited as one reason
to press for quick confirmation of a reorganization plan.
256
Both the lack of corporate expansion and the frequency with
which assets were liquidated are consistent with the view that
creditors dominated the governance of these companies. Another
observation, however, cuts in the opposite direction. In the early
stages of the reorganization cases it was common practice for
management to seek to maintain current business activities, often
under the rubric of "preserving the company."257 The resulting
delays provided an opportunity for upsurges in company fortunes
that would serve the interests of shareholders and junior creditors,
though that rarely happened.
Later in this Article, we argue that both the lack of expansion
and the delays in liquidation result from a single principle of
reorganization governance, which we call "prudent invest-
ment."258 For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the
practices of management with respect to delaying liquidations but
During the Manville case, creditors objected to the debtor's attempt to invest $15
million in ajoint venture in a platinum mine. The argument against court approval
was that mining was "outside the company's main line of business-building
materials." Sandra D. Atchison, Platinum: The Birth of an American Industly, Bus.
WK., Jan. 27, 1986, at 64, 64. Near the end of the case, the creditors agreed to the
venture and it was approved. See Manville Receives Go Ahead for Mining Venture,
Business Wire, July 31, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Bwire File.
256 In both Wickes Companies and Salant, interviewees told us they thought the
companies pressed to get out of reorganization as quickly as possible so that
acquisitions could begin. McLouth Steel and White Motor were other cases in which
the plan of reorganization contemplated acquisitions after confirmation. Both
companies waited until after confirmation to begin. The exception was Air Florida.
Like McLouth Steel, Air Florida disposed of all of its assets during the reorganization
case. With the approval of all parties active in the case, the company then acquired
Pocono Airlines prior to confirmation. The purpose of the acquisition was to
preserve Air Florida's NOLs by satisfying any possible "continuity of business"
requirement under tax law.
257 We concluded that in 25 of the 43 cases in our study there was at least one
major asset sale at or before confirmation. In only nine of those 25 cases did the first
sale occur in the first six months after filing. See infra Table VIII accompanying note
290. Much of the delay in the sale of major assets can be attributed to management's
initial resistance to the break up of the company. During the early months of a case,
management automatically enjoys exclusive authority to propose a plan, while the
creditors' committee often is occupied with the tasks of organizing itself, hiring
counsel, and the like.
258 See infra notes 340.49 and accompanying text.
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avoiding business expansions in chapter 11 provide mixed evidence
about the basic question of whose interests are being served. Like
so much of the evidence presented above, they suggest that in some
respects management puts the interests of creditors first, but that
in other respects they do not.
E. Summary and Assessment
We used an unusual methodology in this study. It is somewhat
akin to an anthropological study, in which an observer attempts a
holistic explanation of a culture after immersion in it for an
extended period of time. We have not exactly immersed ourselves
in the forty-three cases we studied, 259 but we have collected
information from many sources, and we have attempted to
characterize management behavior in a holistic way. This
methodology has the weakness that the conclusions reached are
dependent on our somewhat subjective judgments. We cannot be
certain that if other researchers had done the same work, they
would have come to the same conclusions. On the other hand, if
research on corporate governance issues in bankruptcy is ever to
expand beyond a priori theorizing based on untested
assumptions, 260 something like our methodology will have to be
used. There are no evident objective tests for determining whose
interests management advances in a complicated reorganization
proceeding.
Our most dramatic empirical finding concerns the fragile tenure
of CEOs of large, publicly held companies that reorganize. Tenure
is especially fragile for CEOs we have labeled as tainted, virtually all
of whom were replaced. Perhaps this should not be surprising. In
the cases of insolvent debtors, equity classes seldom retained more
than a small minority of the voting shares. 26 1  A change in
259 Cf Stephen J. Sansweet, Salvage Operation: How Team at Wickes Schemed and
Cajoled to Restore its Health, WALL ST. J., Aug. 2, 1985, at 1. A reporter actually sat
in on many of the meetings in the Wickes reorganization and directly observed the
formulation of management strategy, on condition that he write nothing of his
observations until after confirmation.
260 The most egregious is the naive and widely shared assumption among
bankruptcy scholars that reorganization managements represent shareholder interests.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
261Of the 32 insolvent cases in our study, the equity class retained a majority of
the reorganization shares in only two cases: Dreco Energy and Energetics. Though
the old shareholders retained control of the emerging company in Energetics, they
lost control of the large bulk of its assets. Energetics surrendered the assets to its
major secured lender during reorganization, leaving the emerging company with
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
management is not an unusual occurrence when there is a shift in
control of a large, publicly held company.
The Douglas Report on reorganizations of the 1930's painted a
picture of excessive management discretion, often exercised in a
very self-serving way. This criticism has recently been repeated in
critiques of the current Code. 262 Our findings suggest some very
real limits on the exercise of management discretion, however. One
would expect that self-serving managements would ordinarily make
preservation of their own jobs their first objective. Yet the CEOs in
the companies studied were generally unable to accomplish even
that. Nor were we able to detect any sizeable number of cases in
which reorganization managers were able to convert their power as
such into personal compensation, what we have called management
"grabs." On the other hand, tainted managers often had enough
leverage to negotiate releases from personal liability for possibly
wrongful acts.
263
As to whose interests management did serve, our basic conclu-
sion is that management orientations were diverse. We do not
mean to imply that management orientation was random. But it has
been difficult to discover circumstances that partly or wholly
determine the course followed by management over a number of
cases.
We have made two findings of significance in this respect. First,
shareholder interests were more likely to command the loyalties of
management when an active shareholder held a controlling block of
shares. Second, management's orientation was clearly a function of
the company's solvency. The managements of solvent companies
never aligned with creditors, while the managements of insolvent
companies did so frequently. These alignments may partly account
for the tendency for managements of insolvent companies to avoid
risky investment policies and for deviations from the absolute
priority rule to be limited.
We see two reasons to be concerned with the present state of
affairs. First, there is tremendous uncertainty about how
management is supposed to orient when it exercises the
considerable authority extended to it by the Bankruptcy Code. Our
assets worth only $3 million. Equity retained a majority of the reorganization shares
in seven of the 11 solvent cases in our study. We report the percentage of shares
retained by equity for each case in LoPucki & Whitford, Patterns, supra note 16.
262 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
263 See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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interviewees told us that managers frequently seek guidance on this
issue, but attorneys find it difficult to provide well-grounded advice.
Uncertainty in the law is not always a bad thing, but in this instance
we can see no virtue in it.
Second, and more important, we are concerned that many
managements are not acting to maximize the values of their firms.
The problem is most obvious with respect to the decisions concern-
ing the business plan. The tendency to avoid high risk investments
generally serves the interests of senior creditors. The tendency to
avoid quick liquidations generally serves junior interests. Neither
necessarily serves the whole by maximizing the value of the firm.
Some commentators argue that maximization of firm value
should not be the sole goal of bankruptcy policy.264 They assert
that management should also seek to preserve the employees'jobs,
the established business relationships between the company and its
suppliers, and the welfare of the communities in which the
company's operations are located. These goals are sometimes
presented as expressing values different from the societal wealth
maximization objective that underlies most economic analyses of
law. But they can also be expressed as consistent with societal
wealth maximization through the concept of externalization of costs.
That is, if management considers only the value to the firm in
deciding to discontinue and sell a business, many other "external"
costs may be ignored, such as the cost to workers of finding new
jobs or the disruption to local governments resulting from the
reduction in their tax bases. A policy that only maximizes the estate
available for distribution to creditors and shareholders may
misallocate resources by not taking account of these externalized
costs.
Concern for these externalities may counsel some allowance for
management policies that do not maximize firm value. But the
primary reasons managements are not maximizing firm value during
reorganization are not the result of those concerns. Furthermore,
the reasons we have discussed for why managements are not
264 See Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy,
91 COLuM. L. REV. 717, 732-39 (1991); Robert E. Scott, Through Bankruptcy With the
Creditors'Bargain Heuristic, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 690, 700-08 (1986); Elizabeth Warren,
Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 777, 802-03 (1987). For a response to
Warren, arguing that maximization should be the uniform criterion within bankruptcy
(but not necessarily outside it), though apparently conceding that it is not in practice,
see Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy: A Reply to
Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 815, 816-22 (1987).
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
maximizing firm values may be the piece needed to solve the
bankruptcy costs puzzle. Bankruptcy costs are commonly assumed
to be very high. 26 5 Yet it is clear that for large firms, the direct
costs of bankruptcy, essentially professional fees, are relatively
modest as a percentage of total assets.2 66 If bankruptcy costs are
large, it must be because indirect costs are large. We think the most
likely source of such substantial costs are non-maximizing corporate
decisions that are made as a result of the corporate governance
problems that we have discussed.267
IV. THE NOT-SO-UNEASY CASE FOR CORPORATE REORGANIZATION
In our view, the most fundamental problem of corporate
governance is that of investment policy. So long as the company
remains in reorganization, the risk of investment loss is borne
largely by senior classes while the possibility of investment gain
accrues largely to junior classes. This inclines the representatives of
senior classes toward low risk investment and the representatives of
junior classes toward high risk investments. In most cases, neither
will have incentives that make them appropriate governors of
265 For extreme estimates of the magnitude of bankruptcy costs, see Bradley &
Rosenzweig, Untenable Case, supra note 10, at 1068 ("Thus, in some general sense, the
effect of the [Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978] was to decrease stockholder wealth in
listed firms alone by more than $14 billion."); Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson,
Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA.
L. REV. 295, 297 (1989) (attributing a $3.4 billion decline in the combined trading
values of Texaco and Pennzoil stock to the threat of bankruptcy by Texaco and the
resulting costs).
266 See Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of
Priority of Claims, 27J. FIN. ECON. 285, 286 (1990) (estimating direct costs for publicly
held firms at approximately three percent of assets). But see Edward I. Altman, A
Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067, 1077
(1984) (stating that the average ratio of direct bankruptcy cost to value of publicly
held companies was six percent). This is not to say that the level of professional fees
does not remain a substantial concern. See LoPucki & Whitford, Venue Choice, supra
note 16, at 36-38, 45-47 (discussing courts' practices in the award of attorneys' fees
and their effect on venue choice); Claudia MacLachlan, Anger Rises Over Bankruptcy
Fees, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 9, 1992, at 1.
267 Managers of firms in bankruptcy frequently complain of the amount of time
they must spend talking to lawyers, testifying in court, and the like, and this diversion
of the time and energy of top management may be one reason why there are lost
business opportunities. But management's inability to seize new investment
opportunities because of the corporate governance imponderables that are the subject
of this Article is more likely to be a major source of indirect bankruptcy costs. If the
only problem is that the CEO is required to spend a great deal of time in court, the
firm can hire other personnel to evaluate and pursue new investment opportunities.
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investment policy. In the next part of this Article, we explain how
we think these conflicting interests should be reconciled in
contemporary reorganization cases. In this Part, we explore
proposals to resolve the problem of investment policy by fusing the
risk of loss with the possibility of gain through alteration of
ownership interests shortly after filing, or even before a bankruptcy
filing.
The most dramatic proposal of this nature calls for repeal of
chapter 11.268 It asserts that marketplace contracting then would
result in shares that terminated on default precisely at the time the
company became insolvent. Termination of the stock would fuse
the risk of loss with the possibility of gain in the hands of the class
of creditors with the next lowest priority. One of us has critiqued
this proposal in a separate publication.269 Suffice it to say that we
do not believe capital markets work well enough to make practical
this vision of a world without bankruptcy reorganization.
Another proposal for fusing the risk of loss and the possibility
of gain is to require sale of the company at an auction shortly after
the filing of the bankruptcy case. The purchaser at such an auction
would pay cash and take the company free of the claims of creditors
in the bankruptcy case. After the sale, the purchaser and those who
provided the purchaser's financing would have the same incentives
as other business owners to manage the assets efficiently. Presum-
ably the financier would require that the risk of loss and the
possibility of gain be united in the new owner. What we now call
the business plan would be formulated and implemented by the new
owner after the sale. The primary remaining function of the
bankruptcy process would be to see that the proceeds of the sale
were distributed to the former creditors and shareholders of the
268 See Bradley & Rosenzweig, Untenable Case, supra note 10, at 1078-89. Their
proposal draws heavily on a proposal by Bebchuk. See Bebchuk, supra note 8, at 781-
97. While the Bebchuk proposal differs in detail, it also presumes extraordinarily well
functioning capital markets. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Stakeholders in Bankruptcy: Some
Comments, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. (forthcoming summer 1993) (criticizing Bebchuk's
proposal).
69 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World: A Comment on Bradley
and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REV. 79 (1992).
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
failed firm.270 On this question management could be required
to remain neutral.
271
Something like this change in reorganization practice was
suggested several years ago by Professors Douglas Baird and
Thomas Jackson in separate publications.27 2 Each suggested that
it might be more efficient to liquidate failed companies by auction
to the highest bidder than to reorganize them. Because their
proposals were motivated primarily by a desire to avoid the need for
judicial valuation of the firm or, alternatively, negotiations over
reorganization plans that would deviate from the absolute priority
rule,273 they did not explicitly address the issue of the timing of
the sale. 274 But if sales of assets are to avoid the troublesome
270 This is a function that a chapter 11 reorganization plan could accomplish,
though it could also be accomplished through a chapter 7 proceeding. In chapter 7,
the proceeds are distributed strictly according to the absolute priority rule, without
the need to confirm a reorganization plan. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 507, 726 (1988 & Supp.
III 1991). The advantage of distribution under chapter 7 is that it saves the
transaction costs of soliciting votes under chapter 11. Furthermore, it prevents
underwater interests from using the difficulty of obtaining those votes or confirming
a chapter 11 plan by cram down to negotiate a small distribution for themselves as
their price for a consensual plan. See LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's
Share, supra note 16, at 143-58. On the other hand, as presently constituted, chapter
7 requires the automatic appointment of a trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 701 (1988). This
feature could be seen as unattractive and unnecessarily costly, if incumbent
management can be trusted to oversee the distribution of the sale proceeds. If
incumbent management resigns, however, appointment of a trustee may be no more
burdensome than the hiring of new management.
271 Concern about the suitability of the future financial structure of the company
is commonly cited as a justification for management involvement in negotiations
about the size and nature of the distributions under the plan of reorganization. That
concern disappears with the sale of the business.
272 See THOMAS H.JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMrrs OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 209-24
(1986); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case For Corporate Reorganizations, 15J. LEGAL
STUD. 127, 136-45 (1986).
273 SeeJACKSON, supra note 272, at 211 ("What differs in the situation in which the
firm is sold to its own claimants in a reorganization is that the valuation of the
proceeds out ofwhich the claims against the debtor are to be paid is more difficult.");
Baird, supra note 272, at 136-37 ("Unlike the competing third-party buyers, a
bankruptcyjudge enjoys no benefits and suffers no costs if he under- or overvalues
a firm. A bankruptcyjudge may be less able to cast a cold eye on an enterprise...
than someone who has put his own money on the line.").
274 In his original proposal, Baird contemplated that the sale of assets could be in
parts, rather than a unitary sale, and that the sale could take place over a considerable
period of time. See Baird, supra note 272, at 137. Thus, Baird clearly did not
contemplate that the sale would take place at the time of filing. At one point,Jackson
touched on avoidance of the corporate governance problems with which we are
concerned as a reason for making the sale of assets the essential feature of a chapter
11 reorganization:
19931
756 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:669
corporate governance issues that are the subject of this Article, they
must occur soon after the automatic stay takes effect. Recognizing
this, Baird has recently "revisited" his proposal, advancing it
explicitly as a solution to the corporate governance problems
addressed in this Article and acknowledging that a sale shortly after
filing would be necessary.
275
Advocates of the proposal for an immediate, mandatory auction
must solve the complex problem of "triggering" the filing of the
reorganization case.2 76 In its current operation, the bankruptcy
system relies heavily on voluntary filing. That is, management
initiates the case. 277 If filing led immediately and inevitably to a
sale of the company, there is every reason to believe that the
current process for triggering reorganization would fail.27 8
Purchasers usually replace the managers of the companies they
purchase.27 9 Managers would know that filing for reorganization
For firms that are insolvent, diverse ownership creates vastly different
incentives for different groups of owners. Specifically, it is in the interests
of shareholders to delay. Any event that fixes values today, such as a sale
of assets ... leaves them with nothing as their baseline entitlement. When
a group has nothing to lose by delay, that group will in fact favor delay.
Much of the law of bankruptcy must concern itself with that incentive....
No ... device, however, exists (or can be readily devised) to require
shareholders to compensate unsecured creditors for the costs of delay.
Accordingly, if things turn out worse, the creditors pay for it. If things turn
out better, the unsecured creditors may get some of those benefits, but they
do not get them all.
JACKSON, supra note 272, at 216 (footnote omitted). However, nowhere didJackson
discuss the problems with arranging the quick sale that would be needed to avoid
corporate governance problems.
2 75 See Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & ECON.
(forthcoming April 1993).
276 See generally Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation Problem in Bankruptcy, 11 INT'L
REV. L. & EcON. 223,223-25 (1991) (discussing the problems associated with creditor
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings and arguing that such authority remain vested
with management); LoPucki, supra note 53, at 343-48 (advocating that the triggering
problem be solved by encouraging creditors to file involuntary petitions against
debtors).
277 Only about one half of one percent of all bankruptcy cases are filed by
creditors. See Baird, supra note 276, at 224 n.4. The proportion may be higher for
larger cases. Six of the 43 cases in our study (14%) were initiated by involuntary
petitions: Amarex, Baldwin-United, Energetics, FSC, Marion, and Seatrain Lines. The
difficulties of initiating an involuntary case are discussed in LoPucki, supra note 53,
at 363-65.
278 Easterbrook also offers this reason for rejecting a system of mandatory
auctions shortly after the filing of a chapter 11 petition. See Frank H. Easterbrook,
Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27J. FIN. ECON. 411, 415 (1990).
This was the usual though not inevitable practice in the cases we studied in
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was generally equivalent to resigning their offices. The low filing
rates under chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act suggest that in such
circumstances managers choose not to bring their companies into
bankruptcy.280 It was largely because of this triggering problem
that Congress decided to return to the pre-1939 practice of allowing
management to remain in office after the filing of a reorganization
case.2
81
This is not to say that managers must be assured that they will
remain in office indefinitely. To the contrary, we found that under
current practice, a substantial portion lose their jobs by the end of
the case.282 But to the management of a company in financial
crisis, the difference between immediate, virtually certain loss of
control under a mandatory quick sale procedure and the slow
squeeze that will force most of them from office under the current
procedures is critical. To file for reorganization under the current
practice is risky. But it is usually an acceptable alternative because
it offers management the probability of a "soft landing." That is,
even after filing, management probably will have the time and the
leverage to negotiate a severance arrangement. But in a system
where quick sale of the business was mandatory, the bulk of that
leverage as well as the time in which to negotiate a deal would
disappear. Ironically, therefore, without the delay built into current
chapter 11 practice, the filing of many bankruptcy cases would be
delayed. It is generally assumed that further delay in initiating
which there was a substantial sale of assets. See supra note 59.
280 The total number of chapter X proceedings filed in the 1978 and 1979 fiscal
years, the last two fiscal years (ending on June 30) before the Bankruptcy Act was
repealed, was 75 and 63 respectively. See 1978 & 1979 ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS tbl. F-2, in REPORTS OF
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES FOR 1978 AND
1979. Not all of these cases involved publicly held companies. By contrast, under
chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, filings by publicly held companies averaged over
100 per year between 1985 and 1990. See Securities & Exchange Comm'n, supra note
14.
281 See e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION, H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 231 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6191 ("Proposed chapter 11 recognizes the need for the debtor to remain in control
to some degree, or else debtors will avoid the reorganization provisions in the bill
until it would be too late for them to be an effective remedy."); id. at 233 ("Debtors'
lawyers that participated in the development of a standard for the appointment of a
trustee were adamant that a standard that led to too frequent appointment would
prevent debtors from seeking relief under the reorganization chapter, and would
leave the chapter largely unused except in extreme cases.").
282 See supra Table IV accompanying note 190; supra Table V accompanying note
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bankruptcy for insolvent firms is likely to increase the overall losses
suffered by creditors and shareholders.
28 3
A second problem with substituting a mandatory quick sale of
the business for a reorganization is that the sale may not bring an
appropriate price. The existence of bankruptcy reorganization
procedures is commonly premised on the existence of a difference
between the going concern value of the firm and its liquidation
value, that is, the amount for which it can be sold. The purpose of
establishing a reorganization procedure is to allow the claimants on
the firm, creditors and shareholders together, to capture that
difference for their own benefit by paying themselves with securities
of the reorganized firm rather than the proceeds of an outright
sale.284 Proponents of an immediate auction essentially call into
question the fundamental assumption that for large, publicly traded
firms there can be a substantial difference between the going
concern and liquidation values. Given the prevalence of investment
banking firms, and the widespread acceptance of the efficient
capital markets hypothesis, these proponents doubt that a firm can
be worth more as an continuing entity than what some outsider
would be willing to pay for the firm in its entirety.285 The
283 See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 281, at 233-34 ("One of the problems that
the Bankruptcy Commission recognized in current bankruptcy and reorganization
practice is that debtors too often wait too long to seek bankruptcy relief."); ALAN
SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 887 (2nd ed. 1991);
Bulow & Shoven, supra note 53, at 455; LoPucki, supra note 53, at 333-43. Once it
is clear that a company is unable to restructure privately, it is often best that it file
bankruptcy immediately to gain the benefits of the automatic stay. Otherwise,
management is likely to make unfortunate bargains to avoid execution on important
assets. See generally JACKSON, supra note 272, at 7-19 (rationalizing bankruptcy as a
solution to the common pool problem).
284 See generally Robert C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90
YALE L.J. 1238, 1250-54 (1981) (discussing the historical evolution of bankruptcy
reorganization procedures and emphasizing the desire to capture the difference
between going concern and liquidation values of the firm for the benefit of creditors).
285 As Baird has noted:
[In the event of reorganization] the owners would spare themselves the
expense of searching for an actual buyer. But these savings may not be
substantial. The ability investment bankers have shown to take large firms
public (such as the Ford Motor Co. or Apple Computer) and the willingness
of others to acquire firms for huge sums (such as General Motors'
multibillion dollar purchase of Hughes Aircraft) suggest that it is possible
to sell the assets of even giant corporations to third-party buyers.
Baird, supra note 272, at 140-41. Baird andJackson recognize that for their proposed
system to be an adequate substitute for reorganization, the outsider must be able to
purchase everything of value that the firm currently possesses, and that currently
some legal rules inhibit the sale of some attributes. Baird andJackson's solution to
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acquiring party might raise the necessary capital through borrowing
or through the issue of a new stock offering.
Our interviewees were skeptical that large, publicly held
companies in reorganization could be sold for their going concern
value, particularly if the sales had to take place shortly after
filing.286 Many of the businesses were suffering massive losses at
the time they filed.28 7 Until such losses can be brought under
control, reliable estimates of going concern value will be difficult to
make.288 Potential purchasers will find it hard to acquire the
information needed to evaluate the firm accurately, which will
depress the price.289 Consistent with this view, when there was
that problem is to advocate change in the latter rules. For example, they would make
tax loss carryovers fully transferable to a purchaser of the firm, so that reorganization
would not be the only way to realize the value of these tax benefits. SeeJACKSON,
supra note 272, at 224 ("[T]his solution would require changes in the legal rules ....
to permit what occurs in the operation of the business in chapter 11 to occur with
equal ease in chapter 7."); Baird, supra note 275, at 9; Baird, supra note 272, at 146-47
("The trustee should be able to transfer to a third-party buyer not merely all tangible
assets of the firm but also the intangible ones .... ").
286 Our interviewees were predominantly lawyers who specialized in chapter 11
practice and can be thought to have a vested interest in opposing a proposal to abort
the proceedings that bring their current income. Although they may be a biased
sample, they are also an informed sample. Moreover, as discussed in the text,
substantial corroboration exists for their point of view.
287 See Table I, supra note 25 (26 of the 41 companies for which data are available
reported losses before filing).
288 Time may also be needed to clarify and perhaps resolve some uncertain
potential liabilities that necessarily must be passed along to a purchaser of the assets,
such as potential environmental liabilities imposed on the owner/operator of the
assets. Nor is it always easy to value the unique rights, such as the option to assume
or reject leases and executory contracts, that come into existence only upon the filing
of a bankruptcy case.
289 The problem is essentially one of information differential. Even those in
control of a firm in financial chaos do not have complete knowledge of its worth. But
they usually have much better information than potential purchasers. Even if they
do not, the potential purchasers have no way of knowing that. As Baird correctly
points out, the sellers of such a firm have a problem that can viewed as either one of
credibility or communication. The very fact they have chosen to sell communicates
to the buyer that "the fortunes of the firm [are] bleaker than they otherwise
[appear]." Baird, supra note 275, at 15.
Baird would resolve the problem by forcing the sale of all firms, thus hopefully
eliminating the implication that any firm that is for sale is a lemon. We do not think
his solution can work. First, eliminating the choice to keep or sell a firm that has
filed for reorganization does not eliminate the choice to keep or sell a firm.
Management will still have the ability to decide whether to put the firm in
bankruptcy. And the choice to put a firm into a procedure that inevitably leads to
a sale rightfully will suggest that "the fortunes of the firm [are] bleaker than they
otherwise [appear]." Id. Large, publicly held companies usually have considerable
discretion as to when and whether to file. Many of the assets of companies we
1993)
760 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:669
a sale of all or most of the assets of a firm in our study, it commonly












Name of Case Major Asset290  (in months) (in months)
Air Florida Midway 2 2
Amarex Templeton 33 33 (at confirmation)
Baldwin-United Security Pacific 9 13
Braniff People's Express 10 10
Charter Metropolitan Life 9
Dreco Mud Solids 15
Engineering
Energetics ITR Petroleum 8 8 (at confirmation)
Evans Products Evans City Steel* 3
FSC Crystal Oil 5
Itel Insufficient
Information
studied were unencumbered at filing; the managers could have bought additional
time by granting security in these assets.
The credibility problem cannot be solved by forcing the sale of all firms that file.
It can only be solved by giving buyers a meaningful opportunity to inspect and
evaluate the company. As a practical matter, we think that means stabilizing the firm
to the point where potential purchasers can learn nearly as much about the firm as
its current owners and managers know.
290 In three instances, indicated by an , we were unable to identify the name of
the purchaser. We have substituted a description of the assets sold.
Because we were frequently unable to obtain specific information about the sales
price for an asset sale, we could not formulate an objective standard for what
constitutes a "major" asset sale. Consequently, we have relied on our subjective
judgment in concluding which asset sale should be considered major.
We do not report in this Table cases in which a purchaser acquired a controlling
block of the company's shares rather than purchase its assets directly. However, such
transactions can often have the same effects as asset purchases. In these cases in
which such transactions occurred, there was typically a delay between filing and the
purchase of a controlling share block.
291 Wherever possible we have reported the date on which the sale was agreed to,
but in some cases we have had to rely on the date on which the court approved the
sale or the sale was consummated, since that was the only information available to us.
Consequently, these time periods should be considered approximate.
292 For many cases, we were unable to obtain specific information about the value
of assets sold or the value of assets remaining in the company. Hence ourjudgment
about whether a company substantially liquidated is subjective. For further
information on reduction in asset size while in chapter 11 for companies in our study,






McLouth Cleveland-Cliffs 7 11
MGF Southmark 36 36 (at confirmation)
NuCorp Trico Industries 8
Penn-Dixie Cement Assets* 8
Pizza Time Show Biz 5 13 (at confirmation)
Theatre
Revere Noranda 27
Sambo's Vicorp 32 32 (at confirmation)
Restaurants
Saxon Copystatics 6 35 (at confirmation)
Seatrain Lines Abilene-Pride 5 5
Smith Cameron Iron 19
International Works
Technical Brown & Tanik* 3 17 (at confirmation)
Equities
Towle Town & Country 3 18 (at confirmation)
Jewelry
White Motor White Farm USA 3 34
Wickes Pillsbury 1
Some of the delay was occasioned by disagreement among the
various parties about whether to conduct a sale or to
reorganize.293 But some of the delay was also occasioned by the
perceived need to "structure" the firm so that the maximum bid
could be received.
294
Auction theory2 95 also lends credence to skepticism about the
293 We judged that in 16 of the 43 cases in our study, all or most of the assets
were sold at or before confirmation. The average time elapsed between filing and
liquidation was over 18 months. In 10 cases the last major transaction occurred at
confirmation. The average time elapsed between filing and confirmation for these
10 cases was over two years. See supra Table VIII accompanying note 290. In those
cases, concern that liquidation could only be approved as part of the plan confirma-
tion process may have influenced the timing of the sale. See supra notes 142-44 and
accompanying text. For this reason they may not be the best surrogates for
estimating how quickly sales could take place under a scheme requiring an immediate,
unitary sale of assets.
294 In the six cases in which the liquidating sale occurred before confirmation, the
time period from filing to completion of the sale that substantially liquidated the
corporation varied greatly but averaged over twelve months. See supra Table VIII
accompanying note 290. While theoretically some of this delay may have been
occasioned by management resistance to the idea of liquidation, in fact in all of these
six cases the decision to liquidate was reached very quickly. Virtually all of the delay
was occasioned by the time needed to arrange an advantageous sale by a management
committed to liquidation of the assets as a business plan for the company.
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ability of a quick auction sale process to realize the full going
concern value of the firm. Because many businesses are incurring
losses, 296 potential purchasers will need to develop a business
plan for the company before they can estimate the level of
profitability the reorganized company could achieve. They may
need to obtain financing for the purchase and perhaps pay a
commitment fee for that financing. An outsider will not incur these
costs unless it has reason to believe that it can buy the assets at a
price sufficiently below their going concern value (hereinafter called
the "differential") to cover both the costs of preparing a bid and the
risk that it will not be accepted. There is reason to believe that the
size of this differential is substantial. Today, firms that wish to
attract bids for large blocks of assets often must offer incentives to
persuade a potential purchaser to make the expenditures that are
a prerequisite to bidding. The most common incentives are in the
form of a contract for the seller to pay a "breakup" or "topping" fee
to cover the cost of preparing a bid that is topped by a later
bidder.297 That such incentives are often substantial suggests that
the cost of preparing a bid, and therefore the amount of the
"differential," is substantial. 298  This amount could be captured
A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 44
STAN. L. Rzv. 69, 107-11 (1991).
296 See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
297 See Bruce A. Markell, The Case for Banishing Breakup Fees From Bankruptcy, 66
AM. BANK. L.J. (forthcoming Fall 1992); Howardj. Berman, Using Bidding Incentives
in Bankruptcy Asset Sales, N.Y. LJ., May 9, 1991, at 5;J. Hayden Kepner, Jr., Breakup
Fees and Overbid Amounts (Reported Cases), Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) A7 (Apr. 30, 1992)
(table showing breakup and overbid fees approved by courts in 20 cases); see also In
re Integrated Resources, Inc., 135 B.R. 746, 753 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (authorizing
a breakup fee of $6 million); Twenver, Inc. v. MCA Television, Ltd. (In re Twenver,
Inc.), 127 B.R. 467, 468-69 (D. Colo. 1991) (authorizing commitment to make a
topping fee payment to a bidder if the bid proved unsuccessful). As explained by the
creditors' committee that sought authorization for the debtor to pay a topping fee in
the Twenver case:
[A] topping fee, or breakup fee, is a fee paid to an initial bidder for the
assets of the Debtor if the bidder, after performing its due diligence inquiry,
is outbid by a second bidder. Such a fee is a necessary and appropriate
means to compensate a prospective purchaser of a Chapter 11 debtor's
assets for the time and expenses of performing the "due diligence" analysis
and for the risk of being a "stalking horse" in the sale of the Debtor's
business. Such a bidder runs the risk of ultimately being outbid for the
business by another entity which derives an unfair benefit from the due
diligence performance and the commitment of the first bidder to purchase
the business at a stated price.
Id. at 468 (citations omitted).
298 The breakup and topping fees that exist today are offered when bids are
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
by creditors and shareholders were they to reorganize the company
rather than sell it at auction.
For the proposed auction to render moot the problem of
corporate governance, the firm must be required to sell to the
highest bidder, regardless of the adequacy of the bid. Otherwise,
the conflicts between senior and junior interests would reemerge
when deciding whether to accept the highest and best bid.299 To
warrant reliance that the marketplace is going to yield an adequate
price,30 0 at least two credible outside bidders must exist.
3 01
Several of our interviewees expressed the view that capital markets
are not sufficiently developed to produce enough bidders to ensure
that the winning bid will approximate the going concern value of
solicited for sales that occur long after filing. Because of the greater uncertainty
about the future value of the company that exists at the time of filing, as discussed
earlier in the text, it makes sense that the size of these incentives would need to be
greater to solicit bids at that time, to cover the costs of the increased investigation
that must precede the bid.
2 Acceptance would generallybe in the interests of senior interests; rejection and
continuance of the reorganization case would favor junior interests.
" There is a substantial debate in the literature whether it is sound public policy
to encourage tender offers for solvent firms that approximate the amount that would
be bid in a fully competitive auction. Some believe that shareholders are entitled to
the "full value" of their shares, even if it exceeds their current trading value, and
consequently, that measures to encourage fully competitive tender offers are
appropriate. Others believe that successful tender offers at bargain prices will
encourage greater search for firms whose shares are undervalued and that this
behavior will have several desired effects, including more frequent removal of
incompetent management. Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Sole Owner Standard For
Takeover Policy, 17J. LEGAL STUD. 197, 198 (1988) (favoring measures to guarantee
shareholders' full value in some circumstances) and Reinier Kraakman, Taking
Discounts Seriously: The Implications of 'Discounted" Share Prices As an Acquisition
Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 891, 901-20 (1988) (same) with Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1, 3 (1982)
(opposing auctions in response to initial tender offer) and Alan Schwartz, The Fairness
of Tender Offer Prices in Utilitarian Theory, 17J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 195 (1988) (same).
With respect to insolvency reorganizations, we assume that public policy favors
bids at the prices that would be achieved in fully competitive auctions. Unlike the
takeover situation, there is no need to offer extraordinary returns as rewards for
searching out firms that can be bought at a profit, because the bankruptcy process
is not initiated by the bidders. Moreover, the beneficiaries of higher prices will
mostly be unsecured creditors. Consequently, ensuring adequate prices in chapter
11 auctions might lower the cost of credit to companies.
301 In making this statement, we assume that a sole bidder would know that it is
the sole bidder. Some auction methods, particularly those involving sealed bids,
attempt to conceal from a sole bidder the fact that it is a sole bidder. But in the sale
of a large business, where the number of potential bidders is small and pre-bid
investigation must be extensive, we doubt that the agent conducting the auction could
prevent a sole bidder from discovering its status as such.
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the firm less the "differential." Sizeable businesses were sold in
many of our cases, but none of the purchases were financed through
an initial public offering.30 2 The successful bidder was, in every
instance, an already existing firm, usually one in the same line of
business. This suggests that for most large businesses, only a
limited number of potential buyers exists.303  Despite the
questionable legality of such an agreement,30 4 the number of
potential bidders may be further reduced by the formation ofjoint
ventures among them.30 5 In five of the cases studied, the debtor
302 Easterbrook points to the cost of a public offering in commenting on the lack
of such offerings to finance the takeover of reorganizing firms. See Easterbrook, supra
note 278, at 415. The impracticality of making a public offering while in reorganiza-
tion under chapter 11 is discussed in LoPucki, supra note 269, at 100 n.78.
303 See PAUL AsQUITH ET AL., ANATOMY OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS: AN EXAMINATION
OFJUNK BOND ISSUERS 15-19 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
No. 3942, 1992); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt
Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach, 47J. FIN. 1343 (1992). Both papers suggest
that the prospective buyer of the assets of a large company in financial distress with
the highest use value for the assets is likely to be another company in the same field.
But because economic conditions in the industry in which the distressed firm operates
are likely to be poor, other firms will have difficulty obtaining the credit needed to
bid strongly for the assets. Consequently, they suggest, reorganization may provide
a higher return to the distressed firm than sale of the assets.
3o4 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(n) (1988).
305 In HRT Industries, some months after filing, management agreed with the
creditors' committee to solicit bids from outsiders for purchase of the firm, a
department store chain. One bid was received from Schottenstein Stores, another
department store chain. The creditors found the bid minimally acceptable. But while
a reorganization plan was being negotiated based on that bid, a higher bid was
submitted by McCrory, another department store chain. At that point there was a
prospect of competitive bidding between the two. This possibility was nipped in the
bud, however, when McCrory and Schottenstein formed ajoint venture. On a take
it or leave it basis, they submitted a common bid equal to the McCrory bid. With no
other bidders readily evident, the creditors' committee and management decided to
accept this bid. The equity committee vigorously opposed the bid, which was not
high enough to provide for a distribution to them under the absolute priority rule.
They attempted, without success, to solicit a higher bid from some other outsider, but
the equity committee was laboring in a circumstance in which management and the
creditors' committee were committed to support the joint venture's bid. Potential
bidders must have been reluctant in such circumstances to commit the resources to
prepare a bid, knowing there was a good chance it would be unsuccessful even if
higher than the pending bid. Ultimately, a plan of reorganization based on the joint
venture bid was crammed down over equity's objection.
Later events showed that the joint venture made a large profit. Reorganization
shares traded immediately after confirmation at $6.75 per share. Thejoint venture
paid in cash $3.72 per share for their controlling block. Even before the effective
date of the plan, McCrory obtained an option, later exercised, to acquire
Schottenstein's part of the joint venture's holdings at about $5.50 per share, giving
the latter a quick $4.2 million profit. Within the next year, McCrory took the
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was able to conclude a sale even though only one seriously interest-
ed buyer came forward.306 In those cases, the debtor's ability to
decline to sell, and instead reorganize under an internal plan, must
have been of critical importance in giving it the leverage needed to
negotiate an adequate sale price.
3 0 7
A final reason why it may be less efficient to sell companies in
chapter 7 than to reorganize them under chapter 11 is the possibly
high direct cost of the former. Presumably the sale of a large,
publicly held company in chapter 7 would be conducted in much
the same way as in the absence of bankruptcy: the services of an
investment banker would be employed. When the fees of the
investment banker are considered, the cost of liquidating under
chapter 7 may exceed the cost of reorganizing under chapter
11.308
company private, paying minority shareholders $6 per share. See generally M&'SJoint
Venture Bids for Remainder of HRT's Shares, WALL ST.J., Oct. 5, 1984, at 16; McCroly
Gets Option to Buy 27.5% More of HRT Industries, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 1984 at 16;
Rapid-American Acquires HRT, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1985, at 55.
306 Pizza Time Theatre (acquired by its competitor, Show Biz); Air Florida (most
assets acquired by Midway Airlines); Amarex (acquired by Templeton, another energy
company); Energetics (acquired by ITR, a secured creditor). A particularly instructive
case was McLouth Steel. The debtor contracted to sell some of its steel capacity to
a competitorJones and Laughlin. The Antitrust division of theJustice Department
tried to compel the debtor to sell to someone else, but eventually acknowledged that
there were no other interested parties. By thenJones and Laughlin had withdrawn.
Early in that case, the debtor sold its trucking operation back to the entrepreneur
from whom the debtor had purchased it. There was one other interested buyer, but
that buyer withdrew before a sale could be negotiated. For the company's remaining
major assets, the steel mills, it hired an investment banker to find potential buyers.
Only one, Tang Industries, could be found. The company dosed a sale to Tang.
77 In other cases, attempts to sell assets were abandoned because no serious
bidders could be found. These included Storage Technology (sale of the entire
company); Revere Copper & Brass (sale of an aluminum reduction plant in Alabama);
and FSC Corporation (sale of the entire company).
308 Both Baird and Eisenberg suggest that the direct costs of auctioning a
company may exceed the direct costs of reorganization because of the very high fees
customarily charged by investment bankers. See Baird, supra note 275, at 9-10;
Eisenberg, supra note 78, at 33-34. Although that may be true, the reasons are not
dear. Investment bankers already participate in many chapter 11 cases. In our study,
creditors' committees hired investment bankers in at least 16 cases and equity
committees did so in at least seven. Debtors consulted investment bankers even more
frequently, but we did not systematically collect this information from debtors. When
investment bankers do participate, typically one of their tasks is to investigate and
advise on the available options, which includes selling the company in its entirety.
Consequently, it is possible that much of the work that an investment banker
would have to do in an auction is already done in chapter 11, and it maybe done by
several sets of investment bankers rather than just one. If so, it is hard to see why
investment bankers' fees in an auction should be higher that the direct costs of a
1993]
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In this Part, we have emphasized the need for the sale of assets
to occur shortly after filing, because only a quick sale could render
moot the problems of corporate governance. If, as originally
proposed by Baird and Jackson,3 0 9 the sale could be made months
or years after filing, several of the difficulties we have raised would
be ameliorated. Managers' fear of chapter 11 would be reduced,
because they would know that even after filing they still would have
time to negotiate for a soft landing. Through the ability to conduct
auctions with reserve and to offer bidding incentives, the debtor
would have a better chance of prompting truly competitive bidding.
If an auction were conducted after implementation of a business
plan, a prospective purchaser may find it easier to obtain reliable
information about the firm's prospects, reducing the extent to
reorganization. However, it is possible that an investment banker would have to do
much more work to sell a company in a speedy auction than we realize. Baird
suggests that the high costs of auctions may be attributable to the costs of complying
with securities law. See Baird, supra note 275, at 10. The Bankruptcy Code exempts
a chapter 11 plan from the securities law. See 11 U.S.C. § 1145 (1988).
TABLE IX
INVESTMENT BANKERS EMPLOYED BY CREDITOR OR EQUITY COMMITTEEs
Name of Case Creditors' Committees Equity Committees
AM International yes

















309 See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
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which information deficits lower the bid.3 10  The problem of
shareholder-creditor conflict regarding investment policy during the
period preceding the auction would remain.3 11 However, the sale
price could be deemed to be the value of the company, thereby
ameliorating the problem of allocating reorganization values
between shareholders and creditors.
3 1 2
We have pointed out a number of problems and costs inherent
in requiring a quick sale of reorganizing firms. Problems and costs
arise in the current process as well. 1 3 Which set of problems and
costs is greater is ultimately an empirical question for which we have
no answer. The proposal for an immediate, mandatory, unitary sale
of assets, however, would work a radical change in current
reorganization practice.3 14  Because such a change is not immi-
nent, the question for whom management should govern during the
pendency of the bankruptcy case will remain pertinent. We turn
next to that question.
V. FOR WHOSE BENEFIT SHOULD MANAGEMENT GOVERN?
In Part II of this Article, we described the processes by which
shareholders and creditors compete for the loyalties of manage-
ment. Our description demonstrated that these processes were too
complex and haphazard to support a prediction of a consistent
pattern of management loyalty during reorganization. In Part III,
we presented empirical data on the manner in which managements
divided their loyalties among the interests of shareholders, credi-
tors, or themselves. Our data showed considerable variation from
case to case. That variation mirrors the lack of generally accepted
norms regarding the duties of reorganization management. In this
510 See supra note 289 and text accompanying note 296.
311 A sale of all assets ends this conflict, and perhaps more quickly than
reorganization. See infra note 378.
3f2 That is, sale of the company for cash would greatly reduce the leverages that
are one reason that holders ofunderwater claims and interests can typically negotiate
deviations from the absolute priority rule in their favor. The leverages are discussed
in more detail in LoPucki & Whitford, Preemptive Cram Down, supra note 16, at 628-
33.
313 See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
314 Under current practice, managers who want to sell assets immediately upon
filing may be able to do so if they have an "articulated business justification." See
supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text. But managers who do not want to sell the
assets are generally protected by exclusivity. See Table III, supra note 177. Other
considerations, such as the preservation of tax NOLs through reorganization, would
make it difficult to change the practice without enabling legislation.
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Part we consider for whose benefit management should govern and
also discuss what mechanisms could insure that management
behaves in desired ways.
Management loyalty can affect the content of both business and
reorganization plans. We will focus primarily on the business plan,
however, particularly the central element of investment policy
during reorganization. We believe that management has greater
influence over investment policy than they do over the reorganiza-
tion plan.3 15 Moreover, the normative question of how manage-
ment should behave with respect to the reorganization plan is
somewhat easier to answer, for reasons we will indicate later.
3 16
A. Management as Representative of Shareholders
Some commentators have asserted that insolvent, reorganizing
companies should be governed for the benefit of their sharehold-
ers.3 17 We disagree. Because shareholders bear little of the risks
of loss in the context of insolvency, they have a bias in favor of high
risk investments.3 1 8  In bankruptcy, the bias is especially strong
because the shareholders face cancellation of their interests at
confirmation. Unless the corporation's fortunes are reversed very
quickly, they are likely to receive little or nothing under the plan.
Even a modicum of commitment to wealth maximization as a
normative principle should make one uncomfortable with leaving
the management of an insolvent corporation in the control of
shareholders with such incentives.
3 19
When insolvent companies make risky investments in the
interests of shareholders, creditors bear the losses. So long as those
315 We discuss our empirical findings about the extent of management influence
over the content of reorganization plans in LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over
Equity's Share, supra note 16, at 149-52.
316 See infra notes 356-58 and accompanying text.
317 This seems to be the view of Budnitz, supra note 94, at 1233-34; see also
Gerber, supra note 94, at 343-44 (arguing that governing for the benefit of
stockholders does not contravene federal bankruptcy policy). But see Skeel, supra note
7, at 463-64.
318 This analysis is presented supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text; see also
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 404 ("When the firm is in distress, the
shareholders' residual claim goes underwater, and they lose the appropriate
incentives.").
319 See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications
Corp., 1991 Del Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 n.55 (Dec. 30, 1991) (analysis showing that,
under certian circumstances, neither shareholders nor creditors have appropriate
incentives to act on behalf of an insolvent company).
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
companies are not in chapter 11, it is possible to argue that through
contract provisions defining default, the creditors can protect
themselves and society from wasteful investments intended to serve
only shareholder interests. Such contract provisions enable
creditors to resort to collection remedies that give them control
over corporate assets, preventing managers from using the assets to
facilitate risky investments. In chapter 11, exercise of those
contractual rights is inhibited by the automatic stay, making it
unacceptable to allow management to continue to exercise their
discretion solely in the interest of shareholders.
3 20
Although agreeing for these reasons that management should
not serve just the interests of shareholders in chapter 11, several
commentators have argued that shareholders should nonetheless be
allowed to elect directors during reorganization. This view is partly
based on statutory interpretation.3 21 From a policy perspective,
-20 Skeel makes this argument in defense of his proposition that the right to elect
directors of insolvent corporations in bankruptcy should be routinely transferred to
creditors. See Skeel, supra note 7, at 482-85.
321 These commentators find a shareholder right to elect directors implicit in the
provisions and structure of the Bankruptcy Code. See Budnitz, supra note 94, at 1266-
67; Chou, supra note 94, at 576; Gerber, supra note 94, at 341-55.
From the absence of an express provision barring shareholders from electing
directors, they infer that Congress must have intended that the pre-filing practice
continue after filing. See Budnitz, supra note 94, at 1240 (arguing that the prohibition
of distribution on non-voting stock as part of a reorganization plan shows that
Congress was concerned about shareholder rights to elect directors and concluding
that if Congress intended that shareholders' usual rights to elect directors be
suspended during chapter 11, they would have said so directly). They point out that
Congress substituted specific remedies available only in bankruptcy for the rights
creditors lose by imposition of the automatic stay. For example, creditors can ask the
court to replace management with a trustee, seesupra notes 112-22 and accompanying
text, they can object in court to various actions by management which require court
approval, see supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text, and they can ask the court
to remove exclusivity and propose their own plan of reorganization, see 11 U.S.C.
§ 1121 (1988). These commentators argue that if Congress had intended creditors
to have the additional right to block shareholder election of directors, surelyit would
have so provided.
Chou also cites language in the Senate Committee Report that accompanied the
bill that eventually became the Code as indicating that "Congress clearly intended that
shareholders not be left to the mercy of the debtor and its creditors." Chou, supra
note 94, at 577 (citing S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5796). While there is language to that effect in the Senate
Report, nothing in the Committee discussion addresses specifically the question of
shareholder elections. Further, the Senate version of the bill addressed by the
Committee Report was more protective of shareholder interests than is the Code as
adopted.
As a matter of statutory interpretation, we think that neither these authorities
nor the contrary view expressed by the Second Circuit in In reJohns-Manville Corp.,
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their main concern is that if shareholders are not permitted to elect
new directors during chapter 11, they will be without significant
bargaining leverage in the negotiations about the business and
reorganization plans.
3 22
While there is no doubt that shareholder bargaining leverage
and ability to discipline management will be reduced if shareholder
elections are enjoined, we believe the greater danger is that
shareholders will use the threat of elections to induce management
to adopt corporate policies that are wasteful and inconsistent with
a public policy favoring resource allocation efficiency. Creditors
would continue to dominate some managements through the
leverages we have described. But the strength of those leverages
varies from case to case. In other cases, aggressive shareholders
could install management that would pay little concern to the
interests of creditors.
We believe it is "clear abuse" for shareholders to use the
election process to influence management to hold out for better
treatment for shareholders in the business and reorganization plans
of an insolvent company and that this practice can 323 and should
be enjoined.3 24 The more difficult issue is whether there are any
circumstances in which the shareholders of an insolvent,
reorganizing company should be permitted to elect directors.
Certainly an incompetent or corrupt management should be
removed. The issue is whether election should be an alternative to
801 F.2d 60, 65 n.6 (2d Cir. 1986), are clearly wrong.
32 As Gerber stated:
[S]tockholders who are allowed to form committees, but who are denied the
right to vote for directors, are no better off than stockholders who are
allowed to vote, but who are deprived of a vehicle for concerted action. In
the first instance stockholders are given a place to stand but no lever, in the
second they are given a lever but no place to stand.
Gerber, supra note 94, at 352.
323 It is virtually universally accepted that courts may enjoin shareholder elections
when they would constitute a "clear abuse." Seesupra notes 94-108 and accompanying
text.
324 The Second Circuit seems to agree. See In reJohns-Manville Corp., 801 F.2d
at 65 n.6 ("We note that if Manville were determined to be insolvent, so that the
shareholders lacked equity in the corporation, denial of the right to call a meeting
would likely be proper, because the shareholders would no longer be real parties in
interest."). But see Saxon Indus. v. NKFW Partners, 488 A.2d 1298, 1300 (Del. 1984)
("[A]bsent other compelling legal or equitable factors, insolvency alone, irrespective
of degree, does not divest the stockholders of a Delaware corporation of their right
to exercise the powers of corporate democracy.").
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the more direct motion for the appointment of a trustee.325 If
the removal is by election, the ousted manager's successor is chosen
by the shareholders, whereas a trustee would be appointed by the
U.S. Trustee.126 In the normal case, removal by appointment of
a trustee would be more expeditious and cheaper, but that does not
necessarily mean that the possibility of removal by more
cumbersome shareholder election process should be
foreclosed. 27
Our reasons for opposing shareholder elections apply most
strongly to the insolvent corporation. But if the equity of a solvent
company is so thin that the risks of loss created by managerial
decisions are borne largely by creditors rather than shareholders,
shareholders will not have the correct incentives to control
investment policy. The analysis is the same as for insolvent
companies. Consequently, in this circumstance as well, shareholders
should not have the unfettered right to call meetings of sharehold-
ers for the purpose of electing managers who will prefer their
interests over those of creditors.
Substantially solvent companies occasionally file under chapter
11. The shareholders of those companies for the most part bear
both the risk of loss and the prospect of gain. In the terminology
used in the next section, they are the "residual" owners. For the
reasons stated in that section it is appropriate for them to elect
directors during reorganization and command the loyalty of
management.
B. Collapsed Residual Ownership
From an economic perspective, an accepted approach for
ensuring that a corporation acts in accordance with wealth maximi-
zation norms is to vest the power to govern the corporation in the
"residual owners"-that is, those who stand to gain from profits and
suffer from losses. Professors Baird and Jackson have suggested
325 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988).
326 See id. § 1104(c).
327 In enjoining a meeting of shareholders, the court in FSC noted that it would
cost $60,000 to conduct it. Seesupra notes 100-02 and accompanying text. Legislative
history suggests that Congress permitted the management of a reorganizing company
to remain in office largely out of concern for the possibility that management, fearful
of losing their jobs and their leverage, might otherwise delay the filing of the chapter
11 case. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. Once management has been
ousted by any mechanism, appointment of a successor by the U.S. Trustee rather than
shareholders does no harm to this policy.
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that vesting control in the residual owners is the solution to the
problem of corporate governance in the reorganizing company:
The Bankruptcy Code pays too little attention to ensuring that the
residual claimants are in control of the firm.... [T]he law of
corporate reorganizations should focus on identifying the residual
owner, limiting agency problems in representing the residual
owner, and making sure that the residual owner has control over
the negotiations that the firm must make while it is restructur-
ing.
3 28
We do not doubt that placing control of the reorganizing firm in
the hands of parties who have both the risk of loss and the
possibility of gain can be an effective way to promote wealth
maximizing behavior. The primary problem-often unrecognized-is
that there will commonly be more than one class of claims or
interests that qualify simultaneously as the "residual owner" of an
insolvent firm. The prescription that control should lie with the
residual owners does not tell us how control should be apportioned
among those classes.
To illustrate this point, assume that a firm has underwater
classes of claims and interests. In the absence of bankruptcy, these
claims and interests will continue to have market value. One reason
is that any ensuing reorganization case would almost certainly
culminate in a distribution that deviated from the absolute priority
rule.3 29 But a quantitatively more important reason such claims
and interests retain value is that so long as the firm remains in
business there continues to be an "upside" potential in the value of
328 Baird & Jackson, supra note 7, at 765, 775. Baird and Jackson give the
following rationale for vesting power in the residual owner:
The residual owner is given the power to bind the firm because the residual
owner stands to have the right set of incentives. The dollar that is won or
lost because of good or bad negotiating by definition is felt by the residual
owner... The residual owners should always be the ones who enjoy the
benefits of making good decisions and incur the costs of making bad ones.
Id. at 761, 787-88. Though Baird andJackson do not discuss specifically how they
would implement residual owner control in the insolvent company, Skeel has drawn
the logical conclusion. The creditors should be entitled to elect the board of
directors. See Skeel, supra note 7, at 510-13. Frost proposes a somewhat different
implementation scheme. He wants courts to give deference to the views of residual
owners when approving management actions pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 363-65. See
Frost, supra note 10, at 136-37.
s2 See LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share, supra note 16, at 142.
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the business. If the increase is large enough, a part of it will inure
to the benefit of those claims and interests.
330
At least in the absence of a default, Baird and Jackson accept
that a firm might have the potential to increase in value and the
potential may give value to claims and interests that are currently
underwater. 31 Nevertheless, they assert that a single class of
residual owners always exists. They reach this result by "collapsing"
the future possibilities of different values to a single present value
and using this latter value to identify the single residual owner.
33 2
Thereafter they assume that this residual owner, like a true residual
owner, will have the appropriate incentives to maximize the value
of the company.
3 3 3
Yet for them to say that the future possibilities of different
values have been collapsed to a single value by the debtor's default
under the loan agreement does not make it ,so.s3 4  After they
determine which class is the residual owner and give them control
of the company, changes in the actual value of the company will
continue to occur. If the changes are sufficiently large, they may,
330 For a recent theoretical account of why the stock of a distressed firm retains
value despite insolvency, see BEBcHUK & CHANG, supra note 8, at 4.
331 See Baird & Jackson, supra note 7, at 761 ("[I]n the absence of a default,
everyone's ownership interest has a value. There is always a possibility that the firm's
assets will be worth more-and its liabilities less-than expected.").
332 See id. at 761 ("The firm that is reorganizing is typically insolvent. In the case
that we focus on. .. , if all future possibilities were collapsed to present values, the
senior creditor would be entitled to the entire firm. In this sense, the senior creditor
is the residual owner of the firm.").
333 See id. at 787-88; see also, e.g., Frost, supra note 10 at 112, 130-31, 136, 140
(making similar assumptions).
334 While they do not address the question directly, we doubt that Baird and
Jackson actually would assert that the stock of an insolvent company has no value
after the company defaults. Rather, they would treat the stock as having no value
because under their conception of the creditor's bargain, it should have no value.
Baird andJackson developed their "collapsed residual ownership" concept to deal
with a different problem than the corporate governance problem that is the focus of
this Article. Specifically, they proposed that the residual creditor interests (as
determined by the collapsed residual owner concept) be permitted to agree to
distribute some value to the most junior interests while freezing out interests that
have a higher priority though still underwater. See Baird &Jackson, supra note 7, at
760,78385. Currently, the intermediate interests could bar confirmation of the plan
under the absolute priority rule. So long as formulation of the reorganization plan
takes place at a time so close to confirmation that determination of the "collapsed
residual owner" is a good surrogate for entitlements at confirmation under the
absolute priority rule, there is merit in their proposal. In practice, however,
reorganization plan negotiations commonly occur well before confirmation, when
junior interests still have real potential to benefit from an upside gain.
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for example, render an insolvent company solvent or at least
arguably so. Even though these changes occur after default and
after the filing of the reorganization case, so long as they occur
before the underwater claims and interests can be extinguished at
confirmation, these increases in value will accrue at least in part to
the benefit of the holders of those claims and interests. 335 Thus
underwater claims and interests may continue to bear the
consequences of investment decisions. They, along with the
collapsed residual owner, remain "residual owners."
Under Baird and Jackson's concept, creditors would be the
"collapsed residual owners" of any insolvent firm. Yet these
collapsed residual owners, while bearing most of the risk of
decreases in value, stand to reap only a small part of increases in
value. They would not be as interested as they should be, from a
wealth-maximization perspective, in a business plan that maximized
the value of the company through high risks fully warranted by
correspondingly high returns.
33 6
It is important to realize that this problem of inappropriate
incentives is likely to exist even though the firm is substantially
335 Under current law, the courts value the company as of the date of confirma-
tion of the plan for the purpose of determining whether the proposed plan complies
with the absolute priority rule. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(C) (1988) (a plan can be
crammed down against equity holders only if the plan provides that each retain
"property ofa value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to... the value of [the
equity holder's] interest"); see also In re Guilford Telecasters, Inc., 128 B.R. 622, 625-
27 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. 1991); in re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282, 304-07 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1990) (experts value company as of a date close to confirmation); In re
Pullman Constr. Indus., 107 B.R. 909, 950-51 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
Confirmation of the plan of reorganization implicitly fixes a value for the
company and thereby collapses the possible array of values that a particular interest
in the company might have. As a practical matter, the value of a company is often
fixed before confirmation when the parties agree on the terms of the plan to be
confirmed. In one of the cases studied, Storage Technology, the value of the
company increased substantially between the time the parties agreed to the terms of
a plan and the time the plan was considered by the court for confirmation. The
parties stuck to their bargain and the court confirmed the plan. As a result, some
classes of creditors received stock in the emerging company that had a value
substantially in excess of the full amount of their claims.
336 While Skeel also advocates the collapsed residual ownership theory for
resolving corporate governance problems, he acknowledges the possibility that a
corporation so governed will be too risk averse from a wealth maximization
perspective. But he dismisses the possibility as empirically insignificant. See Skeel,
supra note 7, at 501 n.149. We do not think it is insignificant. In our empirical
observations, we noted that even under current corporate governance rules firms in
chapter 11 rarely undertook new business initiatives. See supra notes 251-56 and
accompanying text.
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insolvent and certain to remain so. In the bankruptcy
reorganizations of large publicly held firms, there are likely to be
several creditor classes whose claims carry different priorities.
Under the collapsed residual ownership theory, one of the more
senior creditor classes of a substantially insolvent firm would be
considered the residual owner. But given the number of layers of
claims in large, publicly held companies,3 3 7 there is likely to be a
creditor class immediately junior to the collapsed residual
ownership class that stands to benefit from any significant increase
in the collapsed value of the firm.
To provide the collapsed residual owners with the appropriate
incentives to manage the reorganizing company would require
radical change in the reorganization process. One such change
might be to require that, soon after filing and before a business or
reorganization plan is adopted or considered, the court actually
collapse the possibilities of future changes. The court could do this
by valuing the company and fixing the entitlements of the various
classes.3 38  Because those entitlements would be enforced
337 To give some concrete indication of the number of different levels of priority
in a complex bankruptcy case, we counted the number of levels, making the
assumption that no substantive consolidation would occur. The assumption of no
substantive consolidation is significant, because in a multi-tiered company the
creditors of different corporate entities occupy potentially different priority positions.
We excluded from the count all secured creditors, all creditors with bankruptcy
priorities, and all securities fraud claimants. That is, we counted only layers of
nonpriority unsecured creditors and shareholders. In 31 of43 cases, there were four
or more levels of priority. The average number of levels exceeded five.
Cases with less than four levels of priority were: Air Florida, AM International,
Dreco, EPIC, Johns-Manville,* Lionel, McLouth, NuCorp,* Phoenix Steel, Salant,
Sambo's Restaurants, and Smith International.*
Cases with four levels of priority were: Cook-United, MGF, Pizza Time Theatre,
Revere, Saxon, Seatrain Lines, Technical Equities, Towner, and Wilson Foods.
Cases with five levels of priority were: Anglo Energy, Crystal Oil, Energetics, Itel,
KDT, Marion, Tacoma Boatbuilding, and Towle.
Cases with six levels of priority were: Baldwin-United, Braniff, HRT, and Storage
Technology.
Cases with seven levels of priority were: Continental Airlines, FSC, Oxoco, and
White Motor.*
Cases with more than seven levels of priority were: Amarex, Charter,
Combustion Equipment, Evans Products, Penn-Dixie, and Wickes.
An * indicates that we did not have enough information to ascertain the precise
number of potential priority classes, usually because of inadequate information about
claims against a subsidiary. In these cases, we have given the minimum number of
classes; the actual number is probably higher.
338 Applying the collapsed residual ownership theory in this manner is arguably
unfair to underwater creditors and equity holders, who may have relied on the
current practice whereby they benefit if companies with financial difficulty
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regardless of changes in the value of the company during the case,
all future increases in value would accrue to the most junior
remaining class, which would have an incentive to manage the
company efficiently. But valuation of the company at filing would
cause so much expense and delay that it is entirely impractical.
339
Furthermore, while the values were being litigated, management
would remain without guidance as to whom they should be loyal.
C. The Principle of Prudent Investment
The Bankruptcy Code provides that a debtor-in-possession "shall
perform all the ... duties ... of a trustee."3 40 This language
suggests looking to the law of trusts for guidance to the corporate
governance dilemma. 4 1  Trust law does deal with analogous
situations, where the interests of successive beneficiaries conflict.
successfully reorganize. If their interests are cut off at the time of filing, their
expectation of sharing in future increases in value will be denied. This fairness
problem would only be transitional, however. Once it was established that the
collapsed residual owners at the time of filing owned the most junior interest in the
firm, new lenders and investors would adjust their expectations accordingly.
339 A major objective of the 1978 reforms was to relieve the court of the necessity
to value the company in every case. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 281, at 224;
REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES PART I,
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 256-58 (1973). The 1978 legislation accom-
plished that by permitting the court to confirm consensual plans without regard to
values. The proposal considered here would revive the necessity for valuation by
requiring that the value determination be made before the parties have had time to
resolve their difference by agreement.
In previous articles, we have proposed that early in the proceeding there be a
"preemptive cram down," as we call it, against classes that are so far underwater that
there is no reasonable probability they will be entitled, under the absolute priority
rule, to receive a distribution at the time of confirmation. See LoPucki & Whitford,
Preemptive Cram Down, supra note 16; LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's
Share, supra note 16, at 186-89. Our purpose in limiting preemptive cram down to
classes that have no reasonable probability of entitlement to share under the plan was
to avoid the need for a precise valuation of the company early in the proceeding. In
most cases, not all classes junior to the collapsed residual owner would be subject to
a preemptive cram down under that standard. Furthermore, we proposed that if the
improbable occurs and the value of the firm so increases that the previously
terminated interest would have received a distribution if there had been no
preemptive cram down, then that interest should be reinstated to receive its
appropriate distribution. Hence, our proposal was quite different and much more
modest than the Baird and Jackson proposal.
340 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988).
341 Some courts take the analogy almost literally. See e.g., In re Technical
Knockout Graphics, Inc., 833 F.2d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The debtor-in-possession
is not free to deal with [property of the estate] as it chooses, but rather holds it in
trust for the benefit of creditors, just as would a trustee.").
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Consider the common trust in which one beneficiary has the right
to the income and another has the right to the principal after some
period of time. Just as management of the reorganizing company
can shift value from creditors to shareholders through excessive
risk-taking, so can the trustee shift value from the residual beneficia-
ry to the income beneficiary by investing in high risk, high income
assets.
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts provides that "[w]hen there are
two or more beneficiaries of a trust, the trustee is under a duty to
deal impartially with them."3 42 While this statement is vague, it
is interpreted as requiring the trustee to maintain an investment
policy that "balances" the interests of the competing beneficiaries.
Investment policies focused solely on generating high income (e.g.,
high yield but risky junk bonds) and investment policies targeted
solely on preservation or growth of the principal (e.g., unproductive
land with little rental value but whose value may increase in the
future) would be equally inappropriate.
3 43
Another rule from the law of trusts that bears on the conflict
between successive beneficiaries is the "prudent" investor rule.
That rule requires that the trustee "make such investments and only
such investments as a prudent man would make of his own property
having in view the preservation of the estate and the amount and
regularity of the income to be drived."3 44 Though vague in its
specification of what is considered "prudent,"3 45 the rule appears
to contemplate a narrow range of risk that would be deemed
appropriate for trust investments, one that avoids the extremes of
being either too conservative or too risky. Thus, the prudent
investor rule commands a result similar to the interest-balancing
rule discussed in the preceding paragraph.
These principles from trust law are somewhat analogous to the
investment policies we observed in many of the cases studied. 46
342 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 183 (1959).
343 See WILIAM F. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 232 (4th ed. 1988) ("[T]he
trustee is under a duty so to administer the trust as to preserve a fair balance between
[successive beneficiaries]."); Case, supra note 146, at 373, 398403 ("In conflicts
between remainderman and income beneficiaries, the personal trustee is put in a
position of balancing the flow of income versus the preservation of the principal.").
344 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959).
345 In the early 1900s, state legislatures in some states enacted "legal lists" of the
permissible investments for trustees. See Leslie J. Bobo, Comment, Nontraditional
Investments of Fiduciaries: Re.Examining the Prudent Investor Rule, 33 EMORY LJ. 1067,
1073 (1984).
"4 We do not mean to suggest that the level of risk-taking considered appropriate
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That is, there seemed to be a general understanding that manage-
ment should steer a middle road with regard to risk-taking. At least
in the early stages of the proceedings, managements generally did
what was necessary to continue the existing businesses of the
companies. And so long as a company remained in bankruptcy,
management did not make the kind of risky new investments that
might, if successful, substantially increase the company's value.
3 47
The balance between senior and junior interests was drawn with an
emphasis on preservation of the existing business; that is what was
considered "prudent" in this context.
3 48
While prudent investment seems to be the principle governing
investment policy in many reorganizations, there is reason to think
it is not the best one. This policy means that during the often
extensive period of a chapter 11 proceeding 349 management is not
investing company resources in a manner that maximizes their
value. For example, the prudent investment principle may prevent
the company from making an acquisition necessary to maximize the
company's own value, or may prevent a liquidation that would in
fact maximize value. The result may be to lock the company into an
inefficient "holding pattern" because any change in investment
policy would have distributional consequences adverse to particular
classes of creditors and shareholders.
for the reorganizing company is no higher than the level considered appropriate for
the investment of trust funds. The former levels are generally much higher than the
latter. The similarity lies in the fact that management of the reorganizing company,
like the trust administrator, is expected to confine its investment policies to courses
that do not involve particularly high or particularly low risks.
317 See supra notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
348 Another analogy which may be helpful is the yellow flag used in automobile
racing to indicate that drivers should not attempt to better their position relative to
other drivers until some adverse track condition has been remedied. The bankruptcy
reorganization equivalent of an adverse track condition is the separation of risk of
loss from possibility of gain. When an adverse condition develops, the level of risk
at which the company's assets have been invested has established the relative values
of the debt and equity interests in the company. In the analogy, those relative values
are the equivalent to the relative positions of the cars. While the risk remains
separated from the gain, that is, until the confirmation of a plan, management should
not favor either creditors or shareholders by reinvesting the assets at either a higher
or lower level of risk.
M9 In our study, the average duration for cases not filed in New York City (30
cases) was 2.1 years. For cases in New York City (13 cases), the average duration was
2.8 years. See LoPucki & Whitford, Venue Choice, supra note 16, at 31 n.68.
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D. Representation
A leading practitioner has offered an innovative solution to the
problem of corporate governance during reorganization. He
proposes that management be free to adopt (1) a pro-equity stance,
(2) a pro-creditor stance, or (3) a neutral stance (which he calls
stakeholder-mediator).350 He would require that management
publicly announce the orientation they have adopted early in the
case. Each constituency not represented by management then
would be entitled to other representation. Ordinarily, the alterna-
tive would be representation by a committee whose lawyers' fees
would be paid by the estate.
351
We refer to this proposed solution to the corporate governance
problem as "representation." Its most attractive aspect is that it
enables management to know who they represent. Presumably,
management's fiduciary duties would run only to the class they
chose to represent. The representation approach would also ease
the problem of deciding when shareholders should be permitted to
replace management through voting. If management chose a pro-
shareholder stance, corporate democracy would continue. If
management chose another stance, they would no longer be the
representatives of shareholders and shareholders would no longer
be entitled to remove them by voting.
The representation proposal has serious shortcomings. By
resting on the assumption that the appropriate outcome will result
when all constituencies are represented, the proposal begs the
question. It relieves management of the obligation to make tough
decisions. But it does not determine whose interests corporate
decisionmaking should serve. Instead, it leaves the tough decisions
for the court. For example, when parties object to proposals that
constitute part of management's business plan, on what basis should
the court make its decision? Because representation does not seek
to assure that management's service of their chosen master will also
maximize the value of the company, the deference courts have
350 See Case, supra note 146, at 382-85. Case is not explicit as to the kind of
investment policy a stakeholder-mediator management should adopt. He may have
intended either that they seek to maximize the estate, see supra text accompanying
note 238, or that they pursue the prudent investment policies discussed in the
preceding section. On issues that have strictly a distributional consequence, he would
apparently require that stakeholder-mediator managements not take sides. See Case,
supra note 146, at 383.
351 See Case, supra note 146, at 384.
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customarily given to management's business judgment would no
longer be appropriate. Representation would require that the
courts become more deeply involved in the company's decision-
making process. Yet they would have to do so without guidance as
to whose interests to serve.
We have a number of other concerns with the representation
proposal. It requires a considerable strengthening of the committee
structure in chapter 11, which might significantly increase the cost
of reorganization. Though unsecured creditors' committees are
generally well-staffed, they may be no match for a management
sworn to represent shareholder interests exclusively. Equity
committees are rarely staffed sufficiently to meet this burden if
management were to adopt a pro-creditor stance.3 52 Moreover,
the representation proposal does not indicate what management
should do in the common situation where there are conflicts of
interest among different classes of creditors. Should management
announce its loyalty to one class of creditors (e.g., secured credi-
tors), leaving others to fend for themselves through representation
by committee? If so, it would put an even greater emphasis on
strengthening the committee process.
353
E. Maximize the Estate
One possible solution to the problem of corporate governance
would be to postulate that management's objective should be to
maximize the value of the bankrupt company,354 without regard
352 That equity committees are not as well-staffed as creditors' committees is
common knowledge among lawyers who participate in the reorganizations of large,
publicly held companies. However, in our empirical study we did not systematically
collect data on the overall staffing of committees or on their professional fees. For
a comparison of the frequency with which creditors' and equity committees retained
investment bankers, see Table IX, supra note 308.
353 During the period covered by our study, the courts sometimes permitted
subordinated debt classes to form their own committee. But in most instances, the
unsecured creditors' committee represented subordinated debt classes alongwith the
senior classes. The purpose was to save on professional fees. Establishment of a
separate committee duplicates expenditures for attorneys and perhaps other
professionals as well. In a system in which management is permitted to announce its
allegiance to only one class of creditors, it is doubtful that the unsecured creditors'
committees could adequately represent the interests of subordinated debt classes.
35' The idea that management has an obligation to maximize the value of the firm
is hardly new to bankruptcy law. It is well-established that this is the duty of a
chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee. See, e.g., In re McKeever, 132 B.R. 996, 1004 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1991) ('In a Chapter 7 case, ... the primary duty of the trustee is to
maximize the estate available for distribution to creditors."). Such language appears
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to how this might affect the relative distributions to creditors and
shareholders. Management would decide between alternative
courses of action by deciding which yielded expected returns with
the higher market value. If the question were whether to close the
business and sell the assets or borrow against the assets and reopen,
management should resolve it by comparing the anticipated return
from liquidation with a weighted average of its estimates of the
different possible returns from reopening, discounted for risk. 55
Similarly, management's only legitimate interest in the post-
confirmation financial structure of the firm would be to assure that
it did not render the firm less valuable than some other financial
structure.356  The purely distributional issues dealt with in the
reorganization plan would be most appropriately negotiated among
the creditors and shareholders. 57  Absent agreement, manage-
ment would propose a distribution only to enable the case to go
forward. The distribution they proposed would normally have to be
in accord with the absolute priority rule.
58
The maximization principle has a number of shortcomings. The
possibility that it will operate to the exclusion of other societal
values was noted earlier.8 59  Even if maximization were a com-
in chapter 11 cases, although much less often. See, e.g., Wabash Valley Power Ass'n
v. Rural Electrification Admin., 903 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1990) ("A debtor [in
possession] in bankruptcy is supposed to maximize the value of the estate . . .).
355 To illustrate, assume that management had the option to sell the assets of the
estate for $100 million or to borrow $100 million against those assets and reopen the
business. There is a 50% chance that the reopening will be a success and the business
will be worth an amount that has a present value of $240 million; there is a 50%
chance that the business will fail and be worth nothing. Assume also that the market
would discount these expectancies from the reopening option by an additional 10%
because of their high-risk nature, but would not further discount the expectancy from
liquidation because it is certain. Seesupra note 289. Management would be expected
to maximize the estate by reopening the business, because the value of reopening is
higher. It is $120 million (50% of $240 million), less a $12 million risk discount, or
$108 million, as compared to an expected return of $100 million from liquidation.
356 By "financial structure" we mean the amounts and types of securities that the
firm will issue. A reorganizing company might issue only stock (often preferred by
the former shareholders) or it might issue various combinations of stock and debt
(often preferred by the former creditors).
357 This would put management in a similar position to a management that had
chosen a stakeholder-mediator role under the representation proposal. Seesupra note
350 and accompanying text.
358 Absent acceptance by adversely affected classes, only such a plan could be
crammed down over objection. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (1988). Thus in many
cases, only such a plan could complete the reorganization without the agreement of
the disputing classes.
359 See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
1993]
782 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 141:669
pletely worthy objective, it would often be of limited use as a
standard against which to measure management's performance and
thereby control the exercise of their discretion. For example, if
management must choose between immediate liquidation or
continuation of the business, placing a value on either option may
involve a good deal of guesswork.360 A management secretly
allied with one interest or another could bias valuation judgments
in their favor with little fear that their bias could be proven.
The most obvious difficulty with the maximization principle,
however, is that it requires management to take whatever level of
risk will maximize the value of the estate. When management
chooses between investments with different levels of risk, its choice
has distributional effects.3 61 The choices will not only alter the
ultimate distributions made at confirmation-they will have an
immediate differential effect on the current trading values of claims
and interests having different priorities.36 2 The magnitude of
those distributional effects can far exceed the increase in the value
of the estate achieved by maximizing. As a result, a management
faithful to maximization could be obliged to significantly alter the
value of the prospective distributions to the various classes in order
to achieve what even management perceive to be a tiny increase in
the total expectancy value of the firm.
To illustrate, assume that reopening a chain of restaurants
would require an all-or-nothing risk of the company's entire $100
million value, that exactly that amount is owing to creditors,
63
.60 This should be evident with respect to the value of continuing in business.
This is the kind of value estimation that was once described by a leading practitioner-
scholar as a "guess compounded by an estimate." Peter F. Coogan, Confirmation of
a Plan Under the Bankruptcy Code, 32 CAsE W. REs. L. REV. 301, 313 n.62 (1982)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 281, at 222, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 6181). To a lesser degree, it is true with respect to the prospective value of the
company in liquidation. Only by going through the extensive and sometimes risky
process of soliciting potential buyers and negotiating a sale can management
accurately determine the price for which the company can be sold. Among the risks
in soliciting buyers (sometimes referred to as "putting the company in play") is the
possibility of damaging ongoing relations with labor, customers, and suppliers,
thereby perhaps reducing the company's value as a going concern. Rather than take
those risks, in making decisions about whether to liquidate, management may prefer
to guess at the price a liquidating sale would yield.
361 Warren has made a similar point in another context. She argued that a policy
of paying interest to secured creditors, which may bejustified on wealth maximization
principles, is not distributionally neutral. See Warren, supra note 264, at 800-03.
362 There is now a developed market for claims and interests of large companies
in chapter 11. See generally Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 109, at 2-3 (detailing recent
developments in the trading of such claims).
363 That is, the company borders on solvency. Our illustration borrows on the
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and that management's assessment of the expectancies from
reopening or liquidating the restaurants is as follows:
TABLE X
VALUE OF EXPECTANCIES FOR FIRM
Level Total Value of expectancies Market
of risk return before risk discount value3
64
Liquidate 0% $100 million $100 million $100million
Reopen 50% $240 million $120 million
3 6 5  $105
or $0 million
The maximization principle would require that management
pursue this $5 million increase in the market value of the firm
instead of liquidating. Yet, as Table XI shows, the decision to
reopen would diminish the value of the creditors' expectancy to less
than half of what it would have been in liquidation:
TABLE XI
VALUE OF EXPECTANCIES FOR CREDITORS
Value of creditors' Market value
Level Creditors' expectancy before of creditors'
of risk return risk discount expectancy
Liquidate 0% $100 million $100 million $100 million
Reopen 50% $100 million or $50 million $43.75 million
3 6 6
$0
Management's decision to reopen would have the opposite effect on
the value of the shareholders' expectancy. In relation to what each
facts of one of the cases in our study, Sambo's Restaurants. In that case, the
investment in reopening and redecorating restaurants was approved by creditors
because the company was deeply insolvent and the benefit of any increase in value
would have gone to the creditors. The reopenings were a spectacular failure,
however, and as a consequence of the decision to reopen, creditors' losses mounted
significantly.
36' In this and subsequent tables, we have assumed no risk discount for the
expectancy arising from the liquidation option and a risk discount of 12.5% for the
expectancies arising from the reopening options. See supra note 355. These
assumptions are arbitrary and are not based on actual market discount rates or
estimates thereof.
365 This number is simply a weighted average of the possible results indicated in
the previous column. Since each outcome has a 50% probability, the expectancy is
the average of the two.
366 We have assumed a risk discount rate of 12.5%. See supra note 364.
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would receive in liquidation, the shareholders would gain even more
($61.25 million) than the creditors' would lose ($56.25 million).
TABLE XII




Level Shareholders' before risk shareholders'
of risk return discount expectancy
Liquidate 0% $0 $0 $0
Reopen 50% $140 million 67  $70 million $61.25 million
or $0
In the example we have presented, the distributional effects are
particularly large due to our extreme assumptions. Management's
choice is between a risk free liquidation or an all-or-nothing gamble
on reopening. Because the company is assumed to border on
solvency, the separation of the risk of loss from the possibility of
gain is complete. Even so, the example may not be far-fetched.
3 68
In cases where a prospective purchaser has an offer on the table,
liquidation usually is a low-risk proposition. In contrast, continua-
tion of a financially distressed business usually involves much more
risk. Failure of a barely solvent company is unlikely to render its
remaining assets worthless, but it could easily wipe out the entire
entitlement of ajunior class under the absolute priority rule. Thus,
367 This figure assumes that the reopening was successful and that the restaurant
chain became worth $240 million. If a reorganization plan was then confirmed and
securities having this value were distributed, the first $100 million in securities would
be distributed to creditors under the absolute priority rule, leaving securities worth
$140 million for shareholders.
368 Several of the companies studied bordered on solvency during the reorganiza-
tion case and a few engaged in investment policies that risked virtually the entire
company. Continental Airlines serves as the best example of this phenomenon in our
study. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
Warren was the first to direct our attention to what may be the purest real life
manifestation of the problem we address. In In re Central Ice Cream Co., 59 B.R.
476 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 62 B.R. 357 (N.D. Ill. 1986), the debtor's sole asset was
a verdict against McDonald's for $52 million. Before McDonald's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict was decided, McDonald's offered $15.5 million
in settlement. That amount was sufficient to pay creditors in full, but left the estate
with only $1 million to $3 million, the bulk of which probably would have been
applied to expenses of administration. The bankruptcy court approved the settlement
over the objection of shareholders.
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continuation of the business can easily be an all-or-nothing risk for
a particular class.3
69
The existence of potentially huge distributional effects from the
investment policies pursued by management casts doubt on
management's ability to remain unbiased while determining what
course of action will maximize the estate. We have already
demonstrated that a management overseeing a reorganization
operates in an environment rife with conflict070 and responds to
that environment. 71 When the distributional effects of a decision
will be large, creditors and shareholders can be expected to attempt
to influence the process. The possibility that their leverages will
balance one another, thereby leaving management free to maximize,
is wishful thinking.
72
169 Of course, the distributional effects of a decision to maximize can run either
in favor of senior claims or against them. This can be illustrated by changing the
facts of the hypothetical to make liquidation, rather than reopening, the maximizing
solution. Assume, for example, that the total market value of the liquidation would
be $110 million, while the total market value of reopeningwould still be $105 million.
This changed assumption would not change the value of the creditors'
expectancies from either reopening or liquidating. Whether the company were
liquidated or reopened, creditors could recover no more than the $100 million owed
to them, while they would still have a 50% chance of losing their money in reopening
and no chance of losing it in liquidation.
For shareholders, the value of the reopening option would remain the same; they
would continue to have a 50% chance of recovering $140 million on reopening. But
the value of the liquidation option would increase to $10 million, since if liquidation
yielded $110 million, creditors would be entitled to $100 million and shareholders
would be entitled to the remainder.
Because a maximizing management would choose to liquidate under these new
assumptions, the shareholders' expected recovery would fall from $61.25 million in
the previous example to $10 million, and the creditors' expected recovery would
increase by an amount even greater than the reduction to shareholders. The
increased benefit to the firm from liquidating rather than reopening would be only
$5 million, but this change in the business plan would shift more than $50 million in
expectancies from shareholders to creditors. Again, the distributional impact of the
decision to maximize greatly exceeds the total benefit to the estate.
370 See supra Part II.
371 See supra Part III.
372 A rule requiring managers to maximize the chapter 11 estate could compel
managers to undertake actions that could not or would not be undertaken outside of
bankruptcy. Outside bankruptcy, the separation of risk of loss from the prospect of
gain is likely to influence management behavior, and may prevent a management
from adopting a maximizing course of action because of its likely distributional
effects. Baird and Jackson have frequently argued that it is improper to use
bankruptcy to alter pre-bankruptcy distributional entitlements because it provides
incentives to "forum shop"; that is, to choose between the distributional effects of the
bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy regimes. See, e.g.,JACKSON, supra note 272, at 20-67;
Baird, supra note 264, at 824-28.
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If managements were able to overcome these influences and
maximize the estates, the terms on which general unsecured credit
is advanced to corporations may be less favorable than today, as
creditors take account of the possibility of increased losses from
bold investments during a subsequent reorganization.3 7 3  If this
were to happen, the cost of raising capital through equity issues
should decrease, as purchasers of equity anticipate benefits from
risky undertakings in bankruptcy. If maximization of firm value in
fact reduces deadweight losses, the net tendency should be to
reduce the cost of capital.374
We live in a second best world in which the cost of capital may
currently be either higher or lower than what is optimal. If it is
lower than optimal, then further reduction would not be desir-
able.3 75 Nevertheless, until concrete evidence to the contrary is
We do not criticize the proposed maximization rule on this basis because we are
unconvinced that forum shopping, as Baird and Jackson define the term, is a bad
thing. If chapter 11 can resolve the financial difficulties of a reorganizing company
in a way that yields more societal wealth than resolutions that would be reached
outside bankruptcy, then the choice to file bankruptcy seems to us a good thing, and
encouragement of it is no vice. For an analogous argument in a different context, see
LoPucki & Whitford, Venue Choice, supra note 16, at 40-41.
373 The principle of prudent investment includes a tendency for management to
resist quick liquidation of existing assets. This practice tends to harm creditors and
would be lessened under an enforceable rule that required management to maximize
within chapter 11. It is possible, therefore, that creditors as a group would be better
off under a maximization rule than under a prudent investment practice. If so, the
adverse effects on the terms of credit that are discussed in the text would presumably
not occur.
374 An additional problem would exist in applying the maximization principle to
companies that incurred their chapter 11 debt before the principle was adopted. The
creditors of those companies probably did not lend on the assumption that the
principle would be applied. The principle of prudent investment provides a better
description of the current practice. See supra notes 346-48 and accompanying text.
Sophisticated parties probably would have assumed its continuance. With regard to
loans already made, the sudden introduction of the principle of maximization would
defeat the expectations of the parties and create an unfair result.
This is, however, merely a transitional problem. Once management's duty to
maximize the estate in bankruptcy has been established, creditors presumably will
take the principle into account when setting terms of credit. Of course, in a world
of perfect markets and perfect foresight, it would be no problem at all. Because
lenders would have perfect information, they would have anticipated both the
introduction of the maximization principle and the time at which it would occur, and
fixed the price of credit accordingly. See LoPucki, Strange Visions, supra note 269, at
98-106.
375 See generally R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best,
24 REv. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956) (describing the General Theory of Second Best);
Richard S. Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis in our Worse-
Than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Related Critique of the Chicago Approach to the
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produced, we suggest that attempting to maximize the value of
chapter 11 estates offers the best possibility for minimizing
deadweight losses.
F. Our Normative Solutions
The root of the problem of governing the reorganizing company
lies in the separation of the possibility of future gain from the risk
of future loss. Although we have stressed the situation of the
insolvent company in our analysis, the same problem exists in the
marginally solvent company. There too, creditors bear most of the
risk of future loss and reap disproportionately little of the benefit
from future gain. In both situations, management's undivided
loyalty to the interests of either shareholders or some or all
creditors will lead to decisions that are too risk prone or too risk
averse, as measured by the wealth maximization ideals that normally
are so weighty when formulating legal rules to govern large
commercial transactions.
1. Shorten the Proceedings
One of the basic purposes of reorganization is to reunify the
possibility of gain with the risk of loss. In the large, publicly held
company, this is usually accomplished by confirmation of a plan of
reorganization that converts enough of the company's debt to equity
to render the company comfortably solvent.3 76 The new equity
holders then have both the possibility of gain and the risk of loss.
The sooner that occurs in reorganization cases, the smaller is the
potential that distorted incentives will result in bad investment
decisions. It follows that bankruptcy courts should expedite chapter
Study of Law and Economics, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 950,967-76 (describing the Theory and
using it as a tool for measuring a policy's effectiveness).
To illustrate the point made in the text, the cost of capital might be lower than
optimal because consumers cannot deduct many of their interest expenditures on
their federal income tax. Consequently, consumers maybid less for investor's dollars
than businesses, even when the utility of additional investment to both is the same.
376 Roe has expressed concern that the dynamics of chapter 11 cause some
publicly held corporations to emerge from bankruptcy with too much debt. See Mark
J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 CoLUM. L.
REV. 527, 536-47 (1983). If this happens, it is a serious concern, since it suggests that
the same corporate governance imponderables that are the subject of this Article
remain with the company even after confirmation. In a forthcoming article, we
present some evidence that Roe's fears are being realized. See LoPucki & Whitford,
Patterns, supra note 16.
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11 proceedings as much as possible. There are many reasons to
avoid unnecessary delay,3 77 but a principal one is that delay
prolongs the time during which the risk of loss is separated from
the possibility of gain.
3 78
Earlier termination of management's exclusive right to file a
plan may be one means for expediting chapter 11 cases. Whether
earlier termination will expedite a particular case will depend on the
circumstances. There is a danger that when exclusivity is
terminated holders of relatively small interests in a company will
prosecute their own plans and divert the attention of other parties
from serious negotiations. But in some cases, management itself is
the principal barrier to quick reorganization. Once exclusivity has
been lifted, the pressure to strike a bargain may become
overwhelming.3 79 When this situation exists, bankruptcy judges
should consider quick termination of exclusivity.
3 80
2. Risk Compensation Payments
The advantages of maximization as the governing principle for
the reorganizing company were previously discussed. In that
discussion, we noted unfortunate distributional effects that can
create incentives for classes of claims or interests to oppose
377 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble With Chapter 11, 1993 WIS. L. REV.
(forthcomingJune 1993) (listing increases in professional fees, wealth shifting from
inconsistent rules regarding interest, and the poor performance of reorganizing
companies as additional problems caused by delay).
3?8 We earlier questioned the practicality of a proposal to require a sale of all
assets sufficiently early in the proceedings to avoid corporate governance problems.
See supra notes 276-308 and accompanying text. We are reluctant to endorse a
requirement that a sale of all the assets be a part of every reorganization proceeding,
but where a sale of assets can be accomplished more quickly than reorganization and
without seriously diminishing the value available for distribution in the reorganization
case, it should be encouraged. Such a sale reunifies the prospect of gain with the risk
of loss.
-71 In the Texaco bankruptcy, the mere suggestion by the bankruptcyjudge that
he might terminate exclusivity is widely credited with bringing that case to a more
rapid conclusion than otherwise would have been possible. See Harvey R. Miller,
Texaco Inc.-An Unexpected DebtorMaking Appropriate Use of the Bankruptcy Code, in 62D
ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BANKRUPTCY JUDGES 5, 13-15
(1988); Mnookin & Wilson, supra note 265, at 307-09.
380 One difficulty with this proposal is that some bankruptcy judges want to attract
the filing of large chapter 11 cases to their districts. A reputation of terminating
exclusivity can deter managers, who generally determine the venue of chapter 11
cases, from selecting that district. We recognize this problem and advocate stricter
controls on the discretion of bankruptcy judges to extend exclusivity in LoPucki &
Whitford, Venue Choice, supra note 16, at 48.
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management's efforts to maximize the value of the company. In this
section, we propose a scheme of mandatory risk compensation
payments that would reduce those distributional effects and thereby
reduce the pressures on management to pursue sub-optimal
business plans.
3 81
Initially, we note that like so many difficult problems of
commercial law, the problem of implementing a rule requiring
wealth maximization exists only because of transaction costs.
Professor Coase has demonstrated that absent transaction costs,
parties who seek only their own economic benefit will agree to a
maximizing application of resources no matter how the underlying
rules distribute legal entitlements in the first instance. 8 2 To
illustrate the application of the Coase Theorem in the current
context, suppose there was an enforceable corporate governance
rule that management was to remain loyal to the residual owner as
defined by the collapsed residual ownership theory. Further
suppose that the company was barely insolvent, making creditors the
residual owners, but that the maximizing course was to reopen the
restaurant. Absent transaction costs and the attendant collective
action problems, the shareholders could be expected to offer a
payment to the residual owners that would make it in the latter's
interest to agree to the reopenings. This is because the
shareholders have more to gain from acceptance of the corporate
opportunity than creditors have to lose. On the facts of the
restaurant reopening hypothetical discussed above,38 3 sharehold-
ers could offer creditors almost all the value of their expectancy if
the decision were made to reopen ($61.25 million in the hypotheti-
cal) and still be better off than they would be if the corporate
opportunity were passed up.
The same possibility of cooperation exists if we assume that the
law required management to follow the prudent investment
principle and management decided to reopen the restaurants as the
381 Jackson recognized the need for compensation of this general sort, though he
did not think that a device for implementing it could be devised. SeeJACKSON, supra
note 274, at 216 ("No ... device, however, exists (or can be readily devised) to
require shareholders to compensate unsecured creditors for the costs of delay.").
Jackson's concern was limited to the possibility that shareholders would be successful
in delaying a liquidation that was in the interests of the creditors. See id. He did not
consider that creditors are often able to block new investments that would be in the
interests of the firm as a whole.
382 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & EcON. 1, 42-44 (1960).
383 See supra notes 363-67 and accompanying text.
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only way to preserve the business. In the absence of transaction
costs, if liquidation were the maximizing course and if the parties
were free to agree to it, a deal would be made. Creditors would
have more to gain from liquidation than shareholders would have
to lose; creditors would be in a position to make shareholders an
offer that would leave both groups better off in liquidation.
3 84
These Coasian deals are sometimes made in reorganization
cases. For example, it is not unusual for the representatives of
shareholders to consent to a liquidating plan if the plan provides a
sufficient payment to shareholders.38 5 If such deals were made
sufficiently early in every reorganization case, the effect would be to
implement the maximization principle. But from our observations
of these forty-three cases, it appears that as a practical matter such
deals are made only as part of a plan of reorganization that resolves
the entire case38 6 and only after a delay that averages about two
years.3
8 7
384 A hypothetical presenting this situation is discussed supra note 369. In that
example, creditors would gain $56.25 million from the decision to liquidate ($100
million) rather than reopening ($43.75 million). See supra Table XI accompanying
note 366. Shareholders would lose $51.25 million from the same decision, since they
will be paid $10 million from liquidation proceeds (assuming the total proceeds of
liquidation were $110 million) instead of the value of reopening ($61.25 million). See
supra Table XII accompanying note 367. Creditors could then offer to give
shareholders $51.25 million of the proceeds received by the creditors from the
liquidation option. Creditors would still be better off in the amount of $5 million,
whereas shareholders would now be indifferent as to the two options.
385 In the Lionel case, shareholders fought vehemently against efforts by creditors
and management to sell the company's most valuable asset, Dale Electronics. See In
re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 1066 (2d Cir. 1983). Their stated reason was that the
proposed sale prices were inadequate. But when auction sale of Dale was made part
of a plan that also provided a generous distribution to shareholders, the equity
committee consented to the plan.
386 An agreement by which certain classes consent to a particular course of action
by management, in return for a payment prior to confirmation, presumably would
require court approval as a compromise or settlement. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019.
The parties might find it difficult to obtain the approval. The court could conclude
that there was no reason for the payment because management was already bound
to follow whatever course was in the best interests of the estate.
The same agreement probably could be approved as part of a plan of reorganiza-
tion. First, as part of the plan it will be mixed in with the settlement of other issues
between or among the classes, and therefore will not receive direct scrutiny. Second,
because the agreement has been accepted pursuant to the formalities of the plan
process, the court will not feel as much obligation to question it. Third, confirmation
of the plan marks the end of the reorganization case. The bargain the court is being
asked to approve goes to management conduct after, not during, reorganization.
387 Once the parties had agreed on the terms of a consensual plan, it was generally
only a few months before the company was able to emerge from bankruptcy. The
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The risk compensation payments we propose are a surrogate for
the payments that would be made pursuant to the Coasian deals
described above. We think the law should explicitly require that
reorganization management maximize the value of the estate.
Classes whose distributional expectations are diminished by that
investment policy should be entitled to a compensating payment
from classes whose expectations are augmented. The baseline
entitlements from which the distributional shift would be measured
are the amounts the affected classes could expect to recover if
management followed the prudent investment principle. We regard
that principle as establishing generally what the parties would
receive under current practice.3
88
No money would change hands at the time of the "payment."
The court would simply order that an appropriate portion of the
claims or interests of the class benefiting from the attempt to
maximize have become the property of the class adversely affected
by it. The effect would be to achieve the efficiency gains that flow
from maximizing conduct by management while preserving the
distributional effects of the prudent investment principle.
To understand how this compensation system would work,
consider the example of a chain of restaurants with the financial
structure shown on the right side of Figure III. Investors in the
company occupy four levels of priority. The company owes secured
creditors $200 million secured by all of the company's assets. It
owes senior unsecured creditors $100 million and junior unsecured
average time from the filing of the case to the confirmation of the plan in the cases
we studied was 2.3 years. See LoPucki & Whitford, Venue Choice, supra note 16, at 31-
32.
38 Who "gains" or "loses" from a particular course of action depends on the
baseline from which the change is measured. We have selected the prudent
investment principle as the baseline for two reasons. First, because it is currently the
customary practice, it is likely to be the practice anticipated by debtors and creditors
in the bargains that resulted in their extensions of credit. The entitlements it
recognizes will come as no surprise. No transitional adjustment will be necessary.
Second, using the prudent investment principle as a baseline will make risk
compensation payments easier to administer than other possible baselines. Basically,
this principle calls on management to continue the company's operations, without
liquidating assets, if possible, and without expanding. Consequently, it would be easy
to detect deviations from this principle, which would trigger the question whether to
make risk compensation payments.
It may seem curious to adopt as a baseline entitlement a distribution that would
be received if management adopted an investment policy contrary to the socially
desired maximization principle. We have argued, however, that simply directing
management to follow a maximization policy without risk compensation payments is
likely to be futile. See supra note 372 and accompanying text.
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creditors $300 million, with shareholders having the right to values
in excess of those amounts. Assume that if the management of this
company pursued a prudent investment strategy, perhaps by
reopening under the old format, the possible range of values the
company might have by the time a plan is confirmed would be those
indicated as "Range P." The expectancies to each of the various
parties from each of the possible outcomes within range P, each
weighted for the likelihood of its occurrence, would be the baseline
entitlements of the parties from which their "gains" and "losses"
from the actual investment policy would be calculated.
Assume further that the value of this estate would be maximized
by reformatting the restaurants before reopening them, a course of
action that would result in the range of possible values indicated in
Figure III as "Range 1." That is, if the strategy is highly successful,
the value of the company may be in excess of $800 million; if it fails
completely, the value could be less than $200 million. The
proposed reformatting will risk the senior unsecured creditors'
entire expectancy and a portion of the secured creditors'
expectancy. 38 9  Even under current law, the secured creditors
arguably are entitled to adequate protection against the loss of their
expectancy.39 0 Under our proposal, the senior unsecured credi-
tors would also be entitled to protection as well, though the
protection would be of a different sort. Their protection would be
in the form of risk compensation payments made by the beneficiary
of the risk-taking. On the facts shown, the primary payors would
likely be the shareholders. The court would order, as compensation
for the increased risk imposed on creditors by the reopening of the
restaurants, that an appropriate percentage of the interests of the
current shareholders be immediately and irrevocably transferred to
389 Under a policy of prudent investment, the value of the company could not fall
below $300 million. Neither senior unsecured creditors nor secured creditors would
bear any risk. But under the maximizing strategy of reopening in the new format,
both would bear risk.
390 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(d) (1988); see, e.g., Bamerical Mortgage & Fin. Co.
v. Paradise Boat Leasing Corp. (In re Paradise Boat Leasing Corp.), 5 B.R. 822, 825
(D.V.I 1980) (secured creditor entitled to protection against risk that debtor's sole
asset, a yacht, would be lost at sea).
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specified classes of creditors. 391  In their additional status as
shareholders, the creditor recipients would share in the upside
potential of the restaurant reopenings.
Absent compensation to creditors for the additional risks that
the maximizing business strategy would impose on them, it would
be in the creditors' interest to defeat that strategy. If management
could implement the maximizing strategy only if they compensated
the creditors, however, the creditors would have little or no
incentive to oppose it. Necessarily, the amount of a risk compensa-
tion payment, like the amount of an adequate protection payment
to a secured creditor, would be only a rough estimate of the amount
that would compensate a senior interest for the extra risk assumed.
Measurement of such amounts can never be exact. It would defeat
the purpose of risk compensation payments to delay an investment
decision for an extensive period while the parties litigated about the
size of the corresponding risk compensation payment.3 92 Further,
it is better to have payments that are only a rough approximation of
the appropriate amounts than to adhere to the current system of
noncompensation that sometimes encourages creditors to block
management's strategies for maximizing the estate.
Management or any other party in interest should be permitted
to ask the court to order a risk compensation payment.93
391 Because the transfer is irrevocable, the creditor recipients will receive more
than full payment if the restaurant reopenings prove successful. Thus risk
compensation payments will alter what the parties would receive today if management
maximized the estate and the absolute priority rule was then applied to the value of
whatever the corporation possessed at confirmation. Risk compensation payments
differ in this respect from the adequate protection payments received by secured
creditors. Adequate protection payments ordinarily are credited against the amount
owing and hence reduce what the secured creditors receive at confirmation.
392 It would be possible for a court to direct management to make the maximizing
investment while reserving decision on the size of the risk compensation payment.
Then litigation about the latter question could take place without delaying actual
investments. Such a procedure, however, invites the parties to try to stall the
litigation about the size of risk compensation payments, so that the actual results of
the investment decision could influence the court to set the amount of the risk
compensation payments favorably to them. In the usual case, we suspect it would be
better for the court to make a quick, though necessarily rough, estimate of the proper
risk compensation payment. If a system of risk compensation payments is adopted,
we anticipate that courts will experiment with such details.
393 Arguably, 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988) provides sufficient authority for the courts
to order risk compensation payments. And 11 U.S.C. § 363 is an existing vehicle by
which parties in interest could raise the issue of risk compensation if management
failed to do so. However, because risk compensation payments would be novel, we
think it would be preferable for Congress to provide a statutory framework for them.
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Management might choose to be the moving party when it wished
to make the maximizing investment and wanted to free itself from
the intense opposition it could expect because of the distributional
effects of its proposed actions. We anticipate that under a regime
of risk compensation payments, there would be a good deal of
bargaining between management and interested parties both about
what investment actions management should undertake and what
risk compensation payments should accompany those actions. If a
consensus resulted from that bargaining, presumably it would then
be presented to the courtfby management for approval.
The logic of our argument implies that if management's pursuit
of maximization relieved any class of the risks they would have
borne under prudent investment, that class should compensate
those whose interests were thereby sacrificed. For example, assume
that management concluded that liquidation of the company
depicted in Figure III would maximize the estate and that the range
of possible liquidation values was the narrow one indicated as
"Range 2." By eliminating the possibility that the estate would ever
return to solvency, 94 the decision to liquidate would render the
shareholders' expectancy worthless at the same time that it reduced
the risk to the junior unsecured creditors. Therefore, it would be
appropriate for the junior unsecured creditors to make a risk
compensation payment to shareholders. Such payments would
eliminate or minimize shareholder incentives to resist liquidating
transactions that in fact maximize the value of the estate.
Though we think the argument is theoretically sound, we
consider the case for requiring risk compensation payments to
junior classes less compelling. We have two concerns. First, in the
cases studied we observed what we considered to be a surprising
amount of liquidation. 395 In our second best world there may
already be an appropriate or even an excessive amount of liquida-
tion. 396  Second, deviations from the absolute priority rule in
394 That is, by changing the maximum possible value of the estate from about 660
(the high end of Range P) to about 560 (the high end of Range 2).
395 See supra Table VIII accompanying note 290. We report additional
information about the typicality of reducing asset size in chapter 11 in LoPucki &
Whitford, Patterns, supra note 16, at 10-12.
396 Even if there is more than an optimal amount of liquidation occurring in
reorganization cases generally, it might nevertheless be advisable to require a risk
compensation payment to encourage liquidation in a particular case. In deciding
whether to order risk compensation payments, the courts should make distinctions
among cases.
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favor of junior classes are already common.3 97 We are concerned
that risk compensation payments to junior classes may to some
degree double compensate them.
We have proposed risk compensation payments as a response to
what we and others believe to be a serious problem of non-maximiz-
ing business decisions by corporate management in chapter 11
reorganizations. The practicality of risk compensation payments
cannot be fully ascertained until the idea is tested. Our proposal
has the advantage, however, of falling within the general framework
of existing chapter 11. It does not require abandonment of the
longstanding idea that sometimes it is in the interests of the
bankruptcy estate to preserve the going concern value of assets by
reorganizing rather than liquidating the company.
CONCLUSION
There are many similarities between the problems of corporate
governance in reorganization proceedings today and those of the
1930s. As under current law, the managements of the 1930s
remained in office and directed the reorganization. The basic
findings of the Douglas Report were that in the 1930s managements
possessed a great deal of power and often exercised it in self-serving
ways. Management seems to have considerable power under the
current Bankruptcy Code as well, because of the debtor-in-posses-
sion concept, the infrequency of appointment of trustees, the
automatic stay, and the right of exclusivity. At least in some
instances, managers in fact have such power and are able to use it
in self-serving ways.
39 8
But we found much reason to doubt the currently fashionable
view399 that chapter 11 leaves tainted managers with virtually
unbridled power. The strongest reason for doubt is the fragile
tenure of CEOs in the cases studied.400 Nearly all of the CEOs
tainted by the firm's failure were out of office by the time a plan
was confirmed. Even their successors suffered a high rate of
attrition. Many of these CEO changes took place while the company
397 See supra note 61.
398 See supra notes 229-35 and accompanying text.
399 For example, Bradley and Rosenzweig describe management as being "able to
remain in control of a firm's assets without answering to the firm's residual claimants"
and therefore being themselves the ultimate residual claimant. See Bradley &
Rosenzweig, Untenable Case, supra note 10, at 1079 n.85.
400 See supra notes 190-224 and accompanying text, table, and figures.
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was in chapter 11. If management has extensive ability to determine
the outcome of reorganization proceedings, we would expect that
they would also have the ability to retain their own jobs.
We conclude instead that the power equation in the reorganiza-
tion of large, publicly held companies is far more complex than is
reflected in current scholarship. We hope this Article will lay to
rest two false but common assumptions that have plagued the
economic modeling of bankruptcy reorganization. The first is that
management represents the interests of shareholders in these
proceedings. 40 1 The data show that direct alignment of manage-
ment with shareholder interests in insolvent, reorganizing compa-
nies is relatively rare. Equally false, however, is the second
assumption sometimes made that once a company becomes
insolvent, management thereafter represents creditor interests.
40 2
We observed a diversity of management behaviors. No simple
proposition can capture the complexity of the system by which these
companies are governed.
The reason for this diversity of management orientations in
chapter 11 is the complex, multifaceted nature of the process by
which reorganizing companies are governed. Managements may be
vulnerable to removal by vote of the company's shareholders or by
appointment of a trustee upon application of its creditors. Their
need for cash to maintain operations may drive them under the
hegemony of creditors who are in a position to impose cash
demands on the company or make additional cash available.
Creditors, shareholders, or other stakeholders may be able to defeat
management's initiatives through legal objection, they may be able
to exert pressure on management through vexatious litigation, or
they may assert that management is their fiduciary. Management's
loyalties might be controlled through employment contract
incentives, their desire to maintain or reclaim their reputations, or
their desire to avoid liability or incarceration. Almost any of these
incentives might incline management to exercise their authority in
different ways on behalf of different interests in different cases.
40 3
Another layer of complexity is added by the fact that nearly every
aspect of the corporate governance process is potentially under the
supervision of the bankruptcy judge to whom the case is assigned.
But this potential power goes unused in many, if not most, cases.
401 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
402 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
403 See supra notes 92-172 and accompanying text.
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That is, judges differ widely in the degree to which they will impose
themselves into the affairs of the reorganizing company, particularly
with regard to its business plan.
In reporting this diversity of management behaviors, we do not
mean to imply that management orientation results from random
processes about which no generalizations can be drawn. First, based
on findings that the managements of solvent 0 4 companies never
aligned with creditors and that the managements of insolvent
companies often did so,40 5 we conclude that management
orientation is to some degree a function of solvency.
40 6
Second, with respect to the conduct of the business during
reorganization, we conclude that it is common practice for manage-
ments to follow a principle we call "prudence." In essence,
managers put the company in a holding pattern until the parties
reach agreement. Though there are exceptions, most managements
initially seek to preserve the company and avoid the liquidation of
major assets. In nearly all cases, they avoid risky new business
initiatives that could lead to major gains or losses. 40 7  Both
tendencies are disturbing. Because of the highly conflicted
environment of a chapter 11 proceeding, managements are
systematically avoiding actions necessary to maximize the value of
the firm.
The most difficult question is the normative one. For whose
benefit should management govern in a chapter 11 reorganization?
The problem is acute for insolvent or marginally solvent companies,
because the risk of future loss is likely to be borne by different
parties than enjoy the prospect of future gain. Underwater interests
bear little or none of the risk of additional loss, and a management
devoted to their interests will be inclined toward high risk
investment decisions. But senior creditor interests bear most or all
of the risk of loss and may benefit little from the upside potential
of a new investment policy. A management devoted to their
interests will be inappropriately risk-averse.
"' Solvency was measured at the time of confirmation.
405 The managements of insolvent companies directly aligned themselves with
shareholder interests only when there was a single shareholder who held a major
block of shares and was represented on the board of directors. See supra note 243
and accompanying text.
406 The relationship is far from perfect. We observed many cases in which the
managers of insolvent companies did not align themselves with creditor interests,
either directly or indirectly.
407 See supra notes 251-58 and accompanying text.
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We reviewed the proposal to separate the management of the
assets from the reorganization by requiring a speedy auction and
found the proposal wanting for several reasons. 408 We also
canvassed a number of proposals for clarifying the uncertain
obligations of management in a reorganization proceeding. We
found them wanting as well, primarily because they do not
adequately assure that management will maximize the value of the
company's assets, normally the most important objective in the
reorganization of large companies.
409
We conclude that the best proposal for maximizing the value of
the company's assets is the most direct: adopt a rule requiring that
management do so. In the conflicted governance environment we
describe, however, simply prescribing that management choose
wealth maximization over loyalty to any particular interest will
neither cause nor enable them to do so. The pursuit of wealth
maximization by a reorganizing debtor can have important distribu-
tional effects. When, for example, the maximizing business plan
calls for a high-risk business expansion or acquisition during
reorganization, adopting it may sharply diminish the value of the
creditors' claims. That threat of diminution gives creditors the
incentive to oppose maximization, and the process of corporate
governance will often provide them with the means. As the system
currently operates, management will find it difficult or impossible
to pursue the maximizing expansion or acquisition.
To lessen the creditors' incentives to oppose management
efforts to maximize the value of the firm, we have advanced a novel
proposal that bankruptcy courts order payments from the groups
who stand to benefit from maximization to compensate the
creditors who are required to bear the risk.4 10  These "risk
compensation payments" would consist of a transfer of an appropri-
ate portion of the interests of junior classes who stand to benefit
from the business initiative, to the senior classes who will be
disadvantaged by it. The primary purpose is to reduce the incen-
tives for senior creditor interests to resist maximizing business
expansions or acquisitions.
408 See supra notes 270-308 and accompanying text.
409 See supra notes 317-53 and accompanying text.
410 We also urge that bankruptcy courts do whatever they can to shorten chapter
11 proceedings in order to reduce as much as possible the period of time when
management incentives to maximize are compromised by their conflicted environ-
ment in bankruptcy. See supra notes 376-80 and accompanying text.
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There are obvious problems in implementing the risk compensa-
tion concept, but we think it is a worthwhile improvement. In the
absence of this reform, we anticipate that most managements will
continue the current practice of avoiding both early liquidation and
high risk business expansions or acquisitions while in
reorganization. In following what we have called the principle of
prudent investment, they will be insuring that the social costs of
bankruptcy remain unnecessarily high.
4 11
411 See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
